Dilip Ravindran

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Placement Chairs

Don Davis: drd28@columbia.edu

Suresh Naidu: <u>sn2430@columbia.edu</u>

Research Interests

Microeconomic Theory, Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Political Economy, Information Economics

References

Navin Kartik	Mark Dean	Alessandra Casella	Jörg Stoye
Professor	Associate Professor	Professor	Professor
Columbia University	Columbia University	Columbia University	Cornell University
<u>nkartik@columbia.edu</u>	mark.dean@columbia.edu	ac186@columbia.edu	stoye@cornell.edu
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Education			

Ph.D. in Economics, Columbia University	2015-21 (expected)
M. Phil. in Economics, Columbia University	2015-18
M.A. in Economics, Columbia University	2015-17
B.A. University of California, Berkeley Majors: Applied Mathematics, Economics; Minor: Physics	2011-2015

Job Market Paper

<u>Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games</u> (with Zhihan Cui, 2020)

Abstract: We study a Bayesian Persuasion game with multiple senders employing conditionally independent experiments. Senders have zero-sum preferences over what information is revealed. We characterize when a set of states cannot be pooled in any equilibrium, and in particular, when the state is (fully) revealed in every equilibrium. The state must be fully revealed in every equilibrium if and only if sender utility functions are sufficiently nonlinear. In the binary-state case, the state is fully revealed in every equilibrium if and only if some sender has nontrivial preferences. Our takeaway is that `most' zero-sum sender preferences result in full revelation.

Placement Assistant Amy Devine: aed2152@columbia.edu,

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Working Papers

Information Aggregation in Liquid Democracy (2020)

Work in Progress

A Better Test of Choice Overload
with Mark Dean and Jörg Stoye

Competition for Choice Overloaded Consumers

Learning to Ignore Non-rationalizable Actions with Evan Friedman and Jeremy Ward

Teaching and Research Experience

Teaching Fellowships

Intermediate Microeconomics (Undergraduate) Instructor: Ingmar Nyman	Spring 2020
Intermediate Microeconomics (Undergraduate) Instructor: Caterina Musatti	Spring 2019
Microeconomic Analysis I (Ph.D. 1st Year Course) Decision Theory, General Equilibrium, and Game Theory. Instructors: Mark Dean and Evan Sadler	Fall 2018
Microeconomic Analysis II (Ph.D. 1st Year Course) Game Theory and Contract Theory. Instructors: Navin Kartik and William Bentley Mcleod	Spring 2018
Principles of Economics (Undergraduate) Instructor: Caterina Musatti	Fall 2016, Spring 2017
Research Assistanceships	
Research Assistant for Mark Dean (Columbia University, Economics) (Hourly RA work)	Spring 2019, Spring 2018
Research Fellow for Navin Kartik (Columbia University, Economics)	Summer and Fall 2017
Research Assistant for Francois Gerard (Columbia University, Economics) (Hourly RA work)	Summer and Fall 2016
Research Assistant for Heather Haveman (Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley)	Spring 2014- Summer 15
Research Assistant for Steven Fish (UC Berkeley, Political Science)	Spring 2013

Technology for Emerging Markets Intern (Microsoft Research India)	Summer 2012
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Research Grants, Fellowships, and Awards

Lewis A Sanders Endowed Fellowship in Economics	2019-2020
Dissertation Fellowship (Department of Economics, Columbia University)	Fall 2019, Fall 2020
CELSS Research Grant (Columbia University Experimental Lab for Social Science Research); \$1000	2018
Runner-up, Vickery Prize for Best 3rd Year Paper (Department of Economics, Columbia University)	2018
Summer Research Fellowship (Program for Economic Research, Columbia University)	2017
Wueller Fellowship (Department of Economics, Columbia University)	2015-20
Dean's Fellowship (GSAS, Columbia University)	2015-16

Invited Seminar Presentations

2019: NYU Microeconomics Student Lunch

Personal

Citizenship: United States

Languages: English (native)