ANDREW KOSENKO

January 2018

al-2012@aalumhia.adu

Department of Economics	5	ак	2912@colullibla.edu	
Columbia University		htt	http://www.columbia.edu/~ak2912	
1022 International Affairs	Building	(64	(646) 403 7527	
420 West 118th Street	-			
New York, NY 10027				
Placement Committee:	co-chair: Martin Uril co-chair: (fall) Pierre co-chair: (spring) Na Jennifer La'O, jl4196	be, mu2166@columbia.edu, (212-8 e-Andre Chiappori, pc2167@colum win Kartik, nk2339@columbia.edu 5@columbia.edu, (212-854-0475)	51-4008) bia.edu, (212-854-6369) , (212-854-3926)	
Placement Assistant:	Amy Devine, aed215	52@columbia.edu, (212-854-6881)		
Education				
2018 (expected)	Ph.D.	Economics	Columbia University	
2015	M.Phil.	Economics	Columbia University	
2014	M.A.	Economics	Columbia University	
2010	M.A.	Quant. Methods in Soc. S	ci. Columbia University	
2008	B.A.	Economics	New York University	
2008	B.A.	European Studies	New York University	

Fields of Specialization

Economic theory, economics of information, behavioral economics, time series analysis. Dissertation title: "Essays in Economic Theory: Strategic Communication and Information Design"

Job Market Paper

"Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information" (2017)

Abstract: I study a model of communication and Bayesian persuasion between a sender who is privately informed and has state independent preferences, and a receiver who has preferences that depend on the unknown state. In a model with two states of the world, over the interesting range of parameters, the equilibria can be pooling or separating, but a particular novel refinement forces the pooling to be on the most informative information structure in all but one case. I also examine two extensions - a model with more information structures as well as a model where the state of the world is non-dichotomous, and show that analogous results emerge.

Working Papers and Work in Progress

"Mediated Persuasion" (2017)

Abstract: I study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures and a receiver who takes an action after observing the signal generated by the first two players. I characterize sufficient conditions for information revelation, and provide comparative statics with regard to the mediator's preferences, the number of mediators, and different informational arrangements.

"Equilibrium in a Competitive Insurance Market under Adverse Selection with Endogenous Information" (with Joseph E. Stiglitz and Jungyoll Yun, submitted, 2017) NBER Working Paper No. 23556

Abstract: This paper investigates the existence and nature of equilibrium in a competitive insurance market under adverse selection with endogenously determined information structures. Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) characterized the self-selection equilibrium under the assumption of exclusivity, enforcement of which required full information about contracts purchased. By contrast, the Akerlof price equilibrium described a situation where the insurance firm has no information about sales to a particular individual. We show that with more plausible information assumptions - no insurance firm has full information but at least knows how much he has sold to any particular individual - neither the RS quantity constrained equilibrium nor the Akerlof price equilibrium are sustainable. But when the information structure itself is *endogenous* - firms and consumers decide what information about insurance purchases to reveal to whom - there *always* exists a Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium set of insurance contracts is unique: the low risk individual obtains insurance corresponding to the pooling contract most preferred by him; the high risk individual, that plus (undisclosed) supplemental insurance at his own actuarial odds resulting in his being fully insured. Equilibrium information revelation strategies of firms entail some but not complete information sharing. However, in equilibrium all individuals are induced to tell the truth.

"<u>A Novel Refinement for Signaling Games</u>" (in progress)

Abstract: Standard equilibrium concepts typically do not generate strong predictions in signaling games - equilibria can be pooling, separating, or hybrid. Refinement concepts are then used to narrow down possible outcomes; however, in many games even these refinements have no bite. I formulate a refinement concept that is applicable in a wide variety of contexts and makes sharp predictions that often coincide with many existing refinements, yet goes strictly beyond those refinements in interesting cases, and captures an appealing logic. I investigate the properties of this refinement and relate it to the literature.

Conference and Colloquia Presentations

Columbia Microeconomic Theory Colloquium

Fall 2013, Spring 2014, Fall 2014, Spring 2015, Fall 2015, Spring 2016, Fall 2016, Spring 2017, Fall 2017

- Presented original research in microeconomic theory (political economy, strategic information design) to an audience of economics faculty members and upper-year doctoral students in economics.

Columbia Political Economy Breakfast Colloquium

Fall 2014

- Presented original research on a laboratory experiment in dynamic bargaining in networks to an audience of economics and political science faculty members and upper-year doctoral students in economics and political science.

Honors and Awards

ego.
ty.
niversity
1

Research Experience (RF is full time, RA is part time)

- <u>RF for professor Joseph E. Stiglitz</u> (Columbia Department of Economics, Business School and SIPA)
- Summer 2016, Fall 2016, Spring 2017, Summer 2017

- Projects included building time-series models, constructing forecasts and tests (including tests for structural breaks in means and variances) using the appropriate custom heteroscedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors as well as the optimal choice of number of lags in a regression according to standard criteria (Akaike and Bayesian information) and forecast error variance decomposition. Work implemented in Matlab going beyond the off-the-shelf routines available; 2000+ lines of original and substantive code. Mathematica was also utilized extensively for computations. Extensive robustness checks for a project on monetary policy, supply of credit and the zero lower bound (NBER working paper 22837). Worked on NBER working paper 23032, a project on electronic money/credit and macroeconomic management; provided comments, editing, numerous suggestions and verified correctness of computations and arguments throughout the work. Worked on several less technical papers and books, including a fiftieth anniversary reissue of the Kerner Report (1967 report of the Presidential commission on civil disorders) and the "*Globalization and Its Discontents Revisited: Anti-Globalization in the Era of Trump*" book, as well as other projects (models of misspecified learning, multi-sector macroeconomic models, work on the ways in which globalization was "oversold", work on economic and social justice).

