

HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE NECESSARY STUDIES IN FREE COUNTRIES.*

AN INAUGURAL ADDRESS DELIVERED ON THE 17TH OF FEBRUARY, 1858, ON ASSUMING THE CHAIR OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, IN COLUMBIA COLLEGE, NEW YORK.

GENTLEMEN OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES,—We are again assembled to do honor to the cause of knowledge—to that sacred cause of learning, inquiry, and of training to learn and to inquire; of truth, culture, wisdom, of humanity. Whenever men are met together to give expression to their reverence for a great cause or to do homage to noble names, it is a solemn hour, and you have assigned a part in this solemnity to me. I stand here at your behest. No one of you expects that I should laud above all other sciences those which form my particular pursuit. Every earnest scholar, every faithful student of any branch, is a catholic lover of all knowledge. I would rather endeavor, had I sufficient skill, to raise before you a triumphal arch in honor of the sciences which you have confided to my teaching, with some bas-reliefs and some entablatures, commemorating victories achieved by them in the

* The author, requested by the board of trustees to prepare a copy of his inaugural address for publication, has given the substance, and in many places his words, as originally delivered, so far as he remembered them; but some of his friends in the board having advised him not to restrict himself in the written address to the limits necessary for one that is spoken, he has availed himself of this liberty, in writing on topics so various and comprehensive as those that legitimately belong to the branches assigned to him in this institution. The extent of this paper will sufficiently indicate this.

[*Editorial note.* The address as given in this volume, follows a copy on which Dr. Lieber had made many slight changes.—G.]

field of common progress; taking heed, however, that I do not fall into the error of attempting to prove "to the Spartans that Hercules was a strong man."

Before I proceed to perform the honorable duty of this evening, I ask your leave to express on this, the first opportunity which has offered itself, my acknowledgment for the suffrages which have placed me in the chair I now occupy. You have established a professorship of political science in the most populous and most active city of our whole, wide commonwealth—a commonwealth of an intensely political character; and this chair you have unanimously given to me. I thank you for your confidence.

Sincere, however, as these acknowledgments are, warmer thanks are due to you, and not only my own, but I believe I am not trespassing when I venture to offer them in the name of this assemblage, for the enlargement of our studies. You have engrafted a higher and a wider course of studies on your ancient institution which in due time may expand into a real, a national university, a university of large foundation and of highest scope, as your means may increase and the public may support your endeavors. So be it.

We stand in need of a national university, the highest apparatus of the highest modern civilization. We stand in need of it, not only that we may appear clad with equal dignity among the sister nations of our race, but on many grounds peculiar to ourselves. A national university in our land seems to have become one of those topics on which the public mind comes almost instinctively to a conclusion, and whose reality is not unfrequently preceded by prophetic rumor. They are whispered about; their want is felt by all; it is openly pronounced by many until wisdom and firmness gather the means and resolutely provide for the general necessity. There is at present in many countries of Europe an active movement in reference to university reforms; others have institutions of such completeness as was never known before, and we, one of the four leading nations, ought not to be without our own, a university, not national, because es-

established by our national government; that could not well be, and if it were, surely would not be well; but I mean national in its spirit, in its work and effect, in its liberal appointments and its comprehensive basis. I speak fervently; I hope I speak knowingly; I speak as a scholar, as an American citizen; as a man of the nineteenth century in which the stream of knowledge and of education courses deep and wide. I have perhaps a special right to urge this subject, for I am a native of that city which is graced with the amplest and the highest university existing. I know, not only what that great institution does, but also what it has effected in times of anxious need. When Prussia was humbled, crippled, and impoverished beyond the conception of those that have never seen with their bodily eyes universal destitution and national ruin, there were men left that did not despair, like the foundation walls of a burnt house. They resolved to prepare even in those evil days, even in the presence of the victorious hosts, which spread over the land like an inundation in which the ramified system of police drew the narrow-meshed seine for large and small victims—even then to prepare for a time of resuscitation. The army, the taxes, the relation of the peasant to the landholder, the city government and the communal government—all branches of administration—were reformed, and, as a measure of the highest statesmanship, the moral and intellectual elevation of the whole nation was decided upon. Those men that reformed every branch of government resolutely invigorated the mind of the entire realm by thorough education, by an all-pervading common school system, which carries the spelling-book and the multiplication table to every hut, by high schools of a learned and of a polytechnical character, and by universities of the loftiest aim. The universities still remaining in the reduced kingdom were reformed, and a national university was planned, to concentrate the intellectual rays and to send back the intensified light over the land. It was then that men like Stein, one of the greatest statesmen Europe has produced, and the scholar-statesman, William Humboldt—his brother Alexander went to our Andes—and

Niebuhr, the bank officer and historian, and Schleiermacher, the theologian and translator of Plato, and Wolf, the enlarger of philology and editor of Homer, with Buttmann the grammarian, and Savigny, the greatest civilian of the age, and Fichte and Steffens the philosophers, these and many more less known to you, but not less active, established the national university in the largest city of Prussia for the avowed purpose of quickening and raising German nationality. All historians as well as all observing contemporaries are agreed that she performed her part well. In less than seven years that maimed kingdom rose and became on a sudden one of the leading powers in the greatest military struggle on record, calling for unheard-of national efforts, and that great system of education, which rests like an arch of long span on the two abutments, the common school and the university, served well and proved efficient in the hour of the highest national need; and, let me add, at that period when the matrons carried even their wedding rings to the mint, to exchange them for iron ones with the inscription, "Gold I gave for Iron," the halls of that noble university stood empty and silent. Students, professors, all, had gone to the rescue of their country, and Napoleon honored them by calling them in his proclamations, with assumed contempt, the school-boy soldiers. They fought, as privates and as officers, with the intelligence and pluck of veterans and the dash of patriotic youth, and when they had fought or toiled as soldiers toil, in the day, many of them sang in the nightly bivouac those songs that swell the breasts of the Germans to this hour.

