Dear all,

Thank you for reading this piece and for participating in the new NYCTC virtual works-in-progress group. I'm happy this group exists and grateful to have your feedback. This is a first draft of what I hope will be the first chapter of my dissertation. It is partly based on an MA paper that focused much more narrowly on Warsaw in 1905. As I've planned the dissertation, this first chapter will follow an Introduction on the significance of the Soviet-British confrontation for the postwar settlement and within the Russian Civil War. The following chapters will show how British and Soviet officials created new borders and national territories in the lands of the former Russian Empire after the First World War and in the 1920s.

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the British consular network in the Russian Empire in the two decades preceding the war, and to give an idea of the work performed by these figures. This is a scene-setting chapter and I want to know if it works in that way. I'm aiming for something that is grounded in personal relationships but that at the same time sets up a very broad imperial and international context. Those less interested in Warsaw in 1905 might skip pages 14-26.

Finally, though it goes without saying, this is a draft and should not be circulated or cited. There is material in this chapter that may be sensitive and needs to be further contextualized and documented before it goes out into the world. Some of the archives I have used for this paper and in my dissertation as a whole are difficult to get into and quick to close their doors. So, like an Okhrana circular, please treat this paper as SOVERSHENNO SEKRETNO.

Thank you again,

Sam

Chapter 1: Warsaw, 1897-1914

> *What a satire on all our boasted armaments and fleets if we prove powerless to rescue an Englishwoman from undeserved and barbarous torture.*[1]

Alex Murray wanted to leave Warsaw. Posted there in 1897, the Russian Revolution of 1905 had made the city a much more difficult consular posting than it had been when he was appointed Consul General eight years earlier. The daily experience of revolutionary violence, martial law, mass strikes, and shortages had affected Murray's nerves and health, his family's well-being, and his ability to perform his duties as Consul General. The revolution had also increased the cost of living. Combined with the Foreign Office's refusal to raise the salary of the post, or reduce the consul's rank and thus his social and material obligations—along with the fact that Murray's "personal means [had] failed"—these hardships made it "impossible" for Murray to "take [his] proper place" in Warsaw's diplomatic scene.[2]

Murray's concerns about affording the lifestyle of a British Consul General in Warsaw were motivated by both personal interest and the special political responsibilities of the post. Though Warsaw may have been a "consular backwater" relative to the Russian capital and within the British Foreign Office system as a whole, the post was at the center of complex geopolitical and inter-imperial relationships.[3] In Murray's own estimation, the Warsaw Consulate-General was an essential "observation point in a political storm center."[4] Unlike Germany and Austria, whose interests in Western Russia made Warsaw "one of their most important Consular posts," French and British interests in the territory were so small that "for commercial interests alone it is not

[1] "Tsardom and Miss Malecka," 24 May 1912, newspaper clipping and translation, Gosudarstvennii Arkhiv Rossiisskoi Federatsii, (GARF), f102 [DPOO 1911g], op241, d135, L82.
[2] Murray, "Warsaw Consulate General. Notes on Warsaw as a Consular post." August 6, 1905, FO 393/22 E 73.
[3] T. G. Otte, *The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 86, 87.
[4] Murray, "Warsaw Consulate General. Notes on Warsaw as a Consular post." August 6, 1905, FO 393/22 E 73.

worth their while."[5] Where the British Consulate-General proved its importance was rather in "representation and political information." In order to obtain political information and make effective representation "the British Consul General must be kept on the same footing as his colleagues" and "live like them," but this was not possible "on the pay of a second-class post." Either the political and intelligence directives of the mission in Warsaw should be abandoned, and the post only focus on commercial matters, or the salary should be increased. There was no middle road, apart from requiring, like the Austrian delegation, the Consul General to be a bachelor so that he would not have to support a family at this standard of living.[6]

What were Murray and his colleagues there to do? British consular postings in the Russian Empire involved a range of responsibilities. Consuls reported on the political situation in their territories and represented the rights and interests of British subjects. They issued passports and adjudicated claims to British citizenship, sometimes assisting British subjects who had fallen into difficult circumstances. Consuls maintained registers of the passports of British subjects entering and leaving the consular district, and kept registers of British births, marriages, and deaths. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, consuls reported on material resources in their districts and on economic and demographic data. Consuls also directly intervened with Russian authorities. Much of British consular intervention included small matters such as petitioning for easier passport procedures, asking for the reduction of customs fees and tariffs, or attempting to control the importation of German-made goods bearing false indications of British origin.[7] But British consular officials also

[5] Murray, "Warsaw Consulate General. Notes on Warsaw as a Consular post," 6 August 1905, TNA FO 393/22/73. See also Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended October 14th," 14 October 1905, TNA FO 393/22/74.
[6] Murray, "Warsaw Consulate General. Notes on Warsaw as a Consular post." 6 August 1905, TNA FO 393/22/73.
[7] See, e.g., Murray to St. Petersburg, "Passports. Asks obtain permission to be vised at Lodz," Despatch No. 9, 27 January 1906, TNA FO 393/23/13; Clive Bayley to Nicolson, 3 March 1910, TNA FO 393/24/47; Clive Bayley to Nicolson, 16 March 1910, TNA FO 393/24/49; Clive Bayley to Buchanan, 15 October 1912, Embassy No. 29/47, TNA FO 393/24/238; Grove to Buchanan, 21 November 1913, Embassy No. 21/24, TNA FO 393/24/296; Murray to

intervened on discrete matters concerning individual ships, cargos, fishing rights, factories, and British subjects, often acting autonomously from the Foreign Office or driving policy from the ground up. These interventions aimed at the overall maintenance of British prestige and were premised on the special rights of British subjects, even as they furthered commercial or political interests.

This chapter introduces the British consular network in the Russian Empire before illustrating this range of duties through consuls' semi-official efforts to monitor and protect British women in Russian Poland, concentrating on a specific case, the Malecka Affair of 1911-1912. It focuses on Warsaw as a city of the western Russian imperial borderlands characterized by pronounced urban, economic, and national tensions, but it also draws upon records from other places in order to show the broad consistency of consular activity in different environments. First, the chapter describes the distribution of British consulates in the Russian Empire and adjacent states, and the ways in which the staff of this consular network reported to the Foreign Office, the Embassy in St. Petersburg, between themselves and with other officials. I then outline the corresponding efforts of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and local Russian officials to monitor, contain, and accommodate the work of British consuls. Turning to the city of Warsaw and the territory of Russian Poland, I show how the proximity of the Austrian and German borders, urban and industrial development, and Polish separatism transformed Warsaw and Russian Poland into a revolutionary space, and how British officials dealt with these circumstances in their everyday work at the Consulate, focusing on the techniques they used to compile their reports and the forms of intervention they found acceptable. Russian officials maintained and activated the empire's border in pursuing and punishing revolutionaries, who in turn made use of the border for

St. Petersburg, "Goods falsely described as British. no restrictions as to import of," 8 November 1907, TNA FO 393/23/39 (9).

the safety and communications it offered. Issues connected with the Russian imperial border loomed large in the activities of the consular staff, though they reflected a different conception of borders and space than those the same officials would later develop in the wake of the Russian Empire's collapse.

The chapter concludes by examining one particular concern of the British consular staff in the Russian Empire: the welfare and honor of British women. Female domestic workers presented British consular officials with unique problems because of the gendered orders of labor and national subjecthood that deprived them of protections available to male foreign subjects. British consular officials' efforts to control and protect British women in Warsaw reveal the attitudes informing the maintenance of the British consular system as a whole, behind the rush of its daily commercial and political activities. Ultimately, the issues raised by the presence of British and other foreign female domestic workers in the territory of Russian Poland were issues of the external and internal borders of the Russian Empire and of who belonged inside them. The border "moved inland" as Russian and British officials tracked subjects of surveillance from the border to interior and urban spaces, maintaining and assigning subjecthood through intervention into the personal lives of British women and their acquaintances.[8] In the Malecka Affair, the Russian state's pursuit and prosecution of an alleged member of Polish revolutionary circles turned on a dispute over whether she was a British or a Russian subject. The outcry the case created in Britain associated Malecka's punishment with the global relationship between the British and Russian Empires, but British intervention in the case rested on the Consul and Vice Consul on the ground.

When he was appointed Consul General in Warsaw in 1897, Murray was one of roughly forty-five British consular officials in the Russian Empire, among five Consuls, three Consuls

[8] Celeste Menchaca, Dissertation, 134; Sara Pursley, *Familiar Futures: Time, Selfhood, and Sovereignty in Iraq* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019).

General, thirty-three Vice-Consuls, and four Consular Agents, not counting the nine members of the Embassy in St. Petersburg. In 1912, the number of consular officials had increased to fifty-six.[9] Britain had maintained diplomatic contacts with the Russian Empire since the mid-16th century. The first British consuls were sent to the Russian Empire in the 18th century, part of a major expansion of British trade with the Russian Empire. Significant British communities in Russian cities emerged in the 18th century, with British residents concentrated in the fields of commerce, medicine, shipbuilding, the navy and the military.[10] Anglo-Russian exchanges in the natural sciences, engineering, agriculture, estate management, and labor discipline, along with commercial connections, ensured the maintenance and growth of these communities throughout the 18th century.[11] Because of their commercial orientation, the British Consul was often the most significant figure in these 18th century British communities, holding greater responsibility and social weight than the Ambassador.[12] In the 19th century, diplomatic and consular contacts between Britain and Russia intensified as a consequence of both empires' position as great powers in the post-1815 system and through their geopolitical competition in Eurasia. Before 1914, consuls' twin economic and political roles expanded in both the inner Asian outposts of the "Great Game" and in the dense industrial web of the Russian Empire's western borderlands.

Consular records provide an extremely rich source base which has gone mostly unexamined. Consuls are more often treated as documentary sources rather than as historical actors

[9] *The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year-Book*, 1912, Godfrey E. P. Hertslet, ed. (London: Harrison and Sons, 1912), 45-46.
[10] Anthony Cross, *By the Banks of the Neva: Chapters from the Lives and Careers of the British in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
[11] Alessandro Stanziani, "The Traveling Panopticon: Labor Institutions and Labor Practices in Russia and Britain in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51:4 (2009), 715-41; Cross, *By the Banks of the Neva*, 177-178, 215-218, 240-261; Ryan Jones, *Empire of Extinction: Russians and the North Pacific's Strange Beasts of the Sea, 1741-1867* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 138-195. See also Robert E. Jones, *Bread Upon the Waters: The St. Petersburg Grain Trade and the Russian Economy, 1703-1811* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013).
[12] Cross, *By the Banks of the Neva*, 4-5, 50-89.

in their own right.[13] Recent work has indicated how changes in consular regimes drove changes in the international system as a whole.[14] Still, though recent interest in consuls has rightly fastened on the essential function of consuls in providing information and projecting influence, it often remains limited to pointing out consuls' importance within international and imperial systems rather than examining how consuls themselves shaped those systems.[15] Consuls were a central element of the global British imperial system and a significant political vector of British informal empire. Consular networks not only reported on events and made political representation but also shaped the systems of international order within which they operated. Looking ahead, the British consular network in the Russian Empire would help create a new order of national states out of the imperial spaces left over from the empire's collapse.

Murray and Vice Consul E. B. St. Clair worked alongside British consuls across the Russian Empire. Vice Consuls in smaller ports and cities reported to Consuls and Consuls General in larger regional hubs, unless they worked under a Consul in the same city, as in Warsaw. The Vice Consuls in the Baltic ports of Libau, Pernau, and Windau reported to the Consulate in Riga; the Vice Consuls in the Caucasus (Baku, Novorossiysk, and Poti) reported to the Consulate in Batoum. The many Vice Consuls in Finnish ports reported to the Consulate in Helsingfors. The Vice Consuls and Consular Agents scattered in cities across South Russia, Ukraine, and along the

[13] Eliyahu Feldman, "Reports from British Diplomats in Russia on the Participation of the Jews in Revolutionary Activity in Northwest Russia and the Kingdom of Poland, 1905-6," in Ezra Mendelsohn, ed., *Studies in Contemporary Jewry: Volume III: Jews and Other Ethnic Groups in a Multi-ethnic World* (Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 181-203; Eliyahu Feldman, "British Diplomats and British Diplomacy and the 1905 Pogroms in Russia," *The Slavonic and East European* Review, Vol. 65, No. 4 (October, 1987), 579-608.

[14] Holly Case, "The Quiet Revolution: Consuls and the International System in the Nineteenth Century," in Timothy Snyder and Katherine Younger, eds., *The Balkans as Europe, 1821–1914* (Rochester: Rochester University Press, 2018). For the classic work on the Consular Service as a whole, see D. C. M. Platt, *The Cinderella Service: British Consuls Since 1825* (New York: Archon Books, 1971). See also T. G. Otte, *The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Zara Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

[15] Heather Streets-Salter, "Consuls, Colonies and the World: Low-level Bureaucrats and the Machinery of Empire, c. 1880–1914," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 20:3 (Winter 2019).

northern shores of the Black Sea reported to the Consulate General in Odessa and at other times to the Consulate in Taganrog; the Vice Consuls in the Russian interior and Siberia (Krasnoyarsk, Omsk) reported to Moscow.[16] All of these consular posts reported to the British Embassy in St. Petersburg. In adjacent states like Persia, consuls and vice consuls reported to the Embassy in Tehran but also directly to St. Petersburg, and Tehran and St. Petersburg were in constant contact.

Charles Hardinge, Ambassador from 1904-1906, had served in Tehran, as had Arthur Nicolson, who succeeded Hardinge as Ambassador after he became Permanent Under-Secretary. When Nicolson also left to become Permanent Under-Secretary, he was replaced by George Buchanan. In addition to corresponding with these Ambassadors, Consuls and Vice Consuls corresponded officially and privately with lower ranking members of the Embassy staff. They also communicated directly with the Foreign Office in London. Finally, Consuls and Vice Consuls communicated laterally with one another across the regional delimitations of consular districts.

