

# Motaz Al-Chanati

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EDUCATION **Ph.D. in Economics** 2016 – 2022 (expected)  
Columbia University, New York, NY

**Sc.B. in Applied Math-Economics, *magna cum laude*** 2011 – 2015  
Brown University, Providence, RI

RESEARCH Applied Microeconomics, Industrial Organization (primary)  
INTERESTS Urban Economics, Health and Education (secondary)

WORKING **Residential Segregation and the Demand for Schooling**  
PAPERS ***Job Market Paper***

How do schools affect where families choose to live and does their effect contribute to residential segregation? I study these questions using unique administrative microdata from Auckland, New Zealand, an ethnically diverse – but segregated – city. I develop and estimate a dynamic model of residential choice where forward-looking families choose neighborhoods based on their children’s schools, local amenities, and moving costs. Previous studies typically estimate school quality valuations using a boundary discontinuity design. I leverage attendance zones in this setting to also generate reduced form estimates using this methodology. The structural model estimates show that the valuation of school quality varies by the child’s school level and the family’s ethnicity; the reduced form approach, however, cannot capture this heterogeneity. Moreover, I find that the reduced form estimates are aligned only with white families’ valuations of quality. The model estimates also show that families experience a high disutility from moving houses if it results in their child changing school. In counterfactuals, I show that residential segregation increases as the link between housing and schools weakens.

## What Drives the Efficiency in Ridesharing Markets?

(with *Vinayak Iyer*)

Ridesharing platforms, who act as intermediaries in transport markets, improve upon traditional taxis along two key dimensions: surge pricing and centralized matching. We study how and why existing inefficiencies are solved by these two features and evaluate how alternate pricing and matching rules can improve outcomes. To this end, we develop a structural model of the ridesharing market with three components: (1) dynamically optimizing drivers who make entry, exit and search decisions; (2) stochastic demand; and (3) a matching technology. We evaluate the welfare effects of surge and matching separately. We also implement a simple change in the pricing rule by making it more flexible which is able to address both static and dynamic inefficiencies, thus generating large welfare gains for all agents. We conclude by drawing policy implications for improving the competitiveness of traditional taxis.

## Cutoff from Support: The Effects of Losing Cash Welfare

(with *Lucas Husted*)

We evaluate a policy reform in Michigan, which unexpectedly removed over 10,000 families from TANF. Affected families increase their employment by 4 percentage points (20% relative to the control mean), but become poorer as they are unable to offset the loss of welfare benefits.

WORK IN PROGRESS      Lunches for Loyalty: The Effect of Direct-to-Physician Advertising in New Drug Markets

The Efficiency Effects of Drug Acquisitions from Access to Sales Representatives (with *Kritika Goel*)

ACADEMIC AWARDS	Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University	2021
	NSF Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant [\$24,300]	2020
	Lewis A. Sanders Endowed Fellowship in Economics	2020
	Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University	2016–2020
	Program for Economic Research Research Grant [\$5,000]	2019
	Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award, Runner-Up	2019
	Phi Beta Kappa, Brown University	2015
	Omicron Delta Epsilon, Brown University	2015
	Undergraduate Teaching and Research Award	2015

TEACHING AWARDS	Wueller Teaching Award (Best Teaching Assistant)	
	Undergraduate Core Courses (runner-up)	2021
	Undergraduate Core Courses	2019
	Undergraduate Core Courses	2018
	Ph.D. Courses	2018
	Finalist, Presidential Teaching Award (10 of 500 nominations)	2021
	Best Ph.D. T.A., Association of Graduate Students in Economics	2019
CONFERENCES	National Tax Association Annual Conference*	2021
	Econometric Society Meeting, Delhi School of Economics*	2020
	(Nominated for Best Paper Prize)	
	Urban Economics Association Virtual Meeting*	2020
	NBER Health Economics Boot Camp	2018
	(* indicates presented by co-author)	
WORK EXPERIENCE	Research Assistant, Brown University	2015–2016
	R.A. for Professor Emily Oster and the Rhode Island Innovative Policy Lab (RIIPL)	
	Intern, New Zealand Superannuation Fund	2013
TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Columbia University	
	Labor Economics (instructor)	Summer 2019
	Intermediate Microeconomics	Fall 2020, Spring 2020
		Fall 2018, Spring 2018
	Advanced Microeconomics	Spring 2019
	Ph.D. Microeconomics	Fall 2017
	Brown University	
	Public Economics	Spring 2015
	Environmental Economics	Fall 2014
	Intermediate Microeconomics	Fall 2014
COMPUTER SKILLS	Python, R, SQL, Julia, Stata, L <sup>A</sup> T <sub>E</sub> X, QGIS, MATLAB, Excel	
	Github: <a href="https://github.com/motazAC">github.com/motazAC</a>	

PERSONAL *Citizenship:* New Zealand  
INFORMATION *U.S. work authorization:* Eligible for 3-year OPT  
*Languages:* English (native), Arabic (conversational)

REFERENCES **Miguel Urquiola** ([msu2101@columbia.edu](mailto:msu2101@columbia.edu))  
Chair and Professor of Economics and International and Public Affairs,  
Columbia University

**Bernard Salanié** ([bs2237@columbia.edu](mailto:bs2237@columbia.edu))  
Professor of Economics, Columbia University

**Cailin Slattery** ([crs2200@columbia.edu](mailto:crs2200@columbia.edu))  
Assistant Professor, Columbia Business School