We are, indeed, not prostrated like Prussia after the French conquest, but we stand no less in need of a broad national institution of learning and teaching. Our government is a federal union. We loyally adhere to it and turn our faces from centralization, however brilliant, for a time, the lustre of its focus may appear, however imposingly centred power, that saps self-government, may hide for a day the inherent weakness of military concentrated polities. But truths are truths. It is a truth that modern civilization stands in need of entire

countries; and it is a truth that every government, as indeed every institution whatever is, by its nature, exposed to the danger of gradually increased and, at last, excessive action of its vital principle. One-sidedness is a universal effect of man's state of sin. Confederacies are exposed to the danger of sejunction as unitary governments are exposed to absorbing central power—centrifugal power in the one case, centripetal power in the other. That illustrious predecessor of ours, from whom we borrowed our very name, the United States of the Netherlands, suffered long from the paralyzing poison of disjunction, and was brought to an early grave by it, after having added to the stock of humanity such worshipful names as William of Orange, and De Witt, Grotius, De Ruyter, and William the Third.¹ There is no German within my hearing that does not sadly remember that his country, too, furnishes us with bitter commentaries on this truth; and we are not exempt from the dangers common to mortals. Yet as was indicated just now, the *patria* of us moderns ought to consist in a wide land covered by a nation, and not in a city or a little colony. Mankind have outgrown the ancient city-state.

¹ Every historian knows that William of Orange, the founder of the Netherlands' republic, had much at heart to induce the cities of the new union to admit representatives of the *country*; but the "sovereign" cities would allow no representatives, unless noblemen, to the farmers and land-owners, who, nevertheless, were taking their full share in the longest and most sanguinary struggle for independence and liberty; but the following detail, probably, is not known to many. The estates of Holland and West Friesland were displeased with the public prayers for the Prince of Orange, which some high-Calvinistic ministers were gradually introducing, in the latter half of the seventeenth century, and in 1663 a decree was issued ordaining to pray first of all "for their noble high mightinesses, the estates of Holland and West Friesland, as the true sovereign, and only sovereign power after God, in this province; next, for the estates of the other provinces, their allies, and for all the deputies in the assembly of the States General, and of the Council of State."

"Separatismus," as German historians have called the tendency of the German princes to make themselves as independent of the empire as possible, until their treason against the country reached "sovereignty," has made the political history of Germany resemble the river Rhine, whose glorious water runs out in a number of shallow and muddy streamlets, having lost its imperial identity long before reaching the broad ocean.

Countries are the orchards and the broad acres where modern civilization gathers her grain and nutritious fruits. The narrow garden-beds of antiquity suffice for our widened humanity no more than the short existence of ancient states. Moderns stand in need of nations and of national longevity, for their literatures and law, their industry, liberty, and patriotism; we want countries to work and speak, write and glow for, to live and to die for. The sphere of humanity has steadily widened, and nations alone can nowadays acquire the membership of that great commonwealth of our race which extends over Europe and America. Has it ever been sufficiently impressed on our minds how slender the threads are that unite us in a mere political system of states, if we are not tied together by the far stronger cords of those feelings which arise from the consciousness of having a country to cling to and to pray for, and unimpeded land and water roads to move on?

Should we, then, not avail ourselves of so well proved a cultural means of fostering and promoting a generous nationality, as a comprehensive university is known to be? Shall we never have this noble pledge of our nationality? All Athens, the choicest city-state of antiquity, may well be said to have been one great university, where masters daily met with masters, and shall we not have even one for our whole empire, which does not extend from bay to bay like little Attica, but from sea to sea, and is destined one day to link ancient Europe to still older Asia, and thus to help completing the zone of civilization around the globe? All that has been said of countries, and nations, and a national university would retain its full force even if the threatened cleaving of this broad land should come upon us. But let me not enter on that topic of lowering political reality, however near to every citizen's heart, when I am bidden by you to discourse on political philosophy, and it is meet for me not to leave the sphere of inaugural generalities.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—This is the first time I am honored with addressing a New York audience, and even if

could wholly dismiss from my mind the words of the Greek, so impressive in their simplicity: It is difficult to speak to those with whom we have not lived—even then I could not address you without some misgiving. The topics on which I must discourse may not be attractive to some of you, and they cover so extensive a ground, that I fear my speech may resemble the enumeration of the mile-stones that mark the way, rather than the description of a piece of road through cultivated plains or over haughty alps. I, therefore, beg for your indulgence, in all the candor in which this favor can be asked for at your hands.

It is an error, as common in this country as it is great, that every branch of knowledge, if recognized as important or useful, is for that reason considered a necessary or desirable portion of the college course of studies. It is a serious error, but I do not believe that it was committed by the trustees when they established my chair.

College education ought to be substantial and liberal. All instruction given in a generous college ought to aim at storing, strengthening, refining, and awakening the head and heart. It ought to have for its object either direct information and positive transmission of knowledge, for the purpose of applying it in the walks of practical life, or in the later pursuits of truth; or it ought to give the beginnings of knowledge, and with them to infuse the longing to enter and traverse the fields which open before the student from the hill-top to which the teacher has led him; or it ought to convey to him the method and skill of study—the scholar's art to which the ancient *Vita brevis ars longa* applies as emphatically as to any other art; or its tendency ought to be the general cultivation and embellishment of the mind, and the formation of a strong and sterling character, Truth and Truthfulness being the inscription on the mansion of all these endeavors.

It is readily understood that all teaching must be within the intellectual reach of the instructed, but it is a grave mistake to suppose that nothing should be placed before the pupil's mind but what he can actually comprehend in all its

details. Life does not instruct us in this manner; the Bible does not teach us thus. There is a suggestive instruction, which, though occasional, is nevertheless indispensable. It consists in thoughts and topics of an evocative character, giving a foretaste and imparting hope. The power of stimulation is not restricted, for weal or woe, to definition. Suggestive and anticipating thoughts, wisely allowed to fall on the learner's mind, are like freighted sayings of the poet, instinctively recognized as pregnant words, although at the moment we cannot grasp their entire meaning. They fill us with affectionate suspicion. Napoleon was a master of the rhetoric of the camp, as Mackintosh calls it speaking of Elizabeth at Tilbury. His proclamations to the army are said to have had an electrifying effect on every soul in the camp, from the calculating engineer to the smallest drummer boy; yet it is observed that every one of these proclamations, intended for immediate and direct effect, contains portions that cannot have been understood by his hosts. Are we then to suppose that these were idle effusions, allowed to escape from his proud heart rather than dictated for a conscious purpose? He that held his army in his hand as the ancient Cæsars hold Victoria in their palm, always knew distinctly what he was about when his soldiers occupied his mind, and those portions which transcended the common intellect of the camp had, nevertheless, the inspiring effect of foreshadowed glory, which the cold commander wanted to produce for the next day's struggle. The same laws operate in all spheres, according to different standards, and it is thus that quickening instruction ought not to be deprived of foretokening rays.

