

# So Yoon Ahn

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Placement Chairs: Prof. Martin Uribe, [mu2166@columbia.edu](mailto:mu2166@columbia.edu); Prof. Pierre-André Chiappori (fall), [pc2167@columbia.edu](mailto:pc2167@columbia.edu); Prof. Navin Kartik (spring), [nk2339@columbia.edu](mailto:nk2339@columbia.edu)

Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, [aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu)

## Education:

2018 (expected)	Ph.D. Economics	Columbia University
2012	M.A. Economics	Yonsei University
2010	B.A. Economics	Yonsei University
2008-2009	Exchange Program	University of California, Berkeley

## Fields of Specialization:

*Primary Fields:* Labor Economics, Family Economics, Applied Microeconomics

*Secondary Fields:* Development Economics, Gender Economics

## Job Market Paper:

### “Matching Across Markets: Theory and Evidence on Cross-Border Marriage”

*Vickrey Prize for Best Third Year Paper (runner-up)*

*Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award for Best Proposal (runner-up)*

Matching theory suggests that a demographic shock that shifts marriage market conditions should affect *all* men and women, not just the group impacted by the shock. This paper uses data on cross-border marriages in East Asia to evaluate these equilibrium effects. It exploits two events that dramatically changed the volume of marriage migration between Vietnam and Taiwan: the rapid emergence of matchmaking firms in the late 1990s, and a tightening of entry visas in Taiwan in 2004. I show that the number of marriage migrants significantly affects the matching patterns and intra-household allocations of local people in both countries. For instance, when marriage migration becomes easier and thus more common, a larger number of less well-educated Vietnamese women emigrate; and those who stay in Vietnam benefit from more control over household expenditures. This purely equilibrium phenomenon takes place even though only a small percentage of Vietnamese women of marriageable age emigrate. My results suggest that changes in trade and immigration policies can have far-reaching implications on marital outcomes and women's bargaining power.

## **Work in Progress:**

**“Improving Job Matching Among Youth”** (with Rebecca Dizon-Ross and Benjamin Feigenberg) *preliminary results available upon request*

Abstract: Do inaccurate expectations about job seeker competitiveness contribute to poor job matching in developing countries? We utilize the largest online job portal in the Middle East and North Africa region to evaluate the effect of an intervention delivering information about job seeker competitiveness to job applicants. Providing information about the relative fit of an applicant's background for a particular job causes job seekers to apply for jobs that are better matches for their background. The effects of information are largest among entry-level workers with higher levels of education, who generally face the highest unemployment rates in the region. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that changes over time in demand for skills in the job market may lead to inaccurate expectations that hinder labor market matching. Improving the efficiency of online job search may be particularly welfare-enhancing in the Middle East and North Africa region given that the young, highly-educated subpopulation that faces the greatest labor market hurdles also has the highest level of internet connectedness.

**“Assimilation of Marriage Migrants: Evidence from South Korea”**  
*preliminary results available upon request*

This paper studies economic assimilation of female marriage migrant using a rich dataset on more than 70,000 marriage migrants in Korea, one of the largest bride hosting country. Consistent with the previous literature on the role of intermarriage on assimilation, marriage migrants catch up with their native counterparts relatively well in terms of earnings and labor hours. The marriage migrants catch up monthly earnings of native women after 10 years of migration. Overall, conditional on education, it is hard to find evidence of discrimination against marriage migrants. In contrast, intra-household decision-making power cannot be caught up even after 15 years of migration. In particular, in terms of decision-making on daily expenditures, only 40% of marriage migrants who spent more than 15 years in South Korea made the decisions themselves, whereas more than 60% of native women made decisions themselves. The results show that migrant women can be particularly vulnerable within the households even when they perform well in the labor market.

## **Publications (before Ph.D.)**

“Introduction of Online Sponsored-Link Auction Theory” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim), *Korean Journal of Economics*, 2011

## **Research and Work Experience:**

2014, Research Assistant for Pierre-André Chiappori and Bernard Salanié  
2012, Intern, Korean Women's Development Institute

## **Honors and Awards:**

2017-2018, Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund

2017, Center for Development Economics and Policy Grant, Columbia University  
2016, Dr. Edwin P. and Dr. Beatrice G. Reubens Travel and Research Fund  
2015, Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award (runner-up), Columbia University  
2015, Vickery Prize for Best Third Year Paper (runner-up), Columbia University  
2004-2009, Samsung Junior Frontier Leadership (JFL) scholarship

### **Teaching Experience:**

Advanced Microeconomics (Spring 2016) *Wueller Teaching Award Winner*  
Intermediate Microeconomics (Fall 2015)  
Introduction to Econometrics (Fall 2013, Spring 2014, Spring 2015)

### **Seminar Presentations:**

Annual Meeting of the Society of Economics of the Household (San Diego), 2017  
Empirics and Methods in Economics, Northwestern University, 2016  
Population Association of America Annual Meeting (Washington DC), 2016

### **Other Activities:**

Ronald Coase Workshop on Institutional Analysis (Tallinn, Estonia), 2016  
Price Theory Summer Camp, University of Chicago, 2015

### **Languages:**

English (fluent), Korean (native), French (basic)

### **References:**

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