

# JOHN W.E. CREMIN

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## Placement Chairs:

Sandra Black ([sblack@columbia.edu](mailto:sblack@columbia.edu))  
Suresh Naidu ([sn2430@columbia.edu](mailto:sn2430@columbia.edu))

Placement Assistant: Amy Devine

## Education:

2024 (expected)	Ph.D. Economics	Columbia University
2021	MPhil Economics	Columbia University
2020	M.A. Economics	Columbia University
2018	M.A. Economics	Cambridge University

## Honors and Awards:

2015-2016, Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University

## Fields of Specialization:

*Primary Field:* Microeconomic Theory (especially Social Learning)  
*Secondary Field:* The Economics of Networks

## Job Market Paper: Too Much Information & The Death of Consensus

Abstract: Modern society is increasingly polarized, even on purely factual questions, despite greater access to information than ever. In a model of sequential social learning, I study the impact of *motivated reasoning* on information aggregation. This is a belief formation process in which agents trade-off accuracy against ideological convenience. I find that even Bayesian agents only learn under extremely connected network structures, where agents have arbitrarily large neighborhoods asymptotically. This is driven by the fact that motivated agents sometimes reject the Bayesian belief implied by their neighbors' actions when it supports their disfavored state. Observing any finite neighborhood, there is always some probability that all of an agent's neighbors will have disregarded information thus. Moreover, I establish that consensus, where all agents eventually choose the same action, is only possible with relatively uninformative private signals and low levels of motivated reasoning.

## Working Paper: Online Partisanship and Learning through Anonymous Speech

Abstract: The intense partisanship of social media is often remarked upon in modern political discourse, here I show that exaggerated partisanship is to be expected when non-partisan agents

dislike to be caught making incorrect statements publicly. This is exacerbated by more limited information, and more extreme punishment for errors. I suggest the introduction of *partial* anonymous commenting as a solution.

### **Research and Work Experience:**

Research Assistant for Evan Sadler Academic Year 2022-23

Research Assistant for Navin Kartik Spring 2021

Research Assistant for Andrew Kosenko Fall 2021

### **Teaching Experience:**

I have worked as a Teaching Fellow for the following classes:

Fall 2019: Introduction to Econometrics UN3412, Professor Jushan Bai

Spring 2020: Introduction to Econometrics UN3412, Professor Thomas Piskula

Fall 2020: Principles of Economics UN1105, Professor Sunil Gulati

Spring 2021: Market Design GU4260, Professor Guillaume Haeringer

Fall 2021: Market Design GU4260, Professor Guillaume Haeringer

Spring 2022: Behavioral Economics GU4840, Professor Mark Dean

Teaching Evaluations are available upon request.

### **Languages:**

English (Native), French (Intermediate)

### **References:**

#### **Evan Sadler**

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