Those branches which I teach are important, it seems, in all these respects and for every one, whatever his pursuits in practical life may be. To me have been assigned the sciences which treat of man in his social relations, of humanity in all its phases in society. Society, as I use the term here, does not only mean a certain number of living individuals bound together by the bonds of common laws, interests, sympathies, and organization, but it means these and the successive gener-

ations with which they are interlinked, which have belonged to the same portion of mankind, and whose traditions the living have received. Society is a continuity. Society is like a river. It is easy to say where the Rhine is, but can you say what it is at any given moment? While you pronounce the word Mississippi, volumes of its waters have rolled into the everlasting sea, and new volumes have rushed into the river from the northernmost lake, Itasca, and all its vying tributaries to the east and west. Yet it remains the Mississippi. While you pronounce the word America, some of your fellow-beings breathe their last, and new ones are born into your society. It remains your society. How else could I, in justice, be called upon to obey laws made by lawgivers before I was born, and who therefore could not, by any theory or construction, represent me individually? I was not in existence, and therefore could have neither rights nor obligations. But my society existed and it exists still, and those are, until repealed, the laws of my society. Society is not arbitrarily made up by men, but man is born into society; and that science which treats of men in their social relations in the past, and of that which has successively affected their society, for weal or woe, is history. Schloezer, one of the first who gave currency to the word *statistik*, of which we have formed statistics, with a somewhat narrower meaning, has well said, History is continuous Statistik; Statistik, History arrested at a given period.

The variety of interests and facts and deeds which history deals with, and the dignity which surrounds this science, for it is the dignity of humanity itself in all its aspirations and its sufferings, give to this branch of knowledge a peculiarly cultivating and enlarging character for the mind of the young.

He that made man decreed him to be a social being, that should depend upon society for the development of his purest feelings, highest thoughts, and even of his very individuality, as well as for his advancement, safety, and sustenance; and for this purpose he did not only ordain, as an elementary principle, that the dependence of the young of man, and they alone of all mammals, on the protection of the parents, should outlast

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by many years the period of lactation; and endowed him with a love and instinct of association; and did not only make the principle of mutual dependence an all-pervading one, acting with greater intensity as men advance; but he also implanted in the breast of every human being a yearning to know what has happened to those that have passed away before him, and to let those that will come after him know what has befallen him and what he may have achieved—the love of chronicling and reading chronicles. Man instinctively shows the continuity of society long before the philosopher enounces it. The very savage honors the old men that can tell of their fathers and of their fathers' fathers, and tries his hand at record in the cairn that is to tell a story to his children's children. Why do the lonely Icelanders pass their uninterrupted night of whole months in copying Norman chronicles?

As societies rise the desire to know the past as a continuous whole becomes more distinct and the uses of this knowledge become clearer; the desire becomes careful inquiry and collection; mere Asiatic reception of what is given changes into Greek criticism; the wish to inform future generations becomes skill to represent, until history, with the zeal of research, the penetration of analysis, the art and comprehension of representing, and the probity of truth, is seen as the stateliest of all the muses.

So soon as man leaves the immediate interests of the day and contemplates the past, or plans for future generations and feels a common affection with them, he rises to an ennobling elevation. There is no more nutritious pabulum to rear strong characters upon than history, and all men of action have loved it. The great Chatham habitually repaired to Plutarch in his spare half-hours—he had not many—and with his own hands he prescribed Thucydides as one of the best books for his son to read and re-read in his early youth. The biographer of Pitt tells us that while at Cambridge he was in the habit of copying long passages from Thucydides the better to impress them on his mind, as Demosthenes before him had copied the whole. Thucydides is nourishing food. When

we read one of our best historical books, when we allow a Motley to lead us through the struggle of the Netherlands, do we not feel in a frame of mind similar to that which the traveller remembers when he left the noisy streets of Rome, with the creaking wine-carts and the screaming street traffic, and enters the Vatican, where the silent, long array of lasting master-works awaits him? Even the contemplation of crime on the stage of history has its dignity, as its contemplation on the stage of Shakspeare has. The real science and art of history is the child of periods of action. No puny time has produced great historians. Historians grow in virile periods, and if a Tacitus wrote under the corrupt empire it was Rome in her manhood that yet lived in him and made him the strong historian we honor in that great name. His very despondency is great, and he wrote his history by the light which yet lingered after the setting of Roman grandeur.

There are reasons which make the study of history peculiarly important in our own day and in our own country. Not only is our age graced with a rare array of historians in Europe and in our hemisphere—I need hardly mention Niebuhr, Ranke, and Neander, and Guizot, and Sismondi, Hallam, Macaulay, and the noble Grote, and Prescott, and Bancroft—but, as it always happens when a science is pursued with renewed vigor and sharpened interest, schools have sprung up which in their one-sided eagerness have fallen into serious errors. There was a time when the greatest sagacity of the historian was believed to consist in deriving events of historic magnitude from insignificant causes or accidents, and when the lovers of progress believed that mankind must forget the past and begin entirely anew. These errors produced in turn their opposites. The so-called historical school sprung up, which seems to believe that nothing can be right but what has been, and that all that has been is therefore right, sacrificing right and justice, freedom, truth, and wisdom at the shrine of Precedent and at the altar of Fact. They forget that in truth theirs is the most revolutionary theory while they consider themselves the conservatives; for what is new to-day

will be fact to-morrow, and, according to them, will thus have established its historical right.

Another school has come into existence, spread at this time more widely than the other, and considering itself the philosophical school by way of excellence. I mean those historians who seek the highest work of history in finding out a predetermined type of social development in each state and nation and in every race, reducing men to instinctive and involuntary beings and society to nothing better than a bee-hive. They confound nature and her unchangeable types and unalterable periodicity with the progress and development as well as relapses of associated free agents. In their eyes every series of events and every succession of facts becomes a necessity and a representative of national predestination. Almost everything is considered a symbol of the mysterious current of nationality, and all of us have lately read how the palaces of a great capital were conveniently proclaimed from an imperial throne to be the self-symbolizations of a nation instinctively intent on centralized unity. It is the school peculiarly in favor with modern, brilliant, and not always unenlightened absolutism; for it strikes individuality from the list of our attributes, and individuality incommodes absolutism. It is the school which strips society of its moral and therefore responsible character, and has led with us to the doctrine of manifest destiny, as if any destiny of man could be more manifest than that of doing right, above all things, and of being man indeed. The error into which this school has relapsed is not dissimilar to that which prevailed regarding ethics with the Greeks before they had clearly separated, in their minds, the laws of nature with their unbending necessity from the moral laws, and which is portrayed with fearful earnestness in the legend of *Œdipus*.

