# Divya Singh

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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu

EDUCATION Last updated: October 4, 2019

## Columbia University in the City of New York

Ph.D. in Economics, Expected May 2020.

### Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Master of Science in Quantitative Economics, 2014.

## Miranda House, University of Delhi

B.A. Honors in Economics, 2012.

## FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Primary field: Public Economics
Secondary fields: Urban Economics, Development Economics.

### AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

#### Awards

Harriss Prize, Best Second Year Paper, Columbia University, 2016.

Teaching Fellow, Columbia University, 2015-19.

Dean's Fellow, Columbia University, 2014-19.

Honorary Book Grant × 4, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, 2012-2014.

Sumana Dutta Gold Medal for Best student in economics, Miranda House, Delhi University, 2012.

## Fellowships and grants

Dissertation fellowship, Columbia University, 2019-20.

Center for Development Economics and Policy, Columbia University, 2016, 2018.

Dr. Edwin P. and Dr. Beatrice Reubens Fellowship, 2017.

### RESEARCH

### Job Market Paper

WP1 "Do Property Tax Incentives for New Construction Spur Gentrification? Evidence from New York City"

This paper uses a natural experiment to estimate whether property tax incentives for new construction lower the rents paid by tenants. In 2006, the New York City government decided to make property tax incentives for new construction less generous, starting in 2008. Developers responded by rushing to apply for these benefits and began building before the deadline. The magnitude of excess housing starts at the deadline suggests that a 1% increase in the future property tax increased current residential investment by 0.4%. A naive demand-supply model indicates that these new units brought to the market by the reform should lower rents in nearby incumbent units. On the contrary, I find that the rents in nearby incumbent units increased. Using the baseline land availability within a small radius around an incumbent unit as an instrument, I find that an additional new tax-exempt unit during the bunching period increased the incumbent unit rent by 2.3%. I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that new residential investment made neighborhoods more desirable by attracting affluent households, facilitating the entry of businesses and consumption

## **Working Papers**

WP2. "Merging to Dodge Taxes? Unexpected Consequences of VAT Adoption in India"

This paper investigates whether tax evasion creates incentives among firms to reorganize their production. Value Added Tax (VAT) is the world's most popular consumption tax and is considered revenue efficient since cross-reporting of firm-to-firm transactions leads to self-enforcement. However, the ability to evade tax on firm to consumer transactions creates incentives for the last two firms in the production chain to integrate vertically. I test this hypothesis by using a quasi-experiment in India where sales tax was replaced with VAT in a staggered manner between 2003 and 2008 and provided exogeneous shock to tax evasion opportunities along the production chain. Difference-in-difference analysis reveals that post reform, treated firms sourced more `upstream' products and had greater vertical mergers, indicating increased vertical integration under VAT. In addition, the effect is largest for firms which are closest to final demand indicating that tax-evasion is one of the channels. Overall, the results suggest that VAT is no longer production efficient in settings of low compliance.

## WP3. "Safer Elections, Women Turnout and Political Outcomes: Evidence from India."

This paper estimates the effects of increasing security at the polling booths on the election day. Using detailed voting and political outcomes dataset at the polling booth-level, and a regression discontinuity design, we find that greater security at the polling booths increases women share in total turnout by 1.4 percentage points. There is suggestive evidence that booths with a higher probability of security treatment are associated with a lower vote share of the incumbent party candidate, corrupt candidates, and a higher vote share of educated candidates. The evidence suggests that safer elections affect outcomes through an increase in women turnout.

### PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

## Conference presentations (\* indicates scheduled)

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Urban Economics Association Meetings*, Philadelphia	WP1	2019
National Tax Association Meetings*, Tampa, Florida	WP1,2	2019
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management*, Denver	WP1	2019
Young Economists Symposium, Columbia, New York	WP1	2019
Independent Budget Office, New York	WP1	2019
NY Fiscal Policy Breakfast, Federal Reserve, New York	WP1	2019
The Mayor's Office of Management and Budget, New York	WP1	2019
ZEW, Advances in Empirical Public Economics, Mannheim, Germany	WP1	2019
Conference on Value Added of Value Added Taxes, World Bank, DC	WP2	2019
Conference on Public Finance in Developing countries, Zurich	WP2	2018
Poster at National Tax Association meeting, New Orleans	WP2	2018
Young Economists Symposium, NYU	WP2	2018
Development and Political Economy Conference, UC Berkeley	WP2	2018
PhD Conference, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK	WP2	2018
PhD Conference, George Washington University, Washington D.C.	WP3	2018
Poster at Women in Science at Columbia	WP3	2018
Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development, ISI Delhi	WP3	2017
APPAM Regional Student Conference, Washington, D.C.	WP3	2017
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Paper

Year

### Attendance

NBER Graduate student workshop and Conference in Business Taxation, 2018.

# (Co)-organization

Summer reading group in Public finance, Columbia University, 2018.

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

# **Research Assistantships**

Professor Francois Gerard, Columbia University, Summer & Fall, 2016.

Professor Suresh Naidu, Columbia University, Summer 2015.

Professor Tridip Ray, Indian Statistical Institute, Summer 2013.

## **Internships**

Consultant, World Bank, D.C., Summer 2016.

### TEACHING EXPERIENCE

### **Full instructor**

• International trade, 2017.

## Teaching assistant:

- Public Economics, Fall 2017 and 2018.
- Economic development, Spring 2018, Spring 2019.
- American Economy, Fall 2016.
- Principles of Economics, Fall 2015, Spring 2016, Summer 2018.

### PERSONAL

Languages: English (fluent), Hindi (native)

Citizenship: India

## REFERENCES

# Wojciech Kopczuk (Sponsor)

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## **Donald Davis**

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