The Russian state, in turn, monitored these outposts of British imperial power with its own internal and external administrations. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also maintained a dense consular network across Eurasia concentrated in many of the same spaces as the British consular service. The Russian state used consuls to impose its strategic and commercial policies on weaker states on its borders, appointing consuls in Kobdo [Khovd] in eastern Mongolia and Aigun in Manchuria in order to impose pressure on the Chinese government in 1911, for example, and a vice consul and military escort to Khoi to check Ottoman infiltration of northwestern Persia in the same year.[17] Russian consuls had de facto control over the northern provinces of Persia.

[16] *The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year-Book*, 1912, Godfrey E. P. Hertslet, ed. (London: Harrison and Sons, 1912), 45-46.
[17] Buchanan, "Annual Report on Russia for the Year 1911," inclosure in Buchanan to Grey, "Annual Report, 1911," 18 March 1912, *BDFA*, Part I, Series A: Russia, 1859-1914, Volume 6, 1910-1914, Document 91 and 92, 195-234, 201, 208.

Consuls with Cossack guards and regular Russia troops garrisoned cities, patrolled roads, carried out military operations, protected Russian settlers, and even collected taxes. In these areas of dense consular power networks and Anglo-Russian overlap, consulates functioned as direct outposts of Russian imperial power. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also interacted with British diplomatic and consular representatives within the Russian Empire. British consular officials corresponded with and were monitored by MID, MVD, police and local government officials in Warsaw.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs even had a system for intercepting and deciphering the communications of the British diplomatic apparatus in the Russian Empire and adjacent states.[18] The MID Chancellery intercepted cipher telegrams between the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg and other Embassy staff, the Foreign Office, and consular posts throughout the Russian Empire and in adjacent states like Persia and the Ottoman Empire. MID officials deciphered and transcribed these telegrams and kept track of changes in the British encryption systems; one note in these files, in a short gap in telegrams of a few days, indicates the adoption of a new code by the British and the "still little advanced" efforts of a Mr. Ziegler to solve it.[19] Even with the difficulties of keeping up with the cipher the MID transcribed thousands of Foreign Office telegrams in 1911 alone. British Foreign Office representatives were not aware their encoded telegrams were being read. They sent messages concerning anti-Russian maneuvers in Persia, the Ottoman-Persian border, and other sensitive and "secret" matters.[20] They advised each other on what to say to their Russian diplomatic counterparts in London and St. Petersburg, not realizing that those diplomats were reading their briefs in advance.[21] British representatives even

[18] See Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiisskoi Imperii (AVPRI), Fond 133 (Chancellery MID), opis' 470, dela 47, 48, 49, 50, 51.
[19] AVPRI f133, op470, d47, L9.
[20] Buchanan to Grey, 22 September 1911 No. 224, AVPRI f133, op470, d50, L120.
[21] See e.g. Grey to O'Beirne, 23 October 1911 No. 639, AVPRI f133, op470, d51, L70.

occasionally sent cipher telegrams alluding to their presumed security and to the fact that they would not be read by the Russian authorities.

According to the 1897 Imperial census, Warsaw was the third largest city in the Russian Empire, with a population of more than 600,000. Since Murray's appointment in the same year, the city had only continued to grow. At the beginning of 1905, Warsaw's "population [was] nearly 800,000."[22] The city's 1914 population was well over a million. Like Riga, Dvinsk, Libava, Tampere, Minsk, Vilna, and Odessa, Warsaw and Lodz drew in workers from across the Russian Empire to work in the thriving textile, machine, and shipping industries. The industrial towns also drew foreign workers from the Austrian and German empires. British domestic workers were a part of this labor system as well, whether working in middle-class houses, on gentry estates, or in service in the city of Warsaw. The growth of Warsaw and Lodz had been fueled by industrial development unmatched anywhere in the Russian Empire. British capital had been invested in Polish manufacturing, especially in the textile industry, and British firms had established mills and factories throughout the Consular District. Foreign workers and foreign investment in turn attracted foreign representatives to protect and advocate for them.

Russian Poland was also a *revolutionary* space, the hub of international revolutionary networks.[23] Russian Poland was uniquely exposed to influence from other places, to actors from different states across its borders, and to groups of foreign citizens. Polish revolutionaries used Austrian Galicia as a base from which to launch bank robberies and attack Russian local government administration offices across the border.[24] In 1910 and 1911 the activities of

[22] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on June 11th – 17th," Despatch No. 24, 17 June 1905, TNA FO 393/22/38.
[23] Alfred Rieber, *Stalin and the Struggle for Supremacy in Eurasia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 18, 25.
[24] Warsaw General-Governor to the Governors of the Privislinskii Krai and the Warsaw Ober-Policemaster, 14 July 1910, GARF f215, op1, d19, L4.

revolutionary organizations intensified in Russian Poland and across Western Russia. The Warsaw General-Governor had received information that three "fighting squads [boevye chetverki]" had been formed in Cracow for robbing banks and post offices in Russian Poland.[25] Money and passport blanks were stolen from *gmina* administration offices near the border.[26] Armed groups carried out these robberies and made attacks on local land guards.[27] Major robberies of large government sums were committed for the needs of the parties.[28] In response, Russian imperial officials in Poland, across the western governorates, and in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) sent a series of circulars to the governors, local administrators (nachalniki), and police captains of Russian Poland calling for increased vigilance against the revolutionary movement, greater preparedness among the police and local administrations, and harsher punishments for those apprehended.[29] The Privislinskii krai administration was too lenient (slishkom sniskhoditelno) with people supporting "Polish separatist tendencies."[30] Attacks against post offices and members of the local land guards proved that the police were underprepared and poorly trained, and called for increased vigilance and harsher measures.[31]

These calls for vigilance accordingly included demands regarding not only the apprehending and punishment of revolutionary agents but also regarding the staffing and

[25] Warsaw General-Governor to the Governors of the Privislinskii Krai and the Warsaw Ober-Policemaster, 14 July 1910, GARF f215, op1, d19, L4. See also Warsaw General-Governor to the Governors of the Privislinskii Krai and the Warsaw Ober-Policemaster, 1 December 1910, GARF f215, op1, d19, L8.
[26] General-Adjutant Skalon of the Warsaw General-Governor to the Governors of the Privislinskii Krai, 17 September 1910, GARF f215, op1, d19, L5; GARF f215, op1, d19, L1-3, unsigned and undated circular; Warsaw General-Governor General-Adjutant Skalon to Governors of the Privislinskii Krai, 7 October 1910, GARF f215, op1, d19, L7.
[27] Warsaw General-Governor General-Adjutant Skalon to Governors of the Privislinskii Krai, 7 October 1910, GARF f215, op1, d19, L7.
[28] Warsaw General-Governor to the Governors of the Privislinskii Krai and the Warsaw Ober-Policemaster, 1 December 1910, GARF f215, op1, d19, L8.
[29] Warsaw General-Governor to the Governors of the Privislinskii Krai, 5 March 1911, GARF f215, op1, d13, L17; Warsaw General-Governor General-Adjutant Skalon to Governors of the Privislinskii Krai, 7 April 1911, GARF f215, op1, d13, L19;
[30] Warsaw General-Governor to the Governors of the Privislinskii Krai and to the Warsaw Ober-Policemaster, 24 February 1911, GARF f215, op1, d13, L16.
[31] Warsaw General-Governor to the Governors of the Privislinskii Krai, 5 March 1911, GARF f215, op1, d13, L17.

organization of the local levels of Russian administration in Poland.[32] The lower ranks of the local city police were so poorly trained that the Warsaw Governor General's office circulated a protocol on stopping and apprehending a criminal, including instructions on what to say, when and how to fire, and how to subdue the suspect.[33] Governors were commanded to pay special attention to money-holding post offices, money-bearing postal transports, and asked to make special arrangements to guard them on the roads, making sure the men guarding them were well trained and of the right sort.[34] The Governor General insisted that local Governors keep state money in secure banks, pay special personal attention to the readiness of the local police command, and asked that uezd administrators personally check and organize the local capacity for defense of finances in their localities.[35]

The theft of passport blanks forced the Warsaw administration to institute special measures for the protection of these uniquely valuable pieces of paper. The Governor General ordered that the passport and gmina administrations keep as few as possible of them on hand at any given time, and determine what the minimum was based on their experience of the volume of their work.[36] Governors should pay special attention to places where passports were held and arm themselves in the case of new robbery attempts.[37] The attacks called for the intensification of the Russian state's exercise of power in the Polish countryside and at places of local administration; if this was

[32] Warsaw General-Governor General-Adjutant Skalon to Governors of the Privislinskii Krai, 7 April 1911, GARF f215, op1, d13, L19.
[33] Chancellery of the Warsaw Governor General, Instruction to the Urban Ranks [Gorodovym] of the Warsaw City Police, [Spring 1911], GARF f215, op1, d13, L18.
[34] Warsaw General-Governor General-Adjutant Skalon to Governors of the Privislinskii Krai, 7 April 1911, GARF f215, op1, d13, L19
[35] Warsaw General-Governor to the Governors of the Privislinskii Krai and the Warsaw Ober-Policemaster, 1 December 1910, GARF f215, op1, d19, L8.
[36] General-Adjutant Skalon of the Warsaw General-Governor to the Governors of the Privislinskii Krai, 17 September 1910, GARF f215, op1, d19, L5; Warsaw General-Governor General-Adjutant Skalon to Governors of the Privislinskii Krai, 7 October 1910, GARF f215, op1, d19, L7.
[37] Warsaw General-Governor General-Adjutant Skalon to Governors of the Privislinskii Krai, 7 October 1910, GARF f215, op1, d19, L7

not possible given local capacities, these administrative/authoritative responsibilities and the materials associated with them had to be shifted to higher levels of administration, and the passport blanks could not be kept at the lowest and most local level of administration..[38] These measures forced local authorities in Russian Poland to ask for new passport blanks more frequently through a dedicated bureaucratic process. The revolutionary movement in Poland, both motivated and facilitated by the border with Austria, led the Russian state to seek to more closely control the movement and identification of subjects as well as the material objects necessary for verifying identity and legalizing movement. The Warsaw Governor General instituted new bureaucratic processes tasking local administrators with the control of paper, the material forms of state knowledge, and information.

Lenin and Nadezhda Krupskaya, in fact, moved from Paris to Cracow in May 1912 in order to be in closer contact with both the legal and illegal arms of the RSDRP organization in Russia.[39] Lenin stayed there until late August 1914 along with Krupskaya, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Inessa Armand, Bukharin, and many others.[40] Lenin's move to Cracow was partly motivated by the mounting strike wave of 1910-1912 and by the launch of the new legal Bolshevik daily, *Pravda*, in St. Petersburg earlier in the spring. Though Lenin complained that his limited knowledge of Polish kept him from being able to use the city's libraries, Cracow's proximity to the Russian border enabled Lenin to hold meetings of the Central Committee there throughout 1912 and 1913, to meet with Stalin throughout the fall of 1912, and to convene the "February" Meeting of the

[38] General-Adjutant Skalon of the Warsaw General-Governor to the Governors of the Privislinskii Krai, 17 September 1910, GARF f215, op1, d19, L5.
[39] R. C. Elwood, "Lenin and Pravda, 1912-1914," *Slavic Review* 31:2 (June, 1972), 355-380, 362, 364; Nadezhda Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin* (New York: International Publishers, 1970 [1933]), 233-282; Lenin to Gorky, c. 25 August 1912, *Collected Works*, Volume 35, 54-55; Lenin to Gorky, c. early January 1913, *Collected Works*, Volume 35, 69-72. Incidentally, it was at a meeting in Galicia that Lenin encouraged Stalin's work on the national question in early 1913. Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin*, 261-262.
[40] Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin*, 258-259.

Party in January 1913 and the "Summer" Conference that October.[41] The RSDRP's Sixth Party Congress was scheduled to take place in Galicia in August 1914. The fact that Lenin's residence in Cracow did not immediately allow him to exert the control over *Pravda* that he had desired, and further exposed the party to infiltration by double agents of the Okhrana, only underlines the proximity and communication possible in this imperial border space.[42]

As Krupskaya wrote, their exile in Cracow was "only half emigration" because it was so close to the community of Social Democrats in Russia.[43] "Cracow was more convenient than Paris" because of the "proximity of the Russian frontier. People could cross it very often. The mail to Russia was not held up."[44] Peasant women coming from Russia to the market in Cracow would take letters back across the border and post them in Russia to avoid the suspicion normally attached to foreign correspondence.[45] The Bolsheviks used forged and stolen *polupaski*—"half" passes issued to local inhabitants to allow them to cross the border for daily activities—to facilitate the movements of illegal party members across the border.[46] They learned this maneuver from Polish political emigres in Galicia. The SDKPiL and the PPS used the same techniques and, as mentioned above, stole passport blanks from vulnerable gmina administrations to disguise their members' illegal movements across the border. The question of the status of foreign workers as international subjects was inseparable from Russian Poland's revolutionary environment and its border location.

National separatism in Poland made Warsaw a unique type of Consulate General. In October 1905, as the revolution neared its height, Murray claimed to have made enquiries "as a

[41] Elwood, "Lenin and Pravda," 362, 364, 368, 370; Lenin to Gorky, c. 25 August 1912, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, 55; Lenin, Notification and Resolutions of the Cracow Meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Functionaries, *Collected Works*, Volume 18, 447-466; Lenin, Resolutions of the Summer 1913 Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Officials, *Collected Works*, Volume 19, 417-431.
[42] Elwood, "Lenin and Pravda," 362-373.
[43] Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin*, 235.
[44] Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin*, 233.
[45] Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin*, 236.
[46] Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin*, 236-237.

matter of curiosity" as to how a reduction of the rank of the Consulate General would be received.[47] The Russians would simply view this "with indifference and as a withdrawal of Great Britain from openly interesting herself in Russo-Polish relations," but "the Poles would be furious." As Murray explained, it was "always considered that Warsaw is a semi-diplomatic post, en attendant…occasion for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Poland."[48] The Warsaw Consulate General, Murray argued, was a British gesture to the Polish state in suspension. The Consulates General in Warsaw recognized the Polish nation currently subsumed under Russian imperial rule and anticipated its eventual restoration. Given this context, the Poles would consider any reduction in the British consulate's status "as depriving them of the semi-recognition as a nation which they consider has been accorded to them…by the maintenance of a Consulate General."[49] This withdrawal of recognition would be all the more difficult to take given that the Poles were at that moment "obtaining recognition as a separate nationality and some measure of independence from the Russian Government" through the events of the revolution.[50] The subordinate position of Poland raised the stakes of the British Consulate General's mission.