Closely akin in historic ethics to the theory of historical necessity is the base theory of success. We are told, and unfortunately by very many that pretend to take philosophic views, that success proves justice; that the unsuccessful cause proves by the want of success its want of right. It is a con-

venient theory for the tyrant; but it is forgotten that if mere superiority of power over antagonists constitutes success, and success proves the right of the successful, the unpunished robber or the deceiver who cannot be reached by the law is justified. Conscience, says a distinguished writer in bitter irony, is a heavy clog chained to the leg of a man who wishes to stride along on the path of success. We are not told what length of time constitutes success. If there had been a *Moniteur de Rome* in the second century of our era, Christianity must have been represented as a very unsuccessful movement. Nor are we allowed to forget the strong lesson of history that no great idea, no institution of any magnitude has ever prevailed except after long struggles and repeated unsuccessful attempts.²

² Connected with this error, again, is the theory of Representative Men, which seems to be in great favor at the present time, and is carried to a remarkable degree of extravagance even by men who have otherwise acquired deserved distinction. One of the most prominent philosophers of France has gone so far as to say that the leading military genius of an age is its highest representative—a position wholly at variance with history and utterly untenable by argument. The philosopher Hegel had said nearly the same thing before him. It would be absurd to say that Hannibal was the representative of his age, yet he was pre-eminently its military genius. Those are the greatest of men that are in advance of their fellow-beings and raise them up to their own height. Whom did Charlemagne represent? The question whom and what did those men represent that have been called representative men, and at what time of their lives were they such, are questions which present themselves at once at the mention of this term. An English judge who, by his decision, has settled once for all a point of elementary importance to individual liberty, so that his opinion and his decision now form part and parcel of the very constitution of his country, is to be considered far more a representative of the spirit of the English people than Cromwell was when he divided England into military districts, and established a government which broke down the moment he breathed his last. The greater portion of those men who are called representative men have reached their historical eminence by measures consisting in a mixture of violence, compression, and, generally, of fraud; they cannot, therefore, have represented those against whom the violence was used, and little observation is required to know that organized force or a well-organized hierarchy can readily obtain a victory over a vastly greater majority that is not organized. The twenty or thirty organized men at Sing-Sing, who keep many hundred prisoners, insulated by silence, in submission, cannot be called the representative men of the penitentiary. Nor must it be forgotten that the bad and the criminal can be concentrated in a leader

The conscientious teacher must guard the young against the blandishments of these schools; he must cultivate in the young the delight in discovering the genesis of things, which for great purposes was infused into our souls; but he must show with lasting effect, that growth in history however well traced, however delightful in tracing, however instructive, and however enriching our associations, is not on that account alone a genesis with its own internal moral necessity, and does not on that account alone have a prescribing power for a future line of action. Whilst the teacher of history ought to stimulate the desire of tracing things through the periods of modification to their sources, he ought at the same time sedulously to point out that crime and folly have their genesis too, and decline and disintegration their laws, which make them natural but not legitimate; and he ought, frequently, to point to the error which steals even into the best minds, of contracting a fondness for that which it has taken us great pains to trace, and of wishing for its continuance, simply for this reason. He, like every other teacher, must impressively warn against the conceit of ingenuity, and the desire of bending facts according to a theory. I have dwelt upon this subject somewhat at length, but those will pardon me who know to what an almost inconceivable degree these errors are at present carried even by some men otherwise not destitute of a comprehensive grasp of mind.

If what I have said of the nourishing character inherent in the study of history is true; if history favors the growth of strong men and is cherished in turn by them, and grows upon their affection as extended experience and slowly advancing years make many objects of interest drop like leaves, one by

and represented by him, just as well as that which is good and substantial. The idea of representative men such as is now floating in the minds of men, is the result, in a great measure, of that unphilosophical coarseness which places the palpable, the vast, and the rapid above the silent and substantial genesis of things and ideas, thus leading to the fatal error of regarding destruction more than growth. Destruction is rapid and violent; growth is slow and silent. The naturalists have divested themselves of this barbarism.

one; if history shows us the great connection of things, that there is nothing stable but the progressive, and that there is Alfred and Socrates, Marathon and Tours, or, if it be not quaint to express it thus, that there is the microcosm of the whole past in each of us; and if history familiarizes the mind with the idea that it is a jury whose verdict is not rendered according to the special pleadings of party dogmas, and a logic wrenched from truth and right—then it is obvious that in a moral, practical, and intellectual point of view it is the very science for nascent citizens of a republic. There are not a few among us who are dazzled by the despotism of a Cæsar, appearing brilliant at least at a distance—did not even Plato once set his hopes on Dionysius?—or are misled by the plausible simplicity of democratic absolutism, that despotism which believes liberty simply to consist in the irresponsible power of a larger number over a smaller, for no other reason, it seems, than that ten is more than nine. All absolutism, whether monarchical or democratic, is in principle the same, and the latter always leads by short transitions to the other. We may go farther; in all absolutism there is a strong element of communism. The theory of property which Louis the Fourteenth put forth was essentially communistic. There is no other civil liberty than institutional liberty, all else is but passing semblance and simulation. It is one of our highest duties, therefore, to foster in the young an institutional spirit, and an earnest study of history shows the inestimable value of institutions. We need not fear in our eager age and country that we may be led to an idolatry of the past—history carries sufficient preventives within itself—or to a worship of institutions simply because they are institutions. Institutions, like the sons of men themselves, may be wicked or good; but it is true that ideas and feelings, however great or pure, retain a passing and meteoric character so long as they are not embodied in vital institutions, and that rights and privileges are but slender reeds so long as they are not protected and kept alive by sound and tenacious institutions; and it is equally true that an institutional spirit is fostered and

invigorated by a manly study of society in the days that are gone.

A wise study of the past teaches us social analysis, and the separation of the permanent and essential from the accidental and superficial, so that it becomes one of the keys by which we learn to understand better the present. History, indeed, is an admirable training in the great duty of attention and the art of observation, as in turn an earnest observation of the present is an indispensable aid to the historian. A practical life is a key with which we unlock the vaults containing the riches of the past. Many of the greatest historians in antiquity and modern times have been statesmen; and Niebuhr said that with his learning alone, and it was prodigious, he could not have understood Roman history, had he not been for many years a practical officer in the financial and other departments of the administration, while we all remember Gibbon's statement of himself, that the captain of the Hampshire militia was of service to the historian of Rome. This is the reason why free nations produce practical, penetrating, and unravelling historians, for in them every observing citizen partakes, in a manner, of statesmanship. Free countries furnish us with daily lessons in the anatomy of states and society; they make us comprehend the reality of history. But we have dwelled sufficiently long on this branch.

