DANIEL RAPPOPORT

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Nationality:
United States, United Kingdom

Education:

2018 (expected)	Ph.D. Economics	Columbia University
2014	M.Phil Economics	Columbia University
2012	B.S. (both with Honors) Mathematics and Economics *Summa Cum Laude*	George Washington University

Honors and Awards:

> 2017: Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
> 2015: Vickrey Prize for the best third year paper*,* Department of Economics, Columbia University
> 2012-17: Deans Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
> 2011: Ruggles Prize for an outstanding undergraduate, Department of Mathematics, George Washington University

Fields of Specialization:

> Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Comparative Statics

Job Market Paper:

> "*Evidence and Skepticism in Verifiable Disclosure Games*"

Abstract: A key feature of communication with evidence is *skepticism*: to the extent possible, a receiver will attribute any incomplete disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence. The degree of skepticism depends on how much evidence the sender is expected to possess. I characterize when a change in the prior distribution of evidence induces *more skepticism*, i.e.

induces any receiver to take an equilibrium action that is less favorable to the sender following every message. I formalize an increase in the sender's (ex-ante) amount of evidence and show that this is equivalent to inducing more skepticism. My analysis provides a method to solve general verifiable disclosure games, including an expression for equilibrium actions. I apply my results to a dynamic disclosure problem in which the sender obtains and discloses evidence over time. I identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the evidence structure such that the receiver can benefit from early disclosures. If this condition does not hold then early disclosures induce more skepticism in the receiver, and therefore violate incentive compatibility.

Working Papers:
   "*Single-Crossing Differences on Distributions*", with Navin Kartik and SangMok Lee, Revise and Resubmit at Econometrica

Abstract: We characterize when choices among lotteries over arbitrary allocations are monotonic in an expected-utility agent's type. Our necessary and sufficient condition is on the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function; we identify an order over lotteries that generates the choice monotonicity when the condition holds. We discuss applications to cheap-talk games, costly signaling games, and collective choice problems. Our characterization requires some new results on monotone comparative statics and aggregating single-crossing functions, a by-product of which is a characterization of the monotone likelihood ratio property.

   "*Incentivizing Information Design*", with Valentin Somma,

Abstract: We study a principal who hires an agent to acquire costly information. While the realized piece of information is observable and contractible, the experimental process is not. Assuming a general family of information cost functions (inclusive of Shannon's mutual information), we show that the first best is achievable when the agent has limited liability or when he is risk averse, in contrast to standard moral hazard models. However, when the agent is both risk averse and has limited liability, efficiency losses arise generically. Specifically, we show that the principal obtains his first best outcome if and only if he intends to implement a "symmetric" experiment, i.e. one in which the cost of generating each piece of evidence is the same. On the other hand, "asymmetric" experiments that are uninformative with high probability but occasionally produce conclusive evidence will bear large agency costs.

   "*Humility in Experts*", winner of the Vickrey Prize for best third year paper

Abstract: I explore whether career concerned experts can admit that they are uncertain. The model has a binary state, and a continuum of signals, where intermediate signals provide both experts and non-experts with little information about the state. I introduce a condition on signal structures, *humility*, that characterizes when all equilibria only involve directional reporting: experts can at most communicate a prediction of the likely state. Humility is defined in terms of the interim expertise: the update on expertise after observing the signal but not the state. A signal structure is humble if interim expertise decreases when the certainty of a signal decreases. If the signal structure is not humble, then there will exist a value for reputation such that uncertainty is revealed.

Research Assistantships:
    2015-16: Navin Kartik, Department of Economics, Columbia University
    2014-15: Amit Khandelwal, Columbia Business School
    2014-15: Andrea Prat, Department of Economics and Columbia Business School

Teaching Assistantships:
    2015-16: Game Theory, Qingmin Liu (two semesters)
    2015: EMBA Managerial Economics (one semester)
    2013-14: Principles of Economics, Anna Caterina Musatti (two semesters)

Invited Seminars and Conference Presentations:
    2017: Microeconomics Student Lunch (NYU), Microeconomics Reading Group (Yale),
     Chicago-Minnesota Theory Conference (U of Chicago), North American Econometrics
    Society Summer Meetings (Washington University in St. Louis), Stony Brook Economic
    Theory Conference (Stony Brook University), Junior Accounting Theory Conference
    (UCSD)
    2016: Northwestern-Columbia-Duke-MIT IO Theory Conference, Rising Scholars
    Session (NWU)
    2015: Econcon (UPenn)

Refereeing:
    Rand Journal of Economics
    Mathematical Social Sciences
    Games and Economic Behavior

References:

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