Consular reports from Warsaw provide a day-to-day and often minute-by-minute record of the impressions and activities of British representatives in Russian Poland during the revolutionary moment of 1905-1906 and the years that followed. The letter books in which these reports are contained include telegraphic communications, ledgers and diagrams, maps, tables, newspaper

[47] Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended October 14th," 14 October 1905, TNA FO 393/22/74.
[48] Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended October 14th," 14 October 1905, TNA FO 393/22/74. Analogous claims to historical statehood Cite that Wheatley article on ancient claims to statehood ; maybe cite a Case article [or put down with paragraph on successive Polish constitutions (and cite law article on council of state)]
[49] Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended October 14th," 14 October 1905, TNA FO 393/22/74.
[50] Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended October 14th," 14 October 1905, TNA FO 393/22/74.

clippings and translations, memos, speeches, pamphlets, posters, and letters written by others. The material accretion of these enclosures testifies to the process of compiling reports and to the priorities, attitudes, and discursive habits consular work engendered and entailed. Everyday experience, habit, and behavior structured the act of consular reporting and provided the basis of consular reports.

Consular reports were based on the direct experience of the consul's everyday work and reflexively alluded to this basis in personal experience and firsthand observation. Murray and St. Clair's framed their reports in terms of food, crafts and trades, animals, prices, disease, recovery, forms of licit and illicit language and speech, printed materials, transportation, and street violence. They aimed for documentary fidelity through anecdotal insight. In his reports, Murray drew attention to the change the revolutionary environment had wrought on his day-to-day experiences and expectations, emphasizing the usefulness and representativeness of his personal experiences and claiming that an "account of personal experience will give…a better idea of life at Warsaw at the present time than a mere record of events."[51]

Murray was anxious to demonstrate the relevance of his reports, as he had heard that his superiors at the FO had "a very unflattering opinion" of his work.[52] Murray promised Hardinge that he "may depend on me to keep you thoroughly posted as to what goes on in Western Russia," insisting that "I really do think I can give good information."[53] After his promise to provide more frequent and thorough reports, Murray wrote to St. Petersburg to detail the disturbances that occurred in Warsaw on May Day. A peaceful "procession with red flags" was fired upon by an

[51] Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. State of Affairs at Warsaw," Despatch No. 41, August 23, 1905, FO 393/22 E 57. See also Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended August 26th." August 26, 1905, FO 393/22 E 60.
[52] Murray to Hardinge, "Despatches Political will send more frequently," April 17, 1905, FO 393/22 E 23.
[53] Murray to Hardinge, "Despatches Political will send more frequently," April 17, 1905, FO 393/22 E 23.

army picquet after the police had failed to disperse the marchers. Murray wrote that "30 dead and 37 seriously wounded were taken" to a single hospital.[54] In his next dispatch Murray would revise the number of casualties to "50 killed or died of wounds and 100 wounded."[55] Another clash that evening left four workers dead and seven wounded. Later that evening near the Vienna station, at the corner of Jerusalem avenue and Marszalowska street, a bomb was thrown into a Cossack patrol "killing three Cossacks and their horses and a Jew" and wounding two Cossacks and a policeman. After the bomb, "Disorder continued for about 2 hours in the Marszalowska, Hussars…cutting down several single individuals at a considerable distance." Murray observed that "the bomb appears to have been very powerful, human intestines still hanging on the telephone wires over head, when I passed the spot about 9,30 a.m. this morning." Though the government would not "admit that any soldier or policeman was killed," Murray testified that "I myself saw the dead bodies of a Cossack and a soldier of the Lithuanian regiment before 5 p.m."[56]

Many of the items in Murray's reports came from such personal, visceral observation and direct experience on the streets of Warsaw. Murray's reports on the First of May seem to draw from the experience of navigating the revolutionary urban environment on foot. To describe the unrest in the city, Murray contrasted May 1 with a usual day: "The street ambulance was called out 36 times, the usual daily average being about 25 times. In 34 cases they found only dead bodies."[57] Murray picked up direct reports from his subordinates, relaying the mood of the Russian

[54] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Reports, April 25th – May 2nd," Despatch No. 14, May 2, 1905, FO 393/22 E 28.
[55] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Reports. May 2nd," Despatch No. 15, undated, FO 393/22 E 29.
[56] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Reports, April 25th – May 2nd," Despatch No. 14, May 2, 1905, FO 393/22 E 28.
[57] Ibid. Murray's sense of normality may be gleaned from his description of May 5, on which "the factories were working, shops were open and life took its usual course." Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Reports. May 2nd," Despatch No. 15, undated, FO 393/22 E 29.

troops in the city through the observation of "Mr. Vice Consul St. Clair, passing just now along the Marszalowska, [who] heard the officer of a picquet adjuring his men not to fire too high."[58]

The efforts of the Consul and Vice-Consul to provide reports on the situation in revolutionary Poland were hindered by the physical danger of the revolutionary urban environment. In April, two door porters were killed in the street behind the Consulate.[59] Murray complained that "Bands of roughs go round the houses and stop people in the streets extorting money."[60] Though military law had been declared throughout Russian Poland, "the actual effect…to the ordinary citizen is that he is liable to be robbed after dark by the soldiers on patrol."[61]

Direct observation could not provide information about other sites of unrest outside Warsaw. In May, Murray lamented the fact that he had not "been able to get reliable details" on events in Lodz and Kalisz.[62] As the strikes intensified and the censorship tightened over the course of the summer, Murray claimed that he could not rely on the press at all and had to rely exclusively "on private information which, if more reliable, is not complete."[63] In late October, St. Clair reported that there was no news from Lodz as only the official Russian government paper had appeared.[64] Murray therefore made use of other "English sources" residing in or passing through the area, especially to obtain "real" casualty figures when Russian government reports were

[58] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Reports, April 25th – May 2nd," Despatch No. 14, May 2, 1905, FO 393/22 E 28.
[59] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Reports, April 20 – 25," Despatch No. 13, April 25, 1905, FO 393/22 E 27.
[60] Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended Dec. 23rd, 1905," December 23, 1905, FO 393/22 E 95.
[61] Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended Dec. 23rd, 1905," December 23, 1905, FO 393/22 E 95. These reports are also borne out by reports from the French Consul during the same period. See Ascher, Vol. 1, 134-135.
[62] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Reports, April 25th – May 2nd," Despatch No. 14, May 2, 1905, FO 393/22 E 28.
[63] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report for week ended August 19th," August 19, 1905, FO 393/22 E 56.
[64] St. Clair to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended October 28th." Despatch No. 57, October 28, 1905, FO 393/22 E 78.

unreliable,[65] as much as he gleaned information from conversations with local police officers and higher officials.[66] St. Clair and Murray relied upon these informants in order to extend the reach of their reporting throughout the district, reproducing specific codes of behavior and reinforcing British expatriate networks centered on commercial and industrial investment in the territory.

Murray and St. Clair covered the whole district on periodic tours to gather information. They traveled to Lodz, Czestochowa, Vilno, Kalisz, Kovno, Suwalki, and other districts, making several trips per year. They focused on the situation in "the industrial districts." Tens of thousands were striking at Lodz, while "At Kovno the workers in the timber yards, leather and iron works and also clerks [were] on strike, at Vilno the cab drivers."[67] "The chief apparent feature of local politics at present," Murray wrote in mid-August, "is chaos."[68] Consuls across the Russian Empire took similar tours of the cities and countryside in their consular districts. Consuls often sent the Vice Consul or Consular Agent to conduct these tours, or left them in charge of the consulate while they traveled. Vice Consuls were generally more mobile than Consuls, even in postings where they were the sole consular representative.

Murray and St. Clair depicted conditions in revolutionary Russian Poland according to a set of scripts covering life in "colonial" environments. Murray emphasized his familiarity with colonial environments as a qualification for being an effective Consul General. Murray could give

[65] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on June 18th – 24th," Despatch No. 25, June 24, 1905, FO 393/22 E 39.
[66] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current affairs in Poland. Report on for week ending July 15th, 1905," Despatch No. 32, July 15, 1905, FO 393/22 E 48; Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report for week ended August 19th," August 19, 1905, FO 393/22 E 56; Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. State of Affairs at Warsaw," Despatch No. 41, August 23, 1905, FO 393/22 E 57.
[67] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on – May 6th – 12th," Despatch No. 18, May 12, 1905, FO 393/22 E 32; St. Clair to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on. June 4th – June 10th," Despatch No. 22, June 10, 1905, FO 393/22 E 36; Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on June 11th – 17th," Despatch No. 24, June 17, 1905, FO 393/22 E 38.
[68] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended August 12th," Despatch No. 37, August 12, 1905, FO 393/22 E 53.

"good information" not only because he was "in touch with all classes and know the country thoroughly," but also because "Poland [was] really an alien colony." "Colonial government," Murray wrote Hardinge, "is a subject I know something about, as I have lived or served in Madeira, Tenerife, Ireland in time of trouble, Egypt, Malta, Ceylon." In addition to these British colonial possessions, Murray had lived in their Russian imperial equivalents: "the Caucasus, Crimea, and Poland which are really Russian colonies."[69] Poland was a colonial territory, no less than Ireland, Egypt, or Ceylon, and was best treated by the British consular mission there as such.[70] Poland was "like Macaulay's prisoner," both in the sense that the sub-imperial position of Poland was like that of India and in the sense that the Poles were analogously unprepared for self-government.[71]

After the mass uprisings of December 1905, Murray reflected on the demands of the "revolutionists." "The demand of the revolutionists for universal suffrage is absurd," Murray declared, because "The people are not now prepared for self-government but the question naturally arises when and how and under what circumstances will they ever become fitted for it."[72] Murray advocated the gradual devolution of governmental responsibility to Poland in an unmistakable idiom: "they must be gradually educated to a sense of their responsibilities for, like Macaulay's prisoner, they will naturally be dazed and blinded when led out into the sunlight to which they must become accustomed to appreciate and utilise it."[73] Poland, like India, could only be brought

[69] Murray to Hardinge, "Despatches Political will send more frequently," April 17, 1905, FP 393/22 E 23.
[70] Comparisons of British imperial dominions to the subject nations and territories of Eastern European empires were common in the first decades of the twentieth century. R. W. Seton-Watson wrote in 1911 that "To the student of British politics the Croatian problem should be of special interest…for Croatia supplies the sole genuine analogy upon the Continent of Europe to the position which Ireland would occupy under a system of Home Rule." R. W. Seton-Watson, Preface, *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy* (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1911), ix.
[71] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended December 30th, 1905," Despatch No. 73, December 30, 1905, FO 393/22 E 96.
[72] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended December 30th, 1905," Despatch No. 73, December 30, 1905, FO 393/22 E 96.
[73] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended December 30th, 1905," Despatch No. 73, December 30, 1905, FO 393/22 E 96.

slowly into self-government, under patient tutelage; too much autonomy would risk severing the protective and educative relationship too soon, before the subject had matured, and spoil the very possibility of independence.

The demand for a republic was "also absurd," according to Murray, because "the task of adjusting republican forms and procedure to a people who by inheritance and tradition know nothing of the difficult art of self-government would be impossible."[74] Due to "centuries of vassalage" which had "accustomed the people to obedience," the subjects of the Russian Empire were not fit for representative self-government.[75] As it was, the constitutional concessions granted in the October Manifesto went "as far in the direction of democratic government as a people who have just emerged from a long night of slavery and ignorance are prepared to go with safety."[76]

Poland's perceived status as a colony determined the context in which consuls intervened in and reported on events there. In anticipation of a cholera epidemic expected to occur later that year in Poland, Murray wrote to Hardinge about his own personal remedy for cholera, acquired from "a Pole in the service of the Turkish Government" on a riverboat from Baghdad to Basra in August 1889, "when the cholera then prevalent in Eastern Persia was [at] its worst." On the voyage,

> a considerable number of the passengers and the crew died, no remedy appearing to be of any use… As I was interested in cholera of which I had considerable experience in Egypt, Marseilles, Naples, and Malta Dr. de Browski told me on arrival at Basrah that he had received telegraphic orders from the Turkish government to try doses of 30 drops of acetic acid with 10 drops of sweet spirit of nitre in a little water as a remedy… in the evening [he] told me that he had been able by means of it to save 72 cases out of 75 and the next day he

[74] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended December 30th, 1905," Despatch No. 73, December 30, 1905, FO 393/22 E 96.
[75] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended December 30th, 1905," Despatch No. 73, December 30, 1905, FO 393/22 E 96.
[76] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended December 30th, 1905," Despatch No. 73, December 30, 1905, FO 393/22 E 96.

> had similar success. … [I]n 1892, when there was cholera in the Caucasus and I induced the local authorities at Batoum to give this prescription a trial it was also found a success.[77]

Murray wrote a column for the semi-official *Varshavskii dnevnik* relating the same story he had written to Hardinge earlier in the month and publicly advising the same remedy.[78] The newspaper article is almost a direct Russian translation of Murray's letter to Hardinge. Just as Murray's reports emphasized and incorporated direct, particular everyday experience in their descriptions of revolutionary unrest and their production of "good information" about the revolutionary situation, here colonial experience and knowledge was instantiated at the level of the everyday, practical remedy, particular in its colonial origin but transferable between equivalent colonial environments.