As Helicon, where Clio dwelt, looked down in all its grandeur on the busy gulf and on the chaffering traffic of Corinth, so let us leave the summit and walk down to Crissa, and cross the isthmus and enter the noisy mart where the productions of men are exchanged. Sudden as the change may be, it only symbolizes reality and human life. What else is the main portion of history but a true and wise account of the high events and ruling facts which have resulted from the combined action of the elements of human life? Who does not know that national life consists in the gathered sheaves of the thousand activities of men, and that production and exchange are at all times among the elements of these activities?

Man is always an exchanging being. Exchange is one of those characteristics without which we never find man, though they may be observable only in their lowest incipiency, and with which we never find the animal, though its sagacity may have reached the highest point. As, from the hideous tattooing of the savage to our dainty adornment of the sea-cleaving prow or the creations of a Crawford, men always manifest that there is the affection of the beautiful in them—that they are æsthetical beings; or as they always show that they are religious beings, whether they prostrate themselves before a fetish or bend their knee before their true and unseen God, and the animal never, so we find man, whether Caffre, Phœnician, or American, always a producing and exchanging being; and we observe that this, as all other attributes, steadily increases in intensity with advancing civilization.

There are three laws on which man's material well-being and, in a very great measure, his civilization are founded. Man is placed on this earth apparently more destitute and helpless than any other animal. Man is no finding animal—he must produce. He must produce his food, his raiment, his shelter, and his comfort. He must produce his arrow and his trap, his canoe and his field, his road and his lamp.

Men are so constituted that they have far more wants, and can enjoy the satisfying of them more intensely, than other animals; and while these many wants are of a peculiar uniformity among all men, the fitness of the earth to provide for them is greatly diversified and locally restricted, so that men must produce, each more than he wants for himself, and exchange their products. All human palates are pleasantly affected by saccharine salts, so much so that the word sweet has been carried over, in all languages, into different and higher spheres, where it has ceased to be a trope and now designates the dearest and even the holiest affections. All men understand what is meant by sweet music and sweet wife, because the material pleasure whence the term is derived is universal. All men of all ages relish sugar, but those regions which produce it are readily numbered. This applies

to the far greater part of all materials in constant demand among men, and it applies to the narrowest circles as to the widest. The inhabitant of the populous city does not cease to relish and stand in need of farinaceous substances though his crowded streets cannot produce grain, and the farmer who provides him with grain does not cease to stand in need of iron or oil which the town may procure for him from a distance. With what remarkable avidity the tribes of Negroland, that had never been touched even by the last points of the creeping fibres of civilization, longed for the articles lately carried thither by Barth and his companions! The brute animal has no dormant desires of this kind, and finds around itself what it stands in need of. This apparent cruelty, although in reality it is one of the greatest blessings to man, deserves to be made a prominent topic in natural theology.*

Lastly, the wants of men—I speak of their material and cultural wants, the latter of which are as urgent and fully as legitimate as the former—ininitely increase and are by Providence decreed to increase with advancing civilization; so that man's progress necessitates intenser production and quickened exchange.

The branch which treats of the necessity, nature, and effects, the promotion and the hindrances of production, whether it be based almost exclusively on appropriation, as the fishery; or on coercing nature to furnish us with better and more

* Natural theology seems to have stopped with Paley. This branch is either destined to be abandoned, or it must extend with advancing knowledge. Agassiz's argument of divine forethought being proved by the succession of types in the successive geological periods, which the great naturalist has given in the first volume of his Contributions to the Natural History of the United States, ought to occupy a prominent place in this science, which, moreover, as I have indicated above, ought to take within its fold those principles and laws founded in the relation which subsists between the organization of man and the material world around him, and which lead to the formation of society. Nor ought the fact be omitted which is perhaps the greatest of all, that man can commune with man, that is to say, that signs, the effects of thoughts and emotions, in him who communicates, are capable of becoming causes of corresponding thoughts and emotions in him to whom communication is made.

abundant fruit than she is willing spontaneously to yield, as agriculture; or on fashioning, separating, and combining substances which other branches of industry obtain and collect, as manufacture; or on carrying the products from the spot of production to the place of consumption; and the character which all these products acquire by exchange, as values, with the labor and services for which again products are given in exchange, this division of knowledge is called political economy—an unfit name; but it is the name, and we use it. Political economy, like all the other new sciences, was obliged to fight its way to a fair acknowledgment against all manners of prejudices. The introductory lecture which Archbishop Whately delivered some thirty years ago, when he commenced his course on political economy in the University of Oxford, consists almost wholly of a defence of his science and an encounter with the objections then made to it on religious, moral, and almost on every conceivable ground, or suggested by the misconception of its aims. Political economy fared, in this respect, like vaccination, like the taking of a nation's census, like the discontinuance of witch-trials.

The economist stands now on clearer ground. Opponents have acknowledged their errors, and the economists themselves fall no longer into the faults of the utilitarian. The economist indeed sees that the material interests of men are of the greatest importance, and that modern civilization, in all its aspects, requires an immense amount of wealth, and consequently increasing exertion and production, but he acknowledges that "what men can do the least without is not their highest need."^{*} He knows that we are bid to pray for our daily bread, but not for bread alone, and I am glad that those who bade me teach Political Economy, assigned to me also Political Philosophy and History. They teach that the periods of national dignity and of the highest endeavors have some-

^{*} Professor Lushington in his Inaugural Lecture, in Glasgow, quoted in Mo-
rell's Historical and Critical View of Speculative Philosophy. London, 1846.

times been periods of want and poverty. They teach abundantly that riches and enfeebling comforts, that the flow of wine and costly tapestry, do not lead to the development of humanity, nor are its tokens; that no barbarism is coarser than the substitution of gross expensiveness for what is beautiful and graceful; that it is manly character, and womanly soulfulness, not gilded upholstery or fretful fashion—that it is the love of truth and justice, directness and tenacity of purpose, a love of right, of fairness and freedom, a self-sacrificing public spirit and religious sincerity, that lead nations to noble places in history; not surfeiting feasts or conventional refinement. The Babylonians tried that road before us.

But political economy, far from teaching the hoarding of riches, shows the laws of accumulation and distribution of wealth; it shows the important truth that mankind at large can become and have become wealthier, and must steadily increase their wealth with expanding culture.

