

Robert Ainsworth

CONTACT INFORMATION	Department of Economics Columbia University New York, NY	Phone: (530) 304-3302 E-mail: ra2747@columbia.edu Website: econ.columbia.edu/e/robert-m-ainsworth
PLACEMENT	Chairs: Donald Davis, drd28@columbia.edu , and Martin Uribe, mu2166@columbia.edu Administrator: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu	
EDUCATION	Ph.D., Economics, Columbia University (<i>expected</i>)	2020
	M.Phil., Economics, Columbia University	2017
	M.A., Economics, Columbia University	2016
	B.A., Economics, Williams College, <i>magna cum laude</i> , Highest Honors	2013
FIELDS	Political Economy, Labor Economics, Economics of Education	
JOB MARKET PAPER	A structural model of gerrymandering <i>Abstract:</i> Legislative maps differ along dimensions of proportionality (the extent to which parties' seat shares align with their vote shares) and competitiveness (the likelihood of close contests). Accurately evaluating maps along