The dissemination of cholera remedies was not merely a demonstration of British colonial-medical knowledge but a response to real concerns in 1905.[79] A strike of the men at the Warsaw sewage works exacerbated the likelihood and the fear of an outbreak.[80] The disruptions caused by the revolution also contributed indirectly to the risk of disease.[81] As the epidemic threatened, Murray emphasized that "So far no case of cholera has actually occurred in Russian territory," but made special preparations for its arrival, asking "the Governor General officially to have me

[77] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Cholera. asks recommend remedy for," Despatch No. 10, April 19, 1905, FO 393/22 E 24.
[78] A. Morei, "Sredstvo potiv [sic] kholery" ("Remedy against cholera"), *Varshavskii dnevnik*, April 29 (May 5) 1905, No. 117, enclosed in Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Cholera. asks recommend remedy for," Despatch No. 10, April 19, 1905, FO 393/22 E 24.
[79] By the first week of October the cholera had spread to Lodz, Lomza, and Warsaw, with a total of 79 reported cases and 46 deaths, not including sixteen further cases and six deaths that had not been officially reported. From the week before, cholera cases and returns were included in every report. Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended October 7th, 1905, October 7, 1905, FO 393/22 E 71. See for example St. Clair to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Cholera. Weekly return as to." Despatch No. 66, December 2, 1905, FO 393/22 E 88. These reports were often delivered in code. See St. Clair to St. Petersburg, "Cholera. reports at Wloclawek." Telegraph, September 19, 1905, TNA FO 393/22/64; St. Clair to St. Petersburg, "Cholera. Reports at Lodz." Telegraph, September 22, 1905, TNA FO 393/22/65. In these cases the code-word "calvinize" is substituted for "cholera."
[80] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on, for week ended July 29," Despatch No. 35, 28 July 1905, TNA FO 393/22/51.
[81] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on, for week ended July 29," Despatch No. 35, 28 July 1905, TNA FO 393/22/51.

informed of any cases that may occur."[82] In early September, Murray reported "the outbreak of cholera on the lower Vistula in German territory and precautionary measures have been taken at the frontier."[83] Later, in 1907, a cholera outbreak at Grodno led the Germans to establish a sanitary cordon on their frontier.[84] Such measures were also established across internal imperial frontiers: in the fall of the same year, St. Clair reported that "measures of quarantine have been adopted in the government of Lublin in view of the fact that several cases of cholera have been reported in the adjacent government of Volhynia."[85]

The threat of cholera in 1905 was framed not only in terms of colonial medicine and imperial migration regimes but within an implicit hierarchy of civilizational development. "The sanitary arrangements at Warsaw and Lodz are in a very bad state and quite inefficient to combat successfully the cholera," St. Clair wrote, continuing, "if more energetic measures will not be taken shortly, cholera may become epidemic like in middle ages."[86] The revolution and the poor administrative practices of the Russian state threatened to return industrialized and urban central Poland to a prior civilizational stage, to the conditions of the "middle ages." The fact that cholera had not been known outside of India before 1817 both highlights the reflexive, stock character of St. Clair's stadial evaluation and underlines the colonial coordinates to which it implicitly referred.

In the next chapter, I show how consuls' practices of monitoring British commercial, financial, and manufacturing interests in the Russian Empire were extended and intensified during the Russian Revolution and after the Soviet state's seizure of raw materials, financial investments

[82] Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended September 9th, 1905," Despatch No. 45, 9 September 1905, TNA FO 393/22/62.
[83] Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended September 2nd." Despatch No. 44, 2 September 1905, TNA FO 393/22/61.
[84] Murray to St. Petersburg, "Cholera. reports apparent cases in govt. of Grodno." 19 August 1907, TNA FO 393/23/33.
[85] St. Clair to St. Petersburg, "Cholera. measures of quarantine adopted in govt of Lublin," Despatch No. 28, 28 October 1907, TNA FO 393/23/37.
[86] St. Clair to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on for week ended September 23rd." Despatch No. 47, 23 September 1905, TNA FO 393/22/66.

and currency, enterprises, and sites of production. The activities of Murray and St. Clair in protecting private British financial interests in the Russian Empire during the Revolution of 1905 provide precedents for similar efforts to account for resources as the empire fell apart.

During the Revolution of 1905, Murray and St. Clair were asked to protect British factories and the British subjects who managed them. Between April, 1905 and February 1907, Murray and St. Clair intervened for British manufacturing interests, their managers, property, or operations roughly fifteen times. The bulk of interventions centered on several large British-owned enterprises: The T. I. Birkin & Co. Lace Works in Warsaw's Wola suburb, the Lodz Manufacturing Co. in Widzew near Lodz, Messrs. Briggs's Bradford Mills worsted complex at Marki outside Warsaw, and the Greenwood machine factory in Lodz. Though these interventions were aimed at protecting the interests and physical safety of British subjects, enterprises, and property from strikes and revolutionary action, they did not directly accord with the requests of British investors and entrepreneurs.

British consular intervention did not only invoke Russian authority to protect British commercial and manufacturing interests from striking workers and revolutionary unrest, but could also flow from requests from British factory owners to protect their own employees. In October 1906, Murray was contacted by Thomas Whitehead, the director of the T. I. Birkin & Co. lace factory in Warsaw, to ask for his assistance in releasing 22 of his 180 employees, "mostly lads and girls," who had been arrested by Cossacks while Whitehead was out on business.[87] Whitehead asked for Murray's help in releasing 11 employees who constituted the entire staff of an essential department of the factory. Whitehead initially applied to the district police, who referred him to the Consulate General. Murray "immediately sent Mr. Vice Consul St. Clair with Mr. Whitehead

[87] Murray to St. Petersburg, "T. I. Birkin + Co. explains action on behalf of." Despatch No. 54, 24 October 1906, TNA FO 393/23/69.

to the Chief of Police."[88] The Police Chief released the 11 essential "lads," along with three others, the next morning.[89] Two days later, Thomas Isaac Birkin, the owner of the lace factory, and a railway and steamship magnate, wrote to Murray from Nottingham to express his gratitude for his role in the release of the workers.[90] Whitehead also wrote to Murray to clarify the position of the workers who remained in custody. The next week, according to Murray, Whitehead asked him to come to the factory to address the workers, who "expressed great gratitude for the release of fourteen of their comrades."[91]

Though in this case the Warsaw Consulate-General intervened to *restrain* the Russian authorities' repression of Polish workers, the act was aimed at averting a strike and simply keeping the factory in operation. The pressure St. Clair put on the Warsaw Chief of Police on behalf of Birkin was not aimed at improving the position of the workers at the lace factory. In fact, it consciously aimed to leave those relationships in the hands of the employer, having addressed the abuse of autocratic power that threatened to throw them out of their normal bounds and into the disorderly relation of a strike. It constituted an example, through the everyday practices of consular intervention—receiving a request from a British subject, delegating to a subordinate, traveling through the city to speak to local authorities, making a request, ascertaining whether the agreement concluded had been honored and upheld, and compiling all of these actions and the circumstances and impressions surrounding them into a coherent report—of what Murray had vaguely advised

[88] Murray to St. Petersburg, "T. I. Birkin + Co. explains action on behalf of." Despatch No. 54, 24 October 1906, TNA FO 393/23/69.
[89] Murray to St. Petersburg, "T. I. Birkin + Co. Continuation of No. 54." Despatch No. 55, October 31, 1906, FO 393/23 E 70.
[90] Letter from Thomas Birkin to Murray, Bestwood Lodge, Nottingham, November 2, 1906, enclosed in Murray to St. Petersburg, "T. I. Birkin + Co. further response as to." Despatch No. 57, November 10, 1906, FO 393/23 E 72.
[91] Letter from Thomas Birkin to Murray, Bestwood Lodge, Nottingham, November 2, 1906, enclosed in Murray to St. Petersburg, "T. I. Birkin + Co. further response as to." Despatch No. 57, November 10, 1906, FO 393/23 E 72.

elsewhere as a solution to the revolutionary upheaval: "What they should do is to preserve order at any cost leaving economic questions to be settled between masters and men."[92]

Murray and St. Clair paid special attention to British subjects with families caught in Poland during the Revolution of 1905. Murray advised "The English manager of some lace works at Warsaw, at which the workmen are almost all Jews," after he had been condemned as an anti-Semite by the Jewish Bund, "to go as he is a married man with a large family of small children and no protection is efficient against the 'Bund' which now terrorizes…whole of western Russia."[93] In April, 1905, Murray was asked about the possibility of protecting the British subjects working at the Lodz Manufacturing Co., especially the Buckley family. Murray could not offer immediate protection but the effort to find a solution continued over the summer.[94] In June, after an inspection trip to Lodz, Murray quietly but proudly wrote to Hardinge, "I have the honour to report that I have brought Mrs. Buckley, her children and her things to Warsaw without troubling the local authorities and without unpleasantness."[95] Murray's concern with "troubling" the local or Russian authorities indicated his consciousness of his own political capital as Consul General. The most effective consular intervention was that which did not require the use of force by the imperial power or the invocation of the host country's authority. Murray had spirited the Buckley family out of danger by his own personal means, acting on his own without the support of the Foreign Office or the Russian state. Murray's personal involvement in the case as Consul General

[92] Murray to Hardinge / St. Petersburg, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on June 18th – 24th," Despatch No. 25, June 24, 1905, FO 393/22 E 39.
[93] Murray to Hardinge, "Current Affairs in Poland. Report on, for week ended July 28," Despatch No. 35, July 29, 1905, FO 393/22 E 51.
[94] See Murray to St. Petersburg, April 15, 1905, FO 393/22, E 22; Murray to St. Petersburg, "Forw. Translation of Memorial of Lodz Thread Mfg. Co. to gov. Piotrkoff Ref. own Desp No 9 of 15-4-05," Despatch No. 11, April 19, 1905, FO 393/22, E 25; Murray to Hardinge, "Strike," Despatch No. 16, Confidential, May 6, 1905, FO 393/22 E 30.
[95] Murray to Hardinge, "Mrs. Buckley. Has brought to Warsaw," Despatch No. 24, June 11, 1905, FO 393/22 E 37.

fit the personal relationships he had with the British subjects in his district and the familial dependents he sought to protect.

Continuing to be pressed by financial hardship and eager to leave the dangers of revolutionary Warsaw behind, Murray made repeated requests for transfer from 1905 to 1907. At the end of July, 1906, he cabled St. Petersburg to ask desperately for a transfer to Brazil, naming the Vice-Consul as a ready successor: "Earnestly beg support application by telegraph for permission to replace Chapman [in] Rio. St Clair perfectly able act here. Please help if possible."[96] At the end of 1907, Murray finally received a transfer to Port-au-Prince.[97]

Murray's replacement, Charles Clive Bayley, arrived in early 1908, taking over from St. Clair. Like Murray, Clive Bayley had a colonial service background. Born in 1864, son of the Indian civil servant and antiquarian Edward Clive Bayley, he was educated at Harrow and Trinity and began his career in the Colonial Office, posted to the Niger Coast Protectorate as Treasurer in 1894. In 1897 he took part in the destruction of Benin during the Benin Expedition, before being appointed Consul in New York in 1898.[98] From New York he was appointed Consul in Warsaw in 1908, where he served for five years. Appointed Consul General in Moscow in 1913, he served in Moscow for two years before being appointed Consul General in New York again in October 1915.[99] When Columbia conferred an honorary degree on Arthur Balfour in 1917, Clive Bayley accepted it in Balfour's absence.[100] Clive Bayley retired from his consular post in New York in 1919, citing the strain of consular work during the war,[101] and died in 1923.[102]

[96] Murray to Nicolson, "Rio de Janeiro. Asks support request leave to act at," 27 July 1906, TNA FO 393/23/46.
[97] Murray to Nicolson, "Departure. Consul General reports," 21 December 1907, TNA FO 393/23/43.
[98] "To Succeed Bennett Here," *New York Times*, 2 October 1915, page 3; "Charles Clive Bayley: Former British Consul General Here Dies in England" *New York Times*, 24 January 1923, page 13.
[99] See "To Succeed Bennett Here," *New York Times*, 2 October 1915, page 3.
[100] "Columbia Degrees Today," *New York Times*, 10 May 1917, page 3.
[101] "Clive Bayley to Retire," *New York Times*, 22 February 1919, page 4.
[102] "Charles Clive Bayley: Former British Consul General Here Dies in England" *New York Times*, 24 January 1923, page 13.