It is, nevertheless, true that here, in the most active market of our whole hemisphere, I have met, more frequently than in any other place, with an objection to political economy, on the part of those who claim for themselves the name of men of business. They often say that they alone can know anything about it, and as often ask: What is Political Economy good for? The soldier, though he may have fought in the thickest of the fight, is not on that account the best judge of the disposition, the aim, the movements, the faults, or the great conceptions of a battle, nor can we call the infliction of a deep wound a profound lesson in anatomy.

What is Political Economy good for? It is like every other branch truthfully pursued, good for leading gradually nearer and nearer to the truth; for making men, in its own sphere, that is the vast sphere of exchange, what Cicero calls *mansueti*, and for clearing more and more away what may be termed the impeding and sometimes savage superstitions of trade and intercourse; it is, like every other pursuit of political science of which it is but a branch, good for sending some light, by means of those that cultivate it as their own science, to the

most distant corners, and to those who have perhaps not even heard of its name.

Let me give you two simple facts—one of commanding and historic magnitude; the other of apparent insignificance, but typical of an entire state of things, incalculably important.

Down to Adam Smith, the greatest statesmanship had always been sought for in the depression of neighboring nations. Even a Bacon considered it self-evident that the enriching of one people implies the impoverishing of another. This maxim runs through all history, Asiatic and European, down to the latter part of the last century. Then came the Scotch professor who dared to teach, in his dingy lecture-room at Edinburgh, contrary to the opinion of the whole world, that every man, even were it but for personal reasons, is interested in the prosperity of his neighbors; that his wealth, if it be the result of production and exchange, is not a withdrawal of money from others, and that as with single men so with entire nations—the more prosperous the one so much the better for the other. And his teaching, like that of another professor before him—the immortal Grotius—went forth, and rose above men and nations, and statesmen and kings; it ruled their councils and led the history of our race into new channels; it bade men adopt the angels' greeting: "Peace on earth and good will towards men," as a maxim of high statesmanship and political shrewdness. Thus rules the mind; thus sways science. There is now no intercourse between civilized nations which is not tintured by Smith and Grotius. And what I am, what you are, what every man of our race is in the middle of the nineteenth century, he owes in part to Adam Smith, as well as to Grotius, and Aristotle, and Shakspeare, and every other leader of humanity. Let us count the years since that Scotch professor, with his common name, Smith, proclaimed his swaying truth, very simple when once pronounced; very fearful as long as unacknowledged; a very blessing when in action; and then let us answer, What has Political Economy done for man? We habitually dilate on

the effect of physical sciences, and especially on their application to the useful arts in modern times. All honor to this characteristic feature of our age—the wedlock of knowledge and labor; but it is, nevertheless, true that none of the new sciences has so deeply affected the course of human events as political economy. I am speaking as an historian, and wish to assert facts.

The other fact alluded to is one of those historical pulsations which indicate to the touch of the inquirer the condition of an entire living organism. When a few weeks ago the widely-spread misery in the manufacturing districts of England was spoken of in the British house of lords, one that has been at the helm^{*} concluded his speech with an avowal that the suffering laborers who could find but half days', nay, quarter days' employment, with the unreduced wants of their families, nevertheless had resorted to no violence, but on the contrary universally acknowledged that they knew full well that a factory cannot be kept working unless the master can work to a profit.

This, too, is very simple, almost trivial, when stated. But those who know the chronicles of the mediæval cities, and of modern times down to a period when most of us recollect, know also that in all former days the distressed laborer would first of all have resorted to a still greater increase of distress, by violence and destruction. The first feeling of uninstructed man, produced by suffering, is vengeance, and that vengeance is wreaked on the nearest object or person; as animals, when in pain, bite what is nearest within reach. What has wrought this change? Who, or what has restrained our own sorely distressed population from blind violence, even though unwise words were officially addressed to them, when under similar circumstances in the times of free Florence or Cologne there would have been a sanguinary rising of the "wool-weavers," if it is not a sounder knowledge and a correcter feeling regarding the relations of wealth, of capital and labor, which

* Lord Derby, then in the opposition.

in spite of the absurdities of communism has penetrated in some degree all layers of society? And what is the source whence this tempering knowledge' has welled forth if not Political Economy?

True indeed, we are told that economists do not agree; some are for protection, some for free trade. But are physicians agreed? And is there no science and art of medicine? Are theologians agreed? Are the cultivators of any branch of knowledge fully agreed, and are all the beneficial effects of the sciences debarred by this disagreement of their followers? But, however important at certain periods the difference between protectionists and free-traders may be, it touches, after all, but a small portion of the bulk of truth taught by Political Economy, and I believe that there is a greater uniformity of opinion, and a more essential agreement among the prominent scholars of this science, than among those of others, excepting, as a matter of course, the mathematics.

If it is now generally acknowledged that Political Economy ought not to be omitted in a course of superior education, all the reasons apply with greater force to that branch which treats of the relations of man as a jural being—as citizen, and most especially so in our own country, where individual political liberty is enjoyed in a degree in which it has never been enjoyed before. Nowhere is political action carried to a greater intensity, and nowhere is the calming effect of an earnest and scientific treatment of politics more necessary. In few countries is man more exposed to the danger of being carried away to the worship of false political gods and to the idolatry of party than in our land, and nowhere is it more necessary to show to the young the landmarks of political truth, and the essential character of civil liberty—the grave and binding duties that man imposes upon himself when he proudly assumes self-government. Nowhere seem to be so many persons acting on the supposition that we differ from all other men, and that the same deviations will not produce the same calamities, and nowhere does it seem to be more necessary to teach what might well be called political physiology and politi-

cal pathology. In no sphere of action does it seem to me more necessary than in politics, to teach and impress the truth that "logic without reason is a fearful thing." Aristotle said: The fellest of things is armed injustice; History knows a feller thing—impassioned reasoning without a pure heart in him that has power in a free country—the poisoning of the well of political truth itself. Every youth ought to enter the practical life of the citizen, and every citizen ought to remain through life deeply impressed with the conviction that, as Vauvenargue very nobly said, "great thoughts come from the heart," so great politics come from sincere patriotism, and that without candid and intelligent public spirit, parties, without which no liberty can exist, will raise themselves into ends and objects instead of remaining mere means. And when the words party, party consistency, and party honor are substituted for the word Country, and, as Thucydides has it, when parties use each its own language, and men cease to understand one another, a country soon falls into that state in which a court of justice would find itself where wrangling pleaders should do their work without the tempering, guiding judge—that state of dissolution which is the next step to entire disintegration. Providence has no special laws for special countries, and it is not only true as Talleyrand said: *Tout arrive*; but everything happens over again. There is no truth, short of the multiplication table, that, at some time or other, is not drawn into doubt again, and must be re-asserted and re-proved.

