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# Golvine de Rochambeau

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**Placement Chairs:** Martin Uribe mu2166@columbia.edu, Pierre-André Chiappori pc2167@columbia.edu

**Placement Coordinator:** Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

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Development Economics, Organizational Economics, Trade

## EDUCATION

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### COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, New York

Ph.D. in Economics (2018 - Expected), MPhil in Economics (2015), MA in Economics (2013)

### ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE, Paris

MSc in Economics and Public Policy (2012), BSc in Mathematics and Physics (2011)

## JOB MARKET PAPER

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### Monitoring and Intrinsic Motivation: Evidence from Liberia's Trucking Firms

**Abstract:** Severe information asymmetries are thought to make contracting particularly difficult within (and across) firms in developing countries. Standard principal-agent theory predicts that a new monitoring technology provided at zero cost should be widely adopted and unambiguously raise workers' effort. I test this classical prediction using a field experiment with trucking companies in Liberia. The treatment offered to install GPS tracking devices on randomly selected trucks at no cost. Treatment-on-the-treated estimates reveal that the tracking devices increased monitored drivers' average speeds by 58 percent, without leading to higher accident rates or maintenance costs. Despite this, managers declined to install the devices on 35 percent of the trucks selected for treatment. Using a model of intrinsic motivation, I show that it may be optimal not to monitor workers who are intrinsically motivated to work hard. While monitoring technologies increase agents' extrinsic incentives to provide effort, they also do not allow worker to show that he or she does not need these incentives to work hard, which can crowd out effort. I provide three pieces of evidence in support of this explanation. First, Liberian trucking company managers choose to install tracking devices only on the trucks of drivers who perform less well at baseline. Second, the treatment effect on speed for monitored drivers is greater the lower the performance of the driver at baseline. Finally, I show that for drivers who performed well at baseline, the treatment has a negative effect on the relation between the manager and the driver, and on the driver's propensity to follow the rules of the business. Overall, this paper demonstrates that, while new monitoring technologies can dramatically raise some workers' productivity in settings where employment contracts are difficult to enforce, their use may lower the productivity of some workers - those who are intrinsically motivated to work hard.

## REFERENCES

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### Eric Verhoogen (sponsor)

Professor  
Columbia University  
Department of Economics and  
School of International and Public  
Affairs  
(212) 854-4428  
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### Jonas Hjort

Assistant Professor  
Columbia University  
Graduate School of Business  
(212) 854-5957  
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### Andrea Prat

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Columbia University  
Graduate School of Business and  
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(212) 854-6176  
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## WORK IN PROGRESS

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- “Ethnicity, Expected Discrimination, and Effort: Evidence from Liberian Firms”, with Jonas Hjort
- “Is Liberia Getting Globalized? Estimating Intra-national Trade Costs in Liberia”

## PUBLICATIONS

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- “Fraud Risks in Customs Bonded Warehouses in Tunisia”, with Lotfi Ayadi and Gaël Raballand, *Global Trade and Customs Journal* (2015) 10, Issue 11/12, pp. 417-425.
- “The Trucking Industry and the Price of Commodities in Liberia”, Chapter for *Liberia Development Conference Anthology: Engendering Collective Action for Advancing Liberia’s Development* (2017), Monrovia, Liberia: USAID/Liberia, Embassy of Sweden and University of Liberia: pp. 341-352.

## RESEARCH AND WORK EXPERIENCE

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<i>Visiting Student</i> , Sciences Po (Paris)	2016
<i>Senior Research Associate</i> , Innovations for Poverty Action - IPA (Liberia)	Apr-Aug 2016
<i>Research Assistant</i> for Eric Verhoogen, Columbia University	2015
<i>Short Term Consultant</i> , The World Bank (Washington D.C.)	Jul-Aug 2014
<i>Teaching Assistant</i> in Game Theory, Intermediate and Advanced Microeconomics, Columbia University (New York)	2013-18
<i>Research Intern</i> , International Monetary Fund (Gabon)	Apr-Jul 2012

## CONFERENCES, SEMINARS AND WORKSHOPS (Presentations\*)

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<i>North East Universities Development Consortium (NEUDC)*</i> , Tufts University	2017
<i>Impact Evaluation Workshop</i> , World Bank (Portugal)	2017
<i>Liberia Development Conference*</i> , Social Impact - USAID Liberia (Liberia)	2017
<i>Summer School in Development Economics*</i> , IDEAS, University of Trento and Verona & CELPE (Italy)	2015
<i>Advanced Graduate Workshop*</i> , Initiative for Poverty Dialogue (India)	2015
<i>Development Colloquium*</i> , Columbia University (New York)	2013-17
<i>Political Economy Colloquium*</i> , Columbia University (New York)	2015

## GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS

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<i>Exploratory Grant</i> , Private Enterprise Development in Low-Income Countries - PEDL	2017
<i>Development Colloquium Grant</i> , Columbia University	2017
<i>Student Research Grant</i> , Center for Development Economics and Policy, Columbia University	2016 & 2017
<i>Research Grant</i> , International Growth Center - IGC	2016
<i>Partnership PhD Mobility Program</i> , Columbia University and Sciences Po Paris	2016
<i>Dissertation Fellowship</i> , Department of Economics, Columbia University	2016 & 2017
<i>Faculty Fellowship</i> , Department of Economics, Columbia University	2012-18

## AFFILIATION & SERVICE

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<i>Fellow</i> , Center for Development Economics and Policy, Columbia University	Sep 2017- present
<i>Referee</i> , <i>Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics</i>	

## LANGUAGES

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French (Native); English (Fluent); Spanish (Fluent); Italian (Conversational); Russian (Beginner)