British Women

Both Murray and Clive Bayley were deeply concerned with the protection and proper behavior of British subjects in the Warsaw "colony," particularly with the conduct of women. A series of letters extending throughout 1905 addressed the promotion of a "club" founded by a Madame Janasz catering to British women employed as servants and maids in Warsaw. Murray fielded concerns about Madame Janasz's "Rooms" from several sources, noting hopefully that there did not seem to be much interest in the establishment, but registering concern about the effect of its very existence on British prestige.[103] Murray and his American counterpart also assessed the prospective marriage partners of British and American women in the consular district. In one case Murray turned the matter over to the American Consul as he had "unusually strict ideas as to the fitness of men for marriage."[104] Murray nevertheless made a point to note to his correspondent that, even with such high standards, "As a matter of fact any English or American girl is making a terrible mistake if she marries a Pole without previously coming out here to see for herself how very different the life here is from that she has been accustomed to."[105]

These concerns about the status and behavior of British women were articulated in personal relationships and in discussions with women. After a visit to the Nicolsons in St. Petersburg, Murray wrote to Mary Nicolson with a list of warnings to British women coming to Russia to work in domestic service, apparently in continuation of a conversation they had started during the visit or at her request.[106] Murray and Lady Nicolson kept up a friendly personal correspondence, but as far as I know they did not discuss policy or consular work on any other issue. "It would be a very

[103] See FO 393/22 E 16 and FO 393/22 E 44.
[104] Murray to Herman C. Norman, 24 October 1904, FO 393/22/15 (11).
[105] Murray to Herman C. Norman, 24 October 1904, FO 393/22/15 (11).
[106] Murray to Lady Nicolson, "Governesses Engl. Suggests Warning To," 12 July 1906, TNA FO 393/23/39.

good thing if girls coming to Russia could be warned" of a list of ten dangers, Murray wrote. Murray's ten commandments included the following warnings. First, British women should "write as soon as possible after arrival to the nearest British Consul asking to be registered as British subjects residing in his district." They must obtain a Russian passport within six months of their arrival from the Russian governor of the province in which they were living, and they must also obtain a visa from the governor and from the police if they intended to leave the country. They should draw their wages at the end of each month rather than at longer intervals to avoid being "swindled." At the same time, they should be aware that they could command higher wages in Russia than they could in England. English women working in domestic service had a reputation for being "filthy" because they expected the washing to be done every week instead of every month, so they should bring a full supply of linen.[107]

Murray emphasized the accessibility and dependability of the British consul, the consul's central role in the lives of British women domestic workers, and his familiarity with their particular problems. British women should know that "If they find themselves in difficulty or danger they should at once telegraph or write to the nearest British Consul," who could be reached without a name or address by simply writing to "'British Consul, Warsaw' or whatever the place may be." "Girls should never accept a place from an agency without trying to find out about it from a Consul or a Chaplain" first, and they should never sign blank contracts, or else they would be "quite likely to find themselves in the depths of the country with no one but a young man to receive them." In relation to this last point, Murray insisted that "Girls should always be told a certain amount about sexual matters…before coming abroad." Murray claimed that "quite two thirds of the girls who get into trouble do so from ignorance," but if educated about sex, such matters could be avoided:

[107] Murray to Lady Nicolson, "Governesses Engl. Suggests Warning To," 12 July 1906, TNA FO 393/23/39.

"Forewarned is forearmed and innocence is not necessarily ignorance." These warnings were necessary because "Every foreign man thinks every woman fair game." Murray claimed to have dealt with three cases in which this ignorance was so extreme that the women had "deliberately [agreed] to sleep with a man, not knowing what was entailed thereby."[108]

"At present it is very inadvisable for English girls to come to Russia," Murray concluded. The price of private lessons had fallen, there were fewer places available, and even those wealthy families willing to hire English governesses were liable—like Murray and his family—to flee the country at any moment out of "panic" over the revolution. There were "at the present time an unusually large number of English governesses already in the country."[109] Murray's warnings were meant to protect and police British women and at the same time to reduce consular work related to them. Because the figure of the female domestic worker was so unstable, having fewer of them in Russia would reduce Murray's anxieties and the consular work they produced.

As late as 1929, consuls' obligations with regard to female domestic servants were the subject of official correspondence within the Foreign Office. In yet another report on measures to address the plight of female domestic workers left with exploitative contracts, Arthur Abbott, then Consul General in Sao Paulo, remembered how "In the early days of my consular career the late Sir Evelyn Grant Duff once said to me that governesses and nurses were the bane of a Consul's existence and, in light of past experience, I am able to confirm his statement."[110] The comments in Abbott's report were used to prepare a Circular to Consular and Passport Control Officers on the "Employment of British Women and Girls Abroad."[111]

[108] Murray to Lady Nicolson, "Governesses Engl. Suggests Warning To," 12 July 1906, TNA FO 393/23/39.
[109] Murray to Lady Nicolson, "Governesses Engl. Suggests Warning To," 12 July 1906, TNA FO 393/23/39.
[110] Arthur Abbott to H.M. Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, No. 30, 11 September 1929, TNA FO 612/123.
[111] Chief Passport Officer Hubert Martin, "Employment of British Women and Girls Abroad," Circular to His Majesty's Consular and Passport Control Officers, 12 November 1929, TNA FO 612/123.

Elite British distrust and moral condemnation of fellow British women in Russia, especially those in domestic service, went back to the very beginnings of British communities there in the 18th century.[112] British women in domestic in domestic service threatened to undermine the prestige of other members of the British "colony." Though these domestic workers could receive higher wages than in England, Murray and his interlocutors feared the employment agencies that could prey on these women because of the vulnerable position they occupied traveling alone.[113] Concern over the activities and intimate relationships of women was built into the structure of consular work at the most fundamental level. Wives, daughters, and other female dependents were recorded on the passports and visas of the male head of household.

Arthur Nicolson's son, Harold Nicolson, represented diplomacy itself as a woman.[114] "All really good people speak of the 'Old Diplomacy'" Nicolson wrote in 1938, "in a tone of moral censure. The implication is that, somewhere about the year 1918, diplomacy saw a great white light, was converted, found salvation, and thereafter and thenceforward became an entirely different woman."[115] Diplomatic negotiation by its nature involved something indecent, which the male diplomatist could compensate for with his uprightness, discretion, honor, and responsible position to the government he represented.[116]

But the "old diplomacy" had been given a bad name. Nicolson lamented the association of the "old diplomacy" with "boudoir diplomacy" even as he reinforced the connection. Corrupt forms of diplomacy exploited sexual interest and sexual property. Thus "it was irksome for Harris to be obliged to flirt with an Empress who was over fifty years of age, even as it was unpleasant

[112] Cross, *By the Banks of the Neva*, 21, 43.
[113] Murray to Lady Nicolson, "Governesses Engl. Suggests Warning To," 12 July 1906, TNA FO 393/23/39; Tara Zahra, *The Great Departure*
[114] Helen McCarthy, *Women of the World: The Rise of the Female Diplomat* (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2014), especially 26-50.
[115] Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958 [1939]), 56-57.
[116] See Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 77-79, 107-126, 138-144.

for him to watch his wife being taken in to supper by Potemkin."[117] As the reference to the Catherinian court suggests, Nicolson remained especially suspicious of the twin potential for duplicity and sensuality held by dealing with "Eastern" governments. "Degeneration" and the disreputable practices for which diplomacy had acquired a bad name came from the "East," from the "Byzantines and the Italians," transmitted through the "foetid lagoons" of Venice.[118] But all diplomacy required discretion. The public could not be trusted to know about diplomatic negotiations and should not be allowed to interfere in them. The new transparent diplomacy of Wilson and the Soviets was in fact too exposed and explicit, while the unfairly named "secret" diplomacy of the pre-war period did not hide any shameful corruption but was properly demure.

In the years leading up to the First World War, tensions within and between the Russian and British empires exacerbated the problem of the status of British women within the Russian Empire. International disputes between the two states were transposed onto the question of the status and position of British and foreign women in the empire's western borderlands. The gendered practices of diplomatic relations in general were plotted onto specific international events and concrete persons and cases.

The Malecka Affair

In late March 1911, Okhrana agents and Warsaw police arrested Kate Malecka, a British woman working as a music and English teacher, at the apartment she was renting.[119] She was imprisoned in the 10th Pavilion of the Warsaw Citadel under the head of the Warsaw Okhrana,

[117] Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 64.
[118] Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 42-44, 47, 48.
[119] Svedeniia for Kate Malecka and others, Warsaw Department of Police, 7 June 1911, GARF f102, op208, d1194, L2-3.

where she would be held for the next six months until her release on bail in October.[120] Malecka was accused of being a member of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and abetting its activities, which under Article 102 of the Criminal Code carried a sentence of exile and up to twelve years forced labor, though these accusations were not formally laid out until December.[121] The disposition of Malecka's case would take more than a year, and would have lasted three or four times longer had the Consul and the British government not attempted to intervene. From Malecka's initial appeal to Clive Bayley, well within the stream of ordinary consular duties—she had done just as Murray had advised British women to do when in "difficulty or danger" and contacted the consul immediately—the case would reach all the way to Grey and Nicolson, to Parliament and wide swathes of British society. Malecka would make appeals to two imperial heads of state, writing to both in English, and to an international network of friends and sympathizers. In summer 1911 and spring 1912, the Malecka case competed with the Persian, Eastern, and Balkan questions in the Foreign Office and the House of Commons.

The Malecka Affair has been noted only as an example of the difficulties facing Grey and the Foreign Office in dealing with British public opinion over Britain's relationship with Russia after the agreement of 1907.[122] Though the Malecka Affair became a high profile diplomatic "incident" involving ambassadors, foreign ministers, and heads of state, the case was directly handled by local consular officials in Warsaw.[123] International incidents by definition involve actors beyond the classic subjects of diplomatic history, such as the press, parliamentary

[120] Podpolkovnik [illegible signature] to the Chancellery of the Secretary of the Warsaw General-Governor for political matters, 16 May 1911, GARF f8254, op3, d234(1), L2.
[121] Obvinitel'nii akt", GARF f124 [f MIO, 1912g 1-101], op 50, d 140, L33-45, December 1911
[122] Keith Neilson and Zara Steiner, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War* (2003), Chapter 4.
[123] Keith Neilson, "'Incidents and Foreign Policy: A Case Study," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* (1998).

politicians, and pressure-groups of concerned citizens.[124] These groups are always involved to some extent in the formulation of foreign policy and in shaping and facilitating the operations of diplomacy. But the Malecka Affair demonstrates the essential role played by local consular officials both during such incidents and at the center of regular diplomatic work. Consuls dealt with external groups interested in the case and carried out Foreign Office directives in dealing with local Russian authorities.[125] Grey and Buchanan wrote to Neratov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to express their displeasure with the slow progress of the case, but Clive Bayley and Kimens went to the Citadel and the police to see if they could get permission to visit the prisoner. At the same time, the Warsaw Consulate pursued intervention in Malecka's case on its own initiative. Moreover, the instructions and information given by the Embassy and the FO often did not fit the conditions consular staff encountered at the local level in Warsaw, and the consular staff had to adapt on the fly.[126]

Malecka was a member of the same social group of British women that concerned the members of the British consulate in Warsaw, and indeed troubled the minds of all of the "better sort" of members of the "British colony" in Poland: domestic workers, service workers, teachers, governesses, and performers. Malecka, a music and piano teacher, English teacher, and part-time governess, fit this mold. She had violated the guidelines suggested by Murray and St. Clair for British women in Poland and the unwritten rules of Warsaw British society. She exposed herself to the perils of contact with Poles and Russians and their different forms of sociability. She lived

[124] Antony Best and John Fisher, eds., *On the Fringes of Diplomacy: Influences on British Foreign Policy, 1800–1945* (London: Routledge, 2016 [2011]); Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980* (London: Fontana Press, 1981).
[125] Temporary superintendent Minister of Foreign Affairs to Aleksandr Nikolaevich Berevkin, 7 September 1911, GARF f124 [f MIO, 1912g 1-101], op50, d140, L7-9.
[126] Clive Bayley to HM Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 31 May 1912, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to O'Beirne, 20 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to St. Petersburg, telegram, 20 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to O'Beirne, 19 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11.

with Polish men and women in an apartment rented from a Polish landlady. She had Polish friends and a Polish lover. But Malecka's friends were alleged members of the PPS, and the man she sometimes saw happened to be a major target of the Okhrana. She was arrested and imprisoned with her Polish friend Ioanna Roszkowska, who would also be tried with her.

After her arrest on March 23 / April 5,[127] Malecka sent a letter to Clive Bayley asking for his help and requesting that he "take all necessary steps in the case of an arrest of a British subject."[128] Upon hearing of her arrest, Kimens had already sought permission to visit Malecka but had been denied.[129] Clive Bayley immediately wrote to Buchanan, who sent an official Note to the Russian Government requesting that permission to visit Malecka be granted to the Consul and asking that she be brought to trial at the earliest possible date.[130] The staff of the Consulate were not granted permission to visit Malecka until early June, and not able to see her until June 23, nearly three months after she was arrested.[131] In the meantime, Clive-Bayley and Kimens dealt with Malecka's affairs: they paid outstanding rent and terminated the lease at her lodgings, removed her furniture (Clive Bayley stored her belongings in a "spare room" in his house in Warsaw, to "save her expense"), forwarded letters from her friends in England, and sent her

[127] GARF arrest record ; Svedeniia for Kate Malecka and others, Warsaw Department of Police, 7 June 1911, GARF f102, op208, d1194, L2-3.
[128] Kate Malecka to the English Consul, Warsaw, 6 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[129] Kimens to Miss Kate Malecka, 16 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[130] Clive Bayley to Buchanan, 12 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to HM Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 12 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Buchanan to HM Consul, Warsaw, 16 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[131] Clive Bayley to O'Beirne, Confidential, 23 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11.

packages of food, money, clothing, and books, including sheet music and books on music and art.[132] They pushed local Russian authorities in Warsaw to speed up their handling of the case.[133]

When Buchanan finally received a reply regarding the Consul visiting Malecka, he was informed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the possibility of visiting her would depend on whether she was determined to be a British or a Russian subject. If Malecka was shown to be a British subject, the Consul would be allowed to visit her officially; if she was declared a Russian subject, he would be able to visit her only as a private individual.[134] Malecka's nationality determined the role the British Consulate could play in her case, and the responsibilities, duties, and privileges it possessed toward her. When the Consular staff were allowed to visit her on June 23, it was in a strictly private capacity and they were not allowed to discuss her case. When Kimens next visited her on August 7, the visit still had to be conducted in a private capacity, but they were able to discuss the case.[135]

Was Malecka a British or a Russian subject? She was born in Folkestone to a Polish father and an English mother. Her father had arrived in England from Russia in 1856 and become a naturalized citizen in 1860.[136] Clive Bayley was initially very optimistic about the outcome of the

[132] Clive Bayley to HM Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 6 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to Pauline Baldwin, 14 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11; M. Neele to Clive Bayley, 19 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to Miss M. Neele, 22 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to Miss Kate Malecka, Pol. 69, Draft, 11 July 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to Chief of Gendarmery, Pol. 70, Draft, 11 July 1911, TNA FO 394/11. Some of these costs were covered by cheques sent to Clive Bayley by Malecka's friends in England. Miss Pauline Baldwin to British Consul Warsaw, 19 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to Pauline Baldwin, 23 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11 Miss E Ripoes to British Consul, 23 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Noel to Clive Bayley, 24 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11. See also the later "Account of Expenses Re: Malecka, TNA FO 394/11. Sending Malecka letters involved going through the Okhrana. British Consul Clive Bayley to Head of the Otdelenie po okhraneniiu poriadka i obshchestvennoi besopasnos[ti] Varshava [Okhrana], 25 May / 7 June 1911, GARF f8254, op3, d234(1), L29.

[133] See, e.g., Clive Bayley to HM Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 31 May 1911, TNA FO 394/11.

[134] O'Beirne to Clive Bayley, 11 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11. Clive Bayley independently received the same information from the local authorities in Warsaw: General-Lieutenant Biraev [?] to British Consul, 30 May 1911 [OS], TNA FO 394/11; Director of the Chancellery of the Warsaw Governor-General to Clive Bayley, 1 June 1911 [OS], TNA FO 394/11.

[135] Kimens to Buchanan, 8 August 1911, TNA FO 394/11.

[136] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Second Department) to First Department of the Ministry of Justice, 9 July 1911, GARF f124 [f MIO 1912g 1-101], op50, d140, L3-4ob.

case on the basis of Malecka's evident British nationality.[137] By British law and international custom Malecka was unquestionably a British subject. British courts would support this interpretation, and Clive-Bayley expected the Russian courts to do so as well. Clive Bayley consulted the local lawyer Leonard Tallen-Wilczewski, who cited Article 17 of the Organic Statute of 1832, which had replaced the 1815 Constitution of Poland, as supporting the right of emigration of Malecka's father and enabling his naturalization as a British subject.[138] Clive-Bayley also consulted the United States consul in Warsaw, who supported the view that Malecka's rights as a British subject would be honored and that she would shortly be released and exiled.[139]

The Russian government, however, held that because Malecka's father had never filed for permission to renounce his Russian subjecthood, which was necessary for changing citizenship under Articles 325 and 326 Criminal Code, he had remained a Russian subject, as did his daughter by birth. Against the interpretations of the consulate and the British courts, the Ministry of Justice cited not only Russian law and the laws of the Kingdom of Poland but also English jurisprudence.[140] In the view of the Ministry of Justice, the Russian government's interpretation of Malecka's nationality did not conflict with British law, because by the British Naturalization Law of 12 May, 1870, naturalization was invalid if by the laws of the former state it was not considered valid.[141] Malecka's father, and hence Malecka herself, could be both a British subject and, at the same time, a Russian subject. Being a Russian subject trumped Malecka's claims to British

[137] Clive Bayley to HM Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 2 May 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[138] "Notice," 30 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to HM Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 2 May 1911, TNA FO 394/11. For the Manifesto and Organic Statute of 1832, see *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii* (*PSZ*), s. 2e, t. VII, 1832, ch. 1, 5053-5876 (Sankt-Peterburg, 1833), 5165, 14 February 1832, 83-90.
[139] Clive Bayley to HM Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 2 May 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[140] Director of the Ministry of Justice to the Second Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 July 1911, GARF f124 [f MIO, 1912g 1-101], op50, d140, L6-7ob.
[141] Director of the Ministry of Justice to the Second Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 July 1911, GARF f124 [f MIO, 1912g 1-101], op50, d140, L6-7ob.

naturalization. This condition was "one of those knots that international law has not yet untied," as *The Manchester Guardian* put it.[142]

Another question concerned the place of birth of Malecka's father within the Russian Empire. If he had been born in the Kingdom of Poland, his right to emigrate and change his nationality would have been covered by Article 17 of the Organic Statute of 1832. If he had been born in Volhynia, however, as he claimed in the biographical statement given to the Home Secretary in 1860 accompanying his request for naturalization as a British subject, then the parts of the Code Napoleon carried over into the Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland in 1815, and subsequently into the Organic Statute, would not apply, as Volhynia had been incorporated as a Governorate within the Russian Empire after the Third Partition of Poland in 1795 and had not been a part of the Kingdom of Poland created in 1815.[143] Determining whether Malecka was a British or a Russian subject seemed to require locating her father's place of birth in the provinces of the Russian Empire, and depended on the history of the constitutional incorporation of Poland into the Russian state. The same imperial history that made the Consulate General in Warsaw a "political" appointment, with more responsibilities than a "purely commercial" consular posting, also affected Malecka's subject status. The internal boundaries of the empire, built up over successive imperial acquisitions, affected the rights of it subjects and of foreign nationals.[144] This question became moot, however, as under the Imperial Ukase of 25th April, 1850, Articles 340 and 341 of the Criminal Code (now Articles 325 and 326) were extended to all of the provinces of Russian Poland. Malecka's legal claim to British subjecthood and the consular protection it afforded, based on differential imperial legal regimes, was undermined by the extension of

[142] "The Case of Miss Malecka," *The Manchester Guardian*, 5 July 1911, page 8.
[143] Clive Bayley to Buchanan, 23 July 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[144] Béatrice von Hirschhausen, Hannes Grandits, Claudia Kraft, Dietmar Müller, and Thomas Serrier, "Phantom Borders in Eastern Europe: A New Concept for Regional Research," *Slavic Review* 78:2 (Summer 2019), 368-389.

centralized imperial power over Russian Poland and the replacement of its earlier privileges with standardized law.[145]

Clive Bayley, Kimens, and the staff of the Warsaw Consulate researched these legal questions and coordinated the acquisition of supporting documentation. Through the Foreign Office and directly, they solicited information, records, and advice from other ministries and institutions in England. Clive Bayley acquired Malecka's birth certificate, her parents' marriage certificate, and her father's naturalization documents through the Registry of Births, Marriages, and Deaths at Somerset House, forwarding them to the Russian officials in charge of the case and overseeing the dispute over her nationality.[146] Before going through Somerset House for the official records, Clive Bayley attempted to get information about Malecka's place of birth and her parents from Malecka's friends in England and from Malecka herself when he visited her in the Warsaw citadel.[147] As the Consulate dealt with these inquiries, it communicated with the Embassy in St. Petersburg to verify and retrieve information based on the changing attitudes of the Russian government and the MID. Consular work was threaded through the exercise of inter-state diplomatic work. Though their objectives were opposed, Russian officials in the MID, the Warsaw police, the courts, and the Warsaw Governor-General's administration collaborated with British consular officials, the Embassy in St. Petersburg, the Foreign Office, the Home Office, and the Registry of Births, Marriages, and Deaths at Somerset House in an effort to fix Malecka's nationality.

Malecka's father's nationality decided her own. According to the patriarchal and patrilineal logic of the international system, Malecka was not a Russian subject by virtue of being born in the

[145] Theodore Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on Russia's Western Frontier 1863-1914* (Dekalb: NIU Press, 1996).
[146] See Protocol, 5 July 1911, GARF f8254, op3, d234(1), L43-44.
[147] Clive Bayley to Pauline Baldwin, 21 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11.

Russian empire or ever having lived there, but because her father's subject status was never altered and he remained a subject of the Russian Empire, a status which transferred to her. The Russian imperial state never renounced its claim on Jan Malecka, which meant that it still had a claim on his daughter. The British counter-argument—Malecka was a daughter of England—was equally premised on a filial conception of national subjecthood.[148]

Foreign subjects who committed political offenses like belonging to the PPS were expelled from the Russian Empire.[149] Related political action and speech, such as calling for uniting the Privislinskii Krai with Austria, which was found to be harmful to the current political situation, could also lead to sending foreign subjects across the border.[150] Teaching Polish nationalist songs could lead to the same sentence,[151] as could being suspected of being a spy.[152] The punishment of expulsion was also used for foreign subjects who committed non-political crimes that disturbed the public order, like public drunkenness,[153] assault, or theft.[154] Foreign subjects who returned after the sentence of banishment could be jailed and then deported again.[155] Between January 1910 and

[148] Letter of Noel Buxton, Byles, Morrell, Ponsonby, MacCallum-Scott and Whitehouse, *Times*, 4 May 1912. [check]
[149]See the correspondence about the Austrian subjects Vladislav Romanov Vnenkovskii and Ian Martinovich Dziura, imprisoned in Lodz and sent across the border without return for their participation in the PPS, March-May 1911, GARF f215, op1, d23, L1-4.
[150] Radom Governor to Warsaw General-Governor, 8 January 1913 GARF f215, op1, d38, L1; Warsaw General-Governor to Radom Governor, 13 January 1913, GARF f215, op1, d38, L2, case of the Austrian subject Martsin Sagan.
[151] Svedeniia on the Austrian subject Kazimir Lavrentev Varkhalskii, GARF f215, op1, d38, L7-8.
[152] Sedlets Governor to Warsaw General-Governor, 31 January 1913, GARF f215, op1, d38, L11-12; Warsaw General-Governor to Sedlets Governor, 5 February 1913, GARF f215, op1, d38, L13, case of the Austrian subject Mateush Valek.
[153] Kielce Governor to Warsaw General-Governor, [21] January 1913, GARF f215, op1, d38, L3-4; General Adjutant of the Warsaw Governor Skalon to Kielce Governor, 1 February 1913, GARF f215, op1, d38, L5, case of the Austrian subject Iosif Ivanov Klisevich.
[154] General-Major of the Warsaw Ober-Policemaster to the Warsaw General-Governor, 18 February 1913, GARF f215, op1, d38, L16-16ob;, Warsaw General-Governor to Ober-Policemaster, 25 February 1913, GARF f215, op1, d38, L17, case of the Austrian subjects the brothers Sviderskii, living with their father Henrik in Warsaw and practicing theft. Such offenses often had an underlying political character.
[155] Warsaw Ober-Policemaster to the Chancellery of the Warsaw General-Governor, case of the Austrian subject Felix Karlov Barabash, 20 February 1914, GARF f215, op1, d21, L26; Head of the Chancellery to the Chancellery of the Warsaw General-Governor, 14 June 1914, GARF f215, op1, d21, L107, case of the Prussian subject Max Neiman; MVD Okhrannoe Otdelenie to Chancellery of the Warsaw General-Governor, 4 April 1914, GARF f215, op1, d21,

early February 1911, the month before Malecka was arrested, at least thirteen foreign subjects were expelled from the Privislinskii krai.[156] Expulsion was so common that the Warsaw Governor General used a standardized printed form to approve and disseminate sentences and record information about the convicted. Upon their expulsion, the foreign subjects' age, height, eye and hair color, and a description of their facial features and any distinguishing characteristics (osobykh primet) were recorded by the local authorities, sent back to the General-Governor, and attached to their registration cards.[157] Information on the sentences and the expelled foreign subjects was sent to the heads of local customs districts, the gendarmery, the Warsaw police, the railroads and the railway police administrations, and the local police at important border crossings and railway junctions.[158] The Russian state used the border to remove foreign subjects who threatened the public order or opposed the imperial system. However, as Neratov told Buchanan, "it was impossible to banish Miss Malecka from Russia, as the Government could not legally banish anyone who was a Russian subject from the Russian Empire.[159]

These legal arguments were mostly instrumental. Malecka's alleged political activity may have been more decisive. Malecka was accused of being present at PPS meetings, possessing socialist literature, holding meetings of the party in her rooms, and attending party meetings elsewhere.[160] But the suspicions of the Okhrana were even more serious. Okhrana agents had

L55, L98, L99, case of the Prussian subject Anton Kokoshko; Warsaw Ober-Policemaster to Chancellery of the Warsaw General-Governor, 5 March 1913, GARF f215, op1, d38, L22-22ob.

[156] Table of the number of people sent out of the governorate of the Privislinskii krai in 1910 and 1911, 28 February 1911, GARF f215, op1, d21, L1.

[157] Petrokovskii Governor to the Chancellery of the Warsaw Governor General, 3 May 1911, GARF f215, op1, d23, L3; see also the physical description of the Prussian subject Max Neiman, 17 June 1914, GARF f215, op1, d21, L108.

[158] See, e.g., Chancellery of the Warsaw General-Governor to the heads of the Warsaw, Vilno, and Southwestern Customs Districts, to the head of the Warsaw Gendarme Police Administration of the Railroads and to the head of the Governorate Gendarme Administration, and also to the head of the Verzhbolov [Virbalis/Kybartai] Border Branch of the Gendarme Police Administration of the Northwestern Railroad, 28 May 1911, GARF f215, op1, d23, L4.

[159] Buchanan, "Annual Report on Russia for the Year 1911," inclosure in Buchanan to Grey, "Annual Report, 1911," 18 March 1912, *BDFA*, Part I, Series A: Russia, 1859-1914, Volume 6, 1910-1914, Document 91 and 92, 195-234, 223-224.

[160] Obvinitel'nii akt", GARF f124 [f MIO, 1912g 1-101], op 50, d 140, L33-45, December 1911

connected Malecka with Titus Filippovich (who also went by the aliases "Karskii" and "Erzhabek"), a man she had a relationship with, who they alleged was a major figure in the party organization. Malecka had received letters from him and sent letters to other party members on his behalf, and had helped him when he was in hiding. Worse, Filippovich escaped from the Okhrana after being arrested in Lodz and had continued to evade them throughout the year. The authorities believed Malecka might have tipped him off, or knew where he was. The Okhrana and the police wanted to keep Malecka in prison in order to have her inform on Filippovich and her other friends and associates. Though there was plenty of evidence to convict Malecka of simply supporting the PPS, the Okhrana wanted more information about its members and operations.

Malecka's case was especially concerning because it involved the frequent crossing of imperial borders and travel between Russian Poland and other imperial spaces. A fake passport was found in Malecka's room.[161] A large part of the accusations brought against Malecka and Roszkowska and the testimony at the trial focused on whether they had left the Russian Empire, where they had traveled, and when and for how long. Malecka had traveled to Cracow and other places in Galicia, while Roszkowska had traveled to Cracow and Zakopane.[162] Though both Malecka and Roszkowska had innocuous reasons for traveling to these places, and alibis for some of their alleged travels, it was in these movements across the porous Austrian-Russian border that the court sought to establish their connections with the Polish revolutionary movement.