One of the means to insure liberty—that difficult problem in history, far more difficult than the insurance of despotism, because liberty is of an infinitely more delicate organization—is the earnest bringing up of the young in the path of political truth and justice, the necessity of which is increased by the reflection that in our period of large cities man has to solve, for the first time in history, the problem of making a high degree of general and individual liberty compatible with populous cities. It is one of the highest problems of our race, which cannot yet be said to have been solved.

Political philosophy is a branch of knowledge that ought

to be taught not only in colleges; its fundamental truths ought to be ingrained in the minds of every one that helps to crowd your public schools. Is it objected that political philosophy ranges too high for boyish intellects? What ranges higher, what is of so spiritual a character as Christianity? But this has not prevented the church, at any period of her existence, from putting catechisms of a few pages into the hands of boys and girls, so that they could read.

We have, however, direct authority for what has been advanced. The Romans in their best period made every school-boy learn by heart the XII Tables, and the XII Tables were the catechism of Roman public and private law, of their constitution, and of the proud *Jus Quiritium*, that led the Roman citizen to pronounce so confidently, as a *vox et invocatio*, his *Civis Romanus sum* in the most distant corners of the land, and which the captive apostle collectedly asserted twice before the provincial officers. Cicero says that when he was a boy he learned the XII Tables *ut carmen necessarium*, like an indispensable formulary, a political breviary, and deplores that at the time when he was composing his treatise on the laws, in which he mentions the fact, the practice was falling into disuse. Rome was fast drifting to Cæsarean absolutism; what use was there any longer for a knowledge of fundamental principles?

The Romans were not visionary; they were no theorists; no logical symmetry or love of system ever prevented them from being straightforward and even stern practical men. They were men of singular directness of purpose and language. Abstraction did not suit them well. Those Romans, who loved law and delighted in rearing institutions and building high-roads and aqueducts; who could not only conquer, but could hold fast to, and fashion what they had conquered, and who strewed municipalities over their conquests, which, after centuries, became the germs of a new political civilization; who reared a system of laws which conquered the west and their own conquerors, when the Roman sword had become dull; and who impressed, even through the lapse of ages, a

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practical spirit on the Latin church, which visibly distinguishes it from the Greek; those Romans who declared their own citizens with all the Jus Romanum on them, when once enrolled, the slaves of the general, and subjected them to a merciless whip of iron chains; those Romans who could make foreign kings assiduous subjects, and foreign hordes fight well by the side of their own veterans, and who could be dispassionately cruel when they thought that cruelty was useful; those Romans who were practical if there ever was a practical people, bade their schoolmaster to drive the XII Tables into the stubborn minds of the little fellows who, in their turn, were to become the ruling citizens of the ruling commonwealth, and we know, from sculptural and written records, in prose and metre, that the magistral means in teaching that *carmen necessarium* was not always applied to the head alone.

Let us pass to another authority, though it require a historic bound—to John Milton, whose name is high among the names of men, as that of Rome is great among the states of the earth. Milton who wrote as clear and direct prose, as he sang lofty poetry, who was one of the first and best writers on the liberty of the press against his own party, and who conscientiously and readily sacrificed his very eyesight to his country—Milton says, in his paper on Education, dedicated to Master Hartlib,¹ that, after having taught sundry other branches in a

¹ Mr. Evert A. Duyckinck, of this city, whom, while writing out this address, I had asked what he knew of "Master Hartlib," obligingly replied by a note, of which I may be permitted to give the following extract:

"In D'Israeli's *Curiosities of Literature*, Hartlib is called a Pole. Thomas Warton, in a note in his edition of Milton's *Minor Poems*, says Hartlib was a native of Holland, and came into England about the year 1640. Hartlib himself tells us in a letter, dated 1660 (reprinted in Egerton Brydges's *Censura Literaria*, iii. 54), that his father was a Polish merchant who founded a church in Pomerania, and, when the Jesuits prevailed in Poland, removed to Elbing, to which place his (Samuel Hartlib's) grandfather brought the English company of merchants from Dantzic. It would appear that Hartlib was born at Elbing, for he speaks of his father marrying a third wife (H.'s mother) after the removal from Poland proper, which third wife would appear to have been an Englishwoman. Hartlib speaks of his family being 'of a very ancient extraction in the German empire, there having been ten brethren of the name of Hartlib, some of

boy's education, "the next removal must be to the study of politics, to know the beginning, end, and reasons of political societies, that they (the learners) may not, in a dangerous fit of the commonwealth, be such poor, shaken, uncertain reeds, of such a tottering conscience, as many of our great counselors have lately shown themselves, but steadfast pillars of the state." This pregnant passage ought not to have been written in vain.

I could multiply authorities of antiquity and modern times, but is not Rome and Milton strong enough?

A complete course of political philosophy, to which every course, whether in a college or a university, ought to approximate, as time and circumstances permit, should wind its way through the large field of political science somewhat in the following manner.

We must start from the pregnant fact that each man is made an individual and a social being, and that his whole humanity with all its attributes, moral, religious, emotional, mental, cultural, and industrial, is decreed forever to revolve between the two poles of individualism and socialism, taking the latter

them privy councillors to the emperor.' Hartlib's mercantile life, I suppose, brought him to England. He was a reformer in church matters, and became attached to the parliament. 'Hartlib,' says Warton, 'took great pains to frame a new system of education, answerable to the perfection and purity of the new commonwealth.' Milton addressed his *Treatise on Education* to him about 1650. In 1662, Hartlib petitioned parliament for relief, stating that he had been thirty years and upwards serving the state and specially setting forth the 'erecting a little academy for the education of the gentry of this nation, to advance piety, learning, morality, and other exercises of industry not usual then in common schools.' His other services were 'correspondence with the chief of note of foreign parts,' 'collecting MSS. in all the parts of learning,' printing 'the best experiments of industry in husbandry and manufactures,' relieving 'poor, distressed scholars, both foreigners and of this nation.'"

So far the extract from Mr. Duyckinck's letter. Hartlib was no doubt a German by extraction and education, and represents a type of men peculiar to the Reformation, and of great importance in the cause of advancing humanity. Milton must have felt great regard for this foreigner, but Milton had too enlightened a mind, and had learned too much in foreign parts, ever to allow a narrowing and provincial self-complacency to become a substitute for enlarging and unselfish patriotism.

term in its strictly philosophical adaptation. Man's moral individualism and the sovereign necessity of his living in society, or the fact that humanity and society are two ideas that cannot even be conceived of, the one without the other, lead to the twin ideas of Right and Duty. Political science dwells upon this most important elementary truth, that the idea of right cannot be philosophically stated without the idea of obligation, nor that of duty without that of right, and it must show how calamitous every attempt has proved to separate them; how debasing a thing obligation becomes without corresponding rights, and how withering rights and privileges become to the hand that wields the power and to the fellow-being over whom it sways, if separated from corresponding duty and obligation.

