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Education

2013-	(In Progress) PhD in Economics	Columbia University
2013	MSc in Mathematics	University of Warsaw
2011	MSc in Economics	University of Warsaw

Fields of Interest

Macroeconomics, Labor Economics

Honors and Awards

2018-2019	Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University
2013-2018	Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University

Job Market Paper: "The Cyclicity of Wages and Match Quality"

I estimate the cyclicity of real wages for job stayers, hires from employment and from unemployment, using an administrative matched employer-employee dataset from Germany. I find that the wages of new hires appear to be *less* procyclical than the wages of job stayers. I propose an explanation based on countercyclical selection on match quality: when aggregate productivity is low, worker-firm matches have to be unusually productive to warrant job creation. The presence of the match quality selection effect is supported by the relationship between the initial aggregate conditions and subsequent risk of separation: jobs started when unemployment is high are at a decreased risk of ending with a separation to unemployment, which suggests that they are positively selected. Finally, I show that a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model with match-specific productivity and turnover costs is consistent with empirical findings.

Work in Progress

"How Dangerous is Godfather? Job-to-Job Transitions and Wage Cuts."

Job-to-job transitions are surprisingly often accompanied by wage cuts. The fraction of such transitions ranges from 20% to 40%, depending on a country and data source, as found by Jolivet et al. (2006), and others. In the US, they are around 33% of job transition and the average wage cut is 20%, according to Tjaden and Wellschmied (2014). There are several competing explanations for this phenomenon. One explanation is based on the idea that workers accept wage cuts to enjoy higher wages in the future. This motive arises if firms offer an increasing wage-tenure profile, as in Coles and Burdett (2010), in the Bertrand competition framework introduced in Robin and