• <u>RF for professor Alessandra Casella (Columbia Department of Economics)</u>

Spring 2014

- Worked on a project on tradeable votes: a model investigating the welfare and equilibrium properties of a model where voters were free to trade votes for votes on issues dynamically. Implemented a Matlab program that checked for stable allocations with arbitrary number of voters, preferences and issues. Among the difficulties of this project were a) decentralized vote exchange, b) pervasive externalities, c) lack of stable allocations.

• <u>RF for professor Mark Orr</u> (Columbia Mailman School of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology) Fall 2011 – Fall 2012

- Projects included modeling health behavior using a complex systems approach and agent-based modeling. Focus of research was on obesity and its determinants (including behavior, genetics, built and natural environments, and others) with a particular attention to racial disparities in health-relevant measures (most prominently, the body-mass index). Among accomplishments was an implementation of a custom agent-based model in NetLogo; results were published in the Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health in 2016.

• <u>RA for professor Allison Carnegie</u> (Columbia Department of Political Science)

Spring, Summer, Fall 2017

- Modeling and computational support for a project on covert monitoring and international arms control. Provided advice on game-theoretic issues (formulating the situation as a game, solving it and interpreting the results and comparative statics).

• <u>RA for professor Shigeo Hirano</u> (Columbia Department of Political Science) 2010

- Worked on gathering raw data from a historical newspaper source.

• <u>RA for professor Bradley Abrams</u> (Columbia Department of History)

2008-2009

- Worked on analyzing original data from consumer surveys from the 1970's Czechoslovakia.

Teaching Experience (TA)

Summer 2016, Summer 2017	Globalization & Markets & the Changing Economic Landscape.
	Profs. Bruce Greenwald and Joseph Stiglitz (Columbia Executive MBA
	course at the Business School)
Spring 2016	Perspectives on Economic Studies (first year economics PhD required
	course). Prof. Joseph Stiglitz (Columbia)
Fall 2015	Financial Crises. Prof. Jose Scheinkman (Columbia)
Summer 2015	Principles of Economics. Inst. Evan Plous (Columbia)
Spring 2015	Historical Foundations of Modern Economics. Prof. Andre
	Burgstaller (Barnard College)
Fall 2014	Financial Crises. Prof. Jose Scheinkman (Columbia)
Summer 2014	Principles of Economics. Inst. Xing Xia (Columbia)
Fall 2013	Financial Crises. Prof. Jose Scheinkman (Columbia)
Fall 2010	Economics of Immigration. Prof. David Bernotas (UCSD)
Winter, Spring 2011	Principles of Macroeconomics. Prof. Valerie Ramey, Inst. Laura
	Gee (UCSD)
Fall 2009	Introduction to Economic Reasoning. Prof. David Weiman
	(Barnard College)

Professional Experience

• <u>Intern</u>, Economics, Energy and Business Bureau, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C. Summer 2008

- Tenure coincided with an intense period of work at State on high priority issues: responding to a global food price crisis and advancing the Doha Round of World Trade Organization negotiations. Attended meetings on the food crisis, maintained database of food prices and related trade restrictions in affected countries (mostly sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia), presented results to an interagency task force. Provided information on textile trade to the Assistant Secretary that was relied upon in his meeting with representatives from Pakistan; contributed to a memorandum for the Secretary of State. Monitored reports from overseas posts (embassies, consulates and sections) on key agricultural issues; worked on the Kimberley Process (framework for tracing diamonds from war-prone regions) under the Special Advisor for Conflict Diamonds. Supervisor: Gary A. Clements, Chief, Agriculture and Biotech Trade Affairs Division, Bureau of Economics and Energy Affairs.

- <u>Departmental Advisor</u>, Department of Economics (Columbia)
- Fall 2015, Spring 2016, Fall 2016, Spring 2017

- Graduate student advisor to undergraduate students majoring or interested in economics. Held weekly office hours and was responsible for an email account; addressed questions about departmental requirements, course advice, career advice (industry and graduate school) and many others from the undergraduate student body. Supervisor: professor Susan Elmes, Director of Undergraduate Studies, Department of Economics.

Personal

Citizenship: USA Fluent in English, Ukrainian and Russian, intermediate French and basic German. Matlab, Mathematica, R, Stata, zTree, LaTeX, NetLogo, Python (beginner).

References

Navin Kartik (primary) Professor Department of Economics Columbia University (212) 854-3926 nk2339@columbia.edu

Yeon-Koo Che

Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory Department of Economics Columbia University (212) 854-8276 yc2271@columbia.edu

Joseph E. Stiglitz

University Professor Department of Economics, SIPA & GSB Columbia University (212) 854-1481 jes322@gsb.columbia.edu

Jose A. Scheinkman (teaching reference)

Charles and Lynn Zhang Professor Department of Economics Columbia University (212) 854-2507 js3317@columbia.edu