Right and duty are twin brothers; they are like the two electric flames appearing at the yard-arms in the Mediterranean, and called by the ancient mariners Castor and Pollux. When both are visible, a fair and pleasant course is expected; but one alone portends stormy mischief. An instinctive acknowledgment of this truth makes us repeat with pleasure to this day the old French maxim, *Noblesse oblige*, whatever annotations history may have to tell of its disregard.*

That philosopher, whom Dante calls *il maestro di color che sanno*, and whom our science gratefully acknowledges as its own founder, says that man is by nature a political animal. He saw that man cannot divest himself of the state. Society, no matter in how rudimental a condition, always exists, and society considered with reference to rights and duties, to rules to be obeyed, and to privileges to be protected, to those that ordain, and those that comply, is the political state. Government was never voted into existence, and the state originates every day anew in the family. God coerces man into society,

* In this sense at least *Noblesse oblige* was often taken, that feudal privileges over feudal subjects involved obligations to them, although it meant originally the obligations due to him who bestowed the nobility.

and necessitates the growth of government by that divinely simple law, which has been alluded to before, and consists in making the young of man depend upon the parents for years after the period of lactation has ceased. As men and society advance, the greatest of institutions—the state—increases in intensity of action, and when humanity falters back, the state, like the function of a diseased organ, becomes sluggish or acts with ruinous feverishness. In this twinship of right and duty lies the embryonic genesis of liberty, and at the same time the distinction between sincere and seasoned civil liberty, and the wild and one-sided privilege of one man or a class; or the fantastic equality of all in point of rights without the steady-pendulum of mutual obligation.

This leads us to that division which I have called elsewhere Political Ethics, in which the teacher will not fail to use his best efforts, when he discourses on patriotism—that ennobling virtue which at times has been derided, at other times declared incompatible with true philosophy or with pure religion. He will not teach that idolatrous patriotism which inscribes on its banner, Our country, right or wrong, but that heightened public spirit, which loves and honors father and mother, and neighbors, and country; which makes us deeply feel for our country's glory and its faults; makes us willing to die, and, what is often far more difficult, to live for it; that patriotism which is consistent with St. Paul's command: Honor all men, and which can say with Montesquieu, "If I knew anything useful to my country but prejudicial to Europe or mankind, I should consider it as a crime;" that sentiment which made the Athenians reject the secret of Themistocles, because Aristides declared it very useful to Athens, but very injurious to Sparta and to the other Greeks. The Christian citizen can say with Tertullian, *Civitas nostra totus mundus*, and abhors that patriotism which is at best bloated provincialism, but he knows, too, that that society is doomed to certain abasement in which the indifference of the *blasé* is permitted to debilitate and demoralize public sentiment. The patriotism of which we stand as much in need as the ancients is neither an amiable weak-

ness, nor the Hellenic pride. It is a positive virtue demanded of every moral man. It is the fervent love of our own country, but not hatred of others, nor blindness to our faults and to the rights or superiorities of our neighbors.

We now approach that branch of our science which adds, to the knowledge of the "end and reasons of political societies," the discussion of the means by which man endeavors to obtain the end or ought to obtain it; in one word, to the science of government, and a knowledge of governments which exist and have existed. The "end and reasons of political societies" involve the main discussion of the object of the state, as it is more clearly discerned with advancing civilization, the relation of the state to the family, its duties to the individual, and the necessary limits of its power. Protection, in the highest sense of the word,¹ both of society, as a whole, and of the component individuals, as such, without interference, and free from intermeddling, is the great object of the civilized state, or the state of freemen. To this portion of our science belong the great topics of the rights as well as the dependence of the individual citizen, of the woman and the child; of primordial rights and the admissibility or violence of slavery, which, throughout the whole course of history wherever it has been introduced, has been a deciduous institution. The reflection on the duties of the state comprehends the important subjects of the necessity of public education (the common school for those who are deprived of means, or destitute of the desire to be educated; and the university, which lies beyond the capacity of private means); of the support of those who cannot support themselves (the pauper, and the poor orphans, and sick); of intercommunication and intercommunion (the road and the mail); of the promotion

¹ That I do not mean by this material protection only, but the protection of all interests, the highest no less so than the common ones, of society as a unit, as well as of the individual human being, will be well known to the reader of my *Political Ethics*. I do by no means restrict the meaning of protection to personal security, nor do I mean by this term something that amounts to the protection of an interest in one person to the injury of others.

of taste and the fine arts, and the public support of religion, or the abstaining from it; and the duty of settling conflicting claims, and of punishing those that infringe the common rules of action, with the science and art of rightful and sensible punishment, or, as I have ventured to call this branch, of penology.

The comprehensive apparatus by which all these objects, more or less dimly seen, according to the existing stage of civil progress, are intended to be obtained, and by which a political society evolves its laws, is called government. I generally give at this stage a classification of all governments, in the present time or in the past, according to the main principles on which they rest. This naturally leads to three topics, the corresponding ones of which, in some other sciences, form but important illustrations or constitute a certain amount of interesting knowledge, but which in our science constitute part and parcel of the branch itself. I mean a historical survey of all governments and systems of law, Asiatic or European; a survey of all political literature as represented by its prominent authors, from Aristotle and Plato, or from the Hindoo Menu, down to St. Simon or Calhoun—a portion of the science which necessarily includes many historians and theologians on the one hand, such as Mariana, De Soto, and Machiavelli, and on the other hand statesmen that have poured forth wisdom or criminal theories in public speech, Demosthenes or Webster, Chatham, Burke, Mirabeau or Robespierre and St. Just. And lastly, I mean that division of our science which indeed is, properly, a subdivision of the latter, but sufficiently important and instructive to be treated separately—a survey of those model states which political philosophers have from time to time imagined, and which we now call Utopias, from Plato's Atlantis to Thomas More's Utopia, Campanella's Civitas Solis or Harrington's Oceana to our socialists, or Shelley's and Coleridge's imaginings and the hallucinations of Comte. They are growing rarer and, probably, will in time wholly cease. Superior minds, at any rate, could feel stimulated to conceive of so-