Malecka's foreignness and her English background played a major part in the Okhrana's suspicions and in the case against her. The Okhrana claimed to have identified her as a PPS sympathizer and operative through its agents in London as early as 1909, before she had moved to

[161] Copy of the presentation of the Procurator of the Warsaw Okrug Court to the Procurator of the Warsaw Court, 3-9 June 1911, GARF f124 [f MIO, 1912g 1-101], op50, d140, L1-2.
[162] Trial reports in TNA FO 394/11.

Warsaw. When, at the beginning of 1910 "by the most secret information" the Okhrana identified Malecka as an individual supporting the activities of the PPS, she came under their surveillance under the code-name "Anglichanka"—"the Englishwoman."[163] A list of the effects found by the Gendarmes in Malecka's apartment during her arrest reads like a passage from a detective novel, in a tone suffused with suspicions of "foreignness."[164] The Gendarmes and the Okhrana seemed to think that Malecka was at the center of a ring of PPS members in Warsaw and the link between the PPS in Russian Poland the members of the party abroad.[165]

Among a British public unaware of these suspicions, Malecka's case became a cause célèbre. Clive-Bayley received at least 55 letters from 22 friends of Malecka and members of Liberal and Labour circles.[166] A telegram to Clive-Bayley from the Christian socialist Conrad Noel expressed "great anxiety respecting Miss Malecka."[167] Then-Liberal MP Noel Buxton wrote to Clive Bayley soon after receiving news of her arrest,[168] and later threatened that Malecka "had many friends in England, and there will be much resentment in Parliament if in spite of the 'entente' she is badly treated"[169] Malecka's friends and supporters covered her expenses in prison, sending the money through Clive Bayley,[170] and many took out subscriptions of one pound for her

[163] Head of the Okhrana in the City of Warsaw to the Head of the Warsaw Governorate Gendarme Administration, 23 May 1911, GARF f102, op208, d1194, L13-17ob.
[164] Protocol, 5 August 1911, GARF f8254, op3, d234(2), L120.
[165] Head of the Warsaw Governorate Gendarme Administration to the Department of Police, 31 May 1911, GARF f102, op208, d1194, L18-19; Copy of the presentation of the Procurator of the Warsaw Okrug Court to the Procurator of the Warsaw Court Palata, 3-9 June 1911, GARF f124 [f MIO, 1912g 1-101], op50, d140, L1-2.
[166] Clive Bayley created a special volume to collect materials and correspondence relating to the Malecka case, TNA FO 394/11. The thick bound volume, covering the case from Malecka's arrest in March 1911 to October 1912, is several hundred pages long and contains nearly a thousand items.
[167] Conrad Noel telegram to British Consul Warsaw Poland, 20 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to Noel, 20 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Noel to Clive Bayley, 24 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[168] Buxton to Clive Bayley, 21 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to Buxton, 26 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Buxton to Clive Bayley, 2 May 1911, TNA FO 394/11
[169] Buxton to Clive Bayley, 2 May 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[170] Miss Pauline Baldwin to British Consul Warsaw, 19 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Clive Bayley to Pauline Baldwin, 23 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11 Miss E Ripoes to British Consul, 23 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Noel to Clive Bayley, 24 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11 ; See also "Account of Expenses Re: Malecka, TNA FO 394/11.

support.[171] Malecka's friends also offered to cover the cost of a lawyer.[172] The lawyer hired to represent Malecka, Leon Papieski, was an existing contact of Clive Bayley and Kimens and described as the leading lawyer for political cases in Russian Poland.[173]

When the possibility of Malecka's release on bail emerged, her supporters offered to pay that as well.[174] The subscription taken out to cover Malecka's bail ran to at least 35 subscribers.[175] Eleanor Sidgwick contributed £100.[176] The American soap company Fels Naphta, whose founder Joseph Fels had strong utopian socialist and Jewish nationalist sympathies, subscribed £500, but most contributions were very modest.[177] Malecka was released on bail on October 8/21,[178] but Clive Bayley later learned that the Procurator had believed that the sum of 20,000 rubles (a little over £2000) would be impossible to raise and had no intention of letting Malecka out.[179] Instead, the bail was raised easily based on the groundswell of public support for Malecka in Britain. Louis Mallet's announcement of the receipt of Malecka's bail was printed in the *Manchester Guardian* and *Votes for Women*.[180] Support for Malecka was particularly strong in women's suffrage circles and publications, which compared her imprisonment to the imprisonment of women "political prisoners" in Britain. "There is a conspiracy of silence in the English Press about Russian evils, just as there is a conspiracy of silence about Suffragist news."[181] Malecka's case was also name-

[171] Clive Bayley to Miss France Noel, 13 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[172] F. Margaret Murray to Clive Bayley, 17 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11
[173] Clive Bayley to HM's Principal Secretary of State, 13 July 1911, TNA FO 394/11. See Fig. 1.
[174] Pauline Baldwin to Clive Bayley, 26 June 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Pauline Baldwin to British Consulate Warsaw [Kimens], 16 August 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Mrs. F. Margaret Murray to Kimens, 6 October 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[175] Malecka to Clive Bayley, 5 November 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[176] Sanger to Malecka, 3 November 1911, copy in Malecka to Bayley, 8 November 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[177] Malecka to Clive Bayley, 5 November 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[178] Uvedomlenie ob izmenenii mery presecheniia, Warsaw Department of Police, 12 October 1911, GARF f102, op208, d1194, L4.
[179] Clive Bayley to O'Beirne, 20 May 1912, TNA FO 394/11
[180] "Miss Malecka: To be Released on Bail," *Manchester Guardian*, 16 October 1911, page 7; "Miss Malecka," *Votes for Women* V:189, 20 October 1911.
[181] F. Melian Stawell, Review of *Saved from Siberia* by Kate Malecka, *Women's Leader and the Common Cause*, Volume V Issue 257, 13 May 1914.

checked in debates on the Government of Ireland Bill and on the position of British Indians in South Africa.[182]

In response to what they perceived as inaction on the part of the Foreign Office, Malecka's supporters held a public rally in Trafalgar Square on July 16. They set up a Committee of the Friends of Miss Malecka headed by Philip Morrell.[183] By the end of Malecka's trial the Committee had raised a "considerable fund."[184] After the trial and Malecka's pardon, Morrell and the Committee used this fund to present Papieski with a silver tray to thank him for his efforts, which was sent to the Consulate and conveyed to Papieski through Clive Bayley and Kimens.[185]

Malecka's case was first raised in the House of Commons on April 26.[186] Support for Malecka came from Liberal, Labour, and Conservative members, and from England, Ireland, and Scotland. MPs that interested themselves in the case and Malecka's cause included Noel Buxton, Phillip Morrell, Arthur Ponsonby, Ramsey MacDonald, William Byles, J. Howard Whitehouse, William Anstruther-Gray, T. E. Harvey, MacCallum Scott, William Thorne, J. R. Clynes, Hugh Law, Gilbert Parker, Charles Duncombe, Lawrence Dundas, Arthur Lynch, Ryland Adkins, Rupert Gwynne, Thomas Wiles, Dr. Christopher Addison, Duncan Millar, Ronald M'Neill, William Redmond, James Falconer, Fred Hall, and John David Rees (who argued against Malecka's supporters and in favor of the Russian government). Radical Bradford Liberal William Byles threatened Grey in the House of Commons with the "growing storm which is rising in the country, [demanding] the expectation that he will firmly assert the traditions of British liberty in regard to

[182] *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 39, 19 June 1912; Lord Ampthill question to Lord Emmott, *Hansard* HL Deb. vol. 12, 17 July 1912.
[183] Philip Morrell to Clive Bayley, 20 May 1912, TNA FO 394/11
[184] Morrell to Clive Bayley, 24 May 1912, TNA FO 394/11.
[185] Morrell to Clive Bayley, 21 June 1912, TNA FO 394/11; Acting Consul Kimens to Morrell, 31 August 1912, TNA FO 394/11.
[186] *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 24, 26 April 1911.

British subjects abroad."[187] The Irish nationalist William Redmond noted "the very widespread interest which is taken in this case, not only in this country, but also in Ireland, and the fact that there is a strong desire that…action should be taken by the Foreign Office in regard to this matter in order to prove whether it is worth anyone's while to be a British subject at all."[188]

Most of the questions put to Grey and McKinnon Wood in the House of Commons centered on this question of Malecka's nationality and the validity of her British passport.[189] These questions were partly motivated by the apparent absurdity that a person born in a foreign country, to a foreign mother, raised and educated abroad, speaking almost no Russian, could be considered a subject of the Russian monarch. Malecka's supporters were outraged that she appeared to have been imprisoned only for holding pro-Polish views and sympathies for socialism, for personal convictions rather than for any seditious actions. But these questions also had to do with anxieties over the meaning and the force behind British subjecthood. *The Manchester Guardian* argued hopefully that if the view that Malecka was a British subject "is adhered to and firmly impressed upon the Russian Foreign Office, Russia is not likely to persist in disputing her claim to British citizenship and the right to protection which it carries with it." After all, the "Foreign Office has a reputation in matters of this kind, of which Sir Edward Grey is as jealous as any of his predecessors."[190] As Morrell asked in the House of Commons, "in view of the fact that she is by English law a British subject, that she was born and brought up as an Englishwoman, and entered Russia with a British passport, His Majesty's Government will take any steps in the matter?"[191] To Malecka's supporters in Britain it seemed impossible that the FO would not take steps to back up

[187] Byles question to Grey, *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 38, 16 May 1912.
[188] Redmond question to Acland, *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 38, 30 May 1912.
[189] E.G. *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 28, 13 July 1911;
[190] "The Case of Miss Malecka," *The Manchester Guardian*, 5 July 1911, page 8.
[191] Morrell question to Acland, *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 38, 13 May 1912.

the power of the British passport, or that the Russian government would not accept Malecka's nationality to be determined once and for all by that document and the force behind it, especially in the case of a British woman.

Answers to these questions in Parliament were given, often with difficulty, by Grey, McKinnon Wood, and Acland on the basis of information given in consular reports and actions taken by Clive Bayley and Kimens. Acland commended the "very full report from our vice-consul" the Foreign Office had received on the first part of Malecka's trial from Kimens.[192] Those in Parliament pushing for more action on the case focused on the role that could be played by the consul and whether he was doing enough. The representatives of the Foreign Office defended them. Pressed on the time it was taking for the government to decide on a course of action after Malecka's conviction, Grey defended Clive Bayley and Kimens's process of writing a report on the trial and the questions it had raised: "The trial was of considerable length, and it must take some time to draw up the report of the trial. It is very desirable that [it] be a carefully considered report, because the matter is of considerable interest in this country."[193]

Mobilizing support for Malecka depended on depicting her as a sensitive and artistic woman who would be damaged by her imprisonment and who could have nothing to do with politics in the first place. Malecka was "a most popular and charming girl, of a dark and picturesque type, and"—therefore—"the prospect of her being imprisoned for a long term either in European Russia or in Siberia is unthinkable to the refined and cultured English friends in whose circle she moved."[194] Her supporters' rhetoric focused on the physical danger and vulnerability of Malecka as a woman, as well as on the humiliation of her confinement. Morrell indignantly asked Grey in

[192] Acland response to Morrell, *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 38, 13 May 1912.
[193] Grey response to Wedgwood, *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 38, 16 May 1912.
[194] "Arrested in Warsaw," *Times*, 9 May 1911.

July if he was "aware that this lady has now been fifteen weeks kept in strict solitary confinement in Warsaw, without trial[?]"[195] These claims depended on a vision of Malecka's character and social milieu. From the early 1890s, Malecka gave concerts and taught music in London.[196] Her supporters emphasized her musical accomplishment: "what with her teaching and her lectures, her artistic life…was very full, and could have left little time, even if she desired it, for active political work of any kind."[197]

The question of whether Malecka or her supporters were in fact socialists, and whether she could have been a part of the organization of the PPS and its active and conscious supporter, rather than a "private" person who had incautiously expressed support for Polish nationalism and social equality, lay at the center of these depictions. Malecka's supporters insisted that she had no active political life beyond the sympathies of a sensitive person for national rights and social support. Malecka sent a list of her bail fund subscribers to Clive Bayley to convince him "that no political party is mixed up in this."[198] Support for Malecka in Britain came equally from quarters supporting a broad vision of social amelioration and from those concerned with liberal, specifically British, public and judicial rights.

In his responses to letters inquiring about Malecka, Clive Bayley repeatedly mentioned that he had warned her about making overt political statements when he had met her after her arrival in Russia in 1909. Clive Bayley repeated this claim to his superiors from the beginning and it

[195] *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 28, 20 July 1911.
[196] See advertisements in, e.g., *The Queen*, 26 March 1892; *London Evening Standard*, 17 September 1900; *Norwood News*, 29 September 1900; *London Evening Standard*, 20 February 1901; *Norwood News*, 18 July 1903. Gustav Ernest, with whom she taught music and performed in London, sent her a letter and books of music from Berlin through Clive Bayley while she was imprisoned in the Warsaw Citadel: Gustav Ernest to Clive Bayley, 19 May 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[197] [check reference]
[198] Malecka to Clive Bayley, 8 November 1911, TNA FO 394/11.

eventually made it into the discussion of the case in the House of Commons.[199] Clive Bayley claimed to have explained to Malecka that "if she took any part in the political movements in this country, she could not expect consular assistance or protection if she should be arrested and imprisoned."[200] Though Grey celebrated Malecka's pardon and release, he emphasized that "her conduct in some instances was undoubtedly such as no British subject has a right to pursue in a foreign country" and hoped that she would not provide encouragement to British subjects looking to involve themselves in the politics of foreign states.[201]

To Clive-Bayley, Kimens, Buchanan, O'Beirne, and Kidston, Malecka's supporters, whether socialists or not, stood for exactly the kind of gendered meddling in normal diplomatic relationships that Nicolson would later deplore. They shared his assumptions about the harmfulness of well-intentioned civilian attempts to influence international affairs. Buchanan questioned why Malecka's "case aroused so much unmerited sympathy in England."[202] Bayley forwarded the list of subscribers to Malecka's bail fund to Kidston, who found it full of "the names of so many mistaken idealists."[203] Kidston wished that "they would only realize the immense amount of trouble they give when they put their well-intentioned fingers into the international pie. The fingers themselves never get burnt, but they sour the ingredients and set up fermentation which is not wholesome in any pie."[204] The agitation in Britain for Malecka's release had only confirmed

[199] Clive Bayley to Buchanan, 12 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11; Buchanan, "Annual Report on Russia for the Year 1911," inclosure in Buchanan to Grey, "Annual Report, 1911," 18 March 1912, *BDFA*, Part I, Series A: Russia, 1859-1914, Volume 6, 1910-1914, Document 91 and 92, 195-234, 223; McKinnon Wood response to Whitehouse, *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 24, 26 April 1911.
[200] Buchanan, "Annual Report on Russia for the Year 1911," inclosure in Buchanan to Grey, "Annual Report, 1911," 18 March 1912, *BDFA*, Part I, Series A: Russia, 1859-1914, Volume 6, 1910-1914, Document 91 and 92, 195-234, 223; Clive Bayley to Buchanan, 12 April 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[201] Grey response to Morrell, *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 39, 11 June 1912.
[202] Buchanan, "Annual Report on Russia for the Year 1912," enclosure in Buchanan to Grey, "Annual Report, 1912," 17 January 1913, *BDFA*, Part I, Series A: Russia, 1859-1914, Volume 6, 1910-1914, Document 134 and 135, 283-306, 294.
[203] Kidston to Clive Bayley, 10 November 1911, TNA FO 394/11.
[204] Kidston to Clive Bayley, 10 November 1911, TNA FO 394/11.

the suspicions of the Russian authorities that she was an important member of the PPS and the socialist movement.[205] Buchanan claimed in 1913 that "resentment…still rankles in [Sazonov's] mind at the agitation carried on in the British press and Parliament in support of Miss Malecka."[206] Similarly, an exasperated Grey told Malecka's vocal advocates in the House of Commons, "Really, if I am to do what is most effective in this case, I must be allowed to have a certain discretion."[207]

Malecka's trial began in mid-February 1912 and was conducted in open court. This was highly unusual for a political trial, especially in Poland. Clive-Bayley, Kimens, and Buchanan congratulated themselves for this innovation, attributing it to the interest taken by the British government in the case.[208] It was "the first political trial, not only in Poland, but in the Russian Empire which since 1863 has been heard with open doors and the details of which have been allowed to be published in the Press throughout Russia."[209] Kimens attended the trial and made a detailed report. In her indictment and during the proceedings of her trial, Malecka was referred to as a British subject, which confused the consular staff and the FO as well as observers in Britain.[210] Nevertheless, she was found guilty under Articles 51 and 102 of Section 2 of the New Criminal Code of 1903, and sentenced to four years of hard labor, the loss of all civil rights, and exile for life to Siberia after the conclusion of the four years' hard labor.[211] Roszkowska was also found guilty but received the more lenient sentence of permanent exile to Siberia.[212]

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[205] Clive Bayley to O'Beirne, 20 May 1912, TNA FO 394/11.
[206] Buchanan, "Annual Report on Russia for the Year 1912," enclosure in Buchanan to Grey, "Annual Report, 1912," 17 January 1913, *BDFA*, Part I, Series A: Russia, 1859-1914, Volume 6, 1910-1914, Document 134 and 135, 283-306, 294.
[207] Grey response to Morrell, *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 38, 16 May 1912.
[208] Clive Bayley to [WHO], 15 February 1912, TNA FO 394/11.
[209] Clive Bayley to HM's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 17 May 1912, TNA FO 394/11.
[210] GARF citations from indictment and trial ; [other FO communications where they mention the fact that she is referred to as a "British subject"] ; Clive Bayley to O'Beirne, 20 May 1912, TNA FO 394/11
[211] Sentence, April 26-27/May 9-10 1912, GARF f124, op50, d140, L69; GARF f124, op50, d140, L117-118ob; Report to the Minister of Justice from the Procurator of the Warsaw Court, 28 April 1912 GARF f124 [f MЮ, 1912g 1-101], op50, d140, L60.
[212] Clive Bayley to HM's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 17 May 1912, TNA FO 394/11. Clive-Bayley and FO were less interested in Roszkowska's case, trial and court proceedings, and sentencing because she

Public outrage over Malecka's long imprisonment in 1911 was redoubled by the apparently harsh sentence she received in May 1912. After her sentencing, some newspapers printed a blank appeal to be sent to Grey to urge him to press for her release.[213] The news of her sentence led to more mass meetings in support of Malecka in London and the countryside.[214] Malecka's supporters believed—correctly—that her sentence had been all but decided before the trial, and that the evidence given against her was not strong enough to warrant her conviction, much less such a harsh sentence. The decisive testimony at the trial was given by the Okhrana informer Anton Sukiennik, who "had already denounced 100 of his former fellow members of his party," and other witnesses had confirmed Malecka and Roszkowska's stories against his.[215] Newspaper articles expressed outrage that the trial was conducted in Russian and an incompetent interpreter had been provided, even though "The British Consul offered to provide competent interpreters, and the British Vice-Consul himself offered to act in that capacity" but had been refused by the Russian government.[216]

Malecka's sentence underlined the failure of the Foreign Office to protect her. Though the same article professed "little sympathy as a rule with the clamour about 'honour,' which is apt to be a word covering none too honourable" actions, the author felt "that British honour is acutely involved in the present instance." British "honour" was precisely the ability to act to protect British subjects in such situations. "What a satire on all our boasted armaments and fleets if we prove

was not a British subject but simply a Russian Pole. They did not fully report on her trial: "The translation is verbatim as respects the case against Miss Malecka, but somewhat condensed as regards the evidence and speech for the defence on behalf of Miss Roszkowska."

[213] *Women's Leader and the Common Cause*, Volume 4 Issue 164, 30 May 1912.

[214] Clippings from *Russkoe Slovo*, 30 April / 13 May 1912, GARF f124, op50, d140, L53-54; Clipping from *Rech'*, 1 May 1912, GARF f124, op50, d140, L55 [check]

[215] Clive Bayley to HM's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 17 May 1912, TNA FO 394/11; *Kurjer Varshavskii*, 10 and 11 May 1912.

[216] "Living Death for an Innocent Englishwoman," newspaper clipping, GARF f102 [DPOO 1911g], op241, d135, L80.

powerless to rescue an Englishwoman from undeserved and barbarous torture," the article observed.[217] What were consuls, and the extension of British power they represented, really supposed to do? At the very least, they were to protect British subjects within other states and within other states' sovereign legal systems. They were posted in other states to advocate for British subjects and extend British protection, law, jurisdiction, support, and power to them. More than anything else, consuls and diplomats should protect British women abroad, and use the British state's honor to protect the honor of British subjects. What was the purpose of their work and the powerful empire they represented if they could not protect a British woman from arbitrary imprisonment? The sentiment expressed in this article emerged, like the Malecka case as a whole, from the workaday concerns of the British consulate in Warsaw and the responsibility and anxiety consular officials felt over ordinary British women.

A newspaper cartoon from the same period connected Malecka's fate to British policy towards the Russian Empire as a whole. In the cartoon, Nicholas II, wearing military uniform, closes and locks a heavy door over which is written "Living Death for an Innocent Englishwoman."[218] Sticking out of Tsar's coat pocket is a rolled-up paper that says "Anglo-Russian Friendship." In the caption of the cartoon, "The Tsar" congratulated himself on being "so friendly with the British Government" as "the Alliance will keep them quiet." "A Government that let me crush Persia," Nicholas continues, "won't worry about an Englishwoman."[219] These clippings were included in the Russian police files on the case, and accompanied by handwritten Russian translations.[220] A Russian military force had occupied northern Persia and Tehran at the

[217] "Tsardom and Miss Malecka," 24 May 1912, newspaper clipping and translation, GARF f102 [DPOO 1911g], op241, d135, L82.
[218] "Living Death for an Innocent Englishwoman," newspaper clipping, GARF f102 [DPOO 1911g], op241, d135, L80. See Fig. 2. See also *Hansard* HC Deb. vol. 41, 25 July 1912.
[219] "Living Death for an Innocent Englishwoman," newspaper clipping, GARF f102 [DPOO 1911g], op241, d135, L80.
[220] Translation of cartoon caption, GARF f102 [DPOO 1911g], op241, d135, L79. See Fig. 3.

end of 1911. 10,000 Russian troops were deployed in Persia, in addition to the garrisons and Cossack escorts under the command of Russian consuls.[221] Public opinion felt that the Foreign Office had done almost nothing to check this abuse of Russian power bordering on annexation. The Malecka Affair could not be separated from British handling of the Persian crisis, either in British popular opinion or in consular and diplomatic practice. The capture and imprisonment of a vulnerable British woman for sham political offenses appeared analogous to the military occupation of Persia's northern provinces.

Malecka petitioned Nicholas II for clemency. She apologized for writing to him in English, but claimed to have no knowledge of Russian.[222] In response to her petition, the Emperor commuted Malecka's sentence on May 18/31 to expulsion from lands of Russia forever. Malecka left Warsaw on May 28/June 10.[223] After her return to England, Malecka gave lectures on her experiences accompanied by musical recitals.[224] Her portrait was painted by F. W. Carter and displayed at the Seventh Exhibition of the Modern Society of Portrait Painters at the Royal Institute Galleries, where it was praised as one of the best in the show.[225] She wrote a book, *Saved from Siberia*, on her imprisonment and trial.[226] In the book, her lectures, and in the press, Malecka spoke openly about conditions in Russia, her political views, and her sympathy for socialism and Polish nationalism with a conviction she had avoided during her imprisonment and in correspondence with the Warsaw consular staff. Later, she went even further. Clive Bayley claimed to have heard

[221] See also Buchanan's report on Persian affairs, Buchanan, "Annual Report on Russia for the Year 1911," inclosure in Buchanan to Grey, "Annual Report, 1911," 18 March 1912, *BDFA*, Part I, Series A: Russia, 1859-1914, Volume 6, 1910-1914, Document 91 and 92, 195-234, 206-217.
[222] Petition from Malecka to Emperor Nicholas II, 17/30 May 1912, GARF f124 [f MIO, 1912g 1-101], op50, d 140, L 108-112, Russian translation L 113-116ob.
[223] Clipping from *Utro Rossii*, "Otezd Maletskoi," 1 June 1912, GARF f124, op50, d140, L104.
[224] "Miss Malecka in Edinburgh," *The Scotsman*, 29 October 1912, page 6.
[225] "Portrait Painters at the Royal Institute," *The Academy and Literature*, 1 March 1913, 277.
[226] F. Melian Stawell, Review of *Saved from Siberia* by Kate Malecka, *Women's Leader and the Common Cause*, Volume V Issue 257, 13 May 1914.

from an Englishman resident in Warsaw that she was "in close connexion with all the chief men of the Russian Socialists and Anarchist Parties and was at present in Zakopany in Galicia, the head quarters of those organizations."[227]

The furor created by the Malecka Affair in Britain tied her case to larger concerns about British imperial policy and the proper use of British imperial power. The Foreign Office's perceived inaction on her case—belied by the consular work of Clive Bayley and Kimens in Warsaw—and its genuine impotence to influence her trial and sentencing, provoked questions regarding the weight of British imperial and international power in general. Observers from all political persuasions wondered if Britain had compromised its principles—and its global power—by its alliance with Russia. The imprisonment of a British woman in Warsaw could become a stand-in for allowing the Russian domination of Persia, and vice versa.

In the following chapters, I show how British consular officials dealt with the transformations of subjecthood precipitated by the collapse of imperial states in the First World War, and how their everyday actions, grounded in the imperial context explored in this chapter, contributed to reconfiguring former imperial spaces into national territories. The places in which consular officials worked in the Russian Empire became battlefields in the Russian Civil War, occupied territories, and the seats of aspiring national governments. Consular officials who had worked in the Russian Empire took their training and practices with them when they served in British postwar occupation regimes, high commissions and missions, and on diplomatic service in new independent national states. Just as consuls' colonial experience affected their perceptions of the Russian imperial locations in which they worked, their prewar experiences in the Russian

[227] Clive Bayley to Buchanan, 9 October 1912 [1913?], TNA FO 394/11.

Empire shaped their approach to constructing the postwar order and the new territories and borders they created after the empire's collapse.

MAY 29, 1912 THE SKETCH. 241

SUBJECT OF QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE: A PRISONER.

SENTENCED TO FOUR YEARS' PENAL SERVITUDE, AND, IT IS SAID, TO EXILE FOR LIFE: MISS KATE MALECKA, WITH HER COUNSEL, M. LÉON PAPIESKI.

Considerable astonishment was expressed in this country when it was known that Miss Kate Malecka, accused of conspiring against the Russian Government by associating with Polish revolutionaries, had been sentenced, in Warsaw, to four years' penal servitude, and still more comments were made when it was said, a little later, on the authority of her counsel, that that sentence meant also exile for life to Siberia, with the loss of all civil rights and the obligation to live where ordered by the police after the expiration of the sentence. Questions as to the matter have been raised in Parliament. As we have pointed out before, Miss Malecka's father, a Russian Pole, was naturalised in this country, but did not obtain the Russian Government's consent to this step, and so remained in their eyes a Russian subject. Her mother was an Englishwoman whose maiden name was Mary Anne Boys Sankey. It is claimed by Miss Malecka, and for her, that she is a British subject.—[*After a Photograph by S. and G.*]

Fig. 1. Papieski and Malecka. *The Sketch*, Volume 78, Issue 1009, 29 May 1912, 241.

Fig. 2. “Living Death for an Innocent Englishwoman,” newspaper clipping, GARF f102 [DPOO 1911g], op241, d135, L80.



Fig. 3. Translation of cartoon caption, GARF f102 [DPOO 1911g], op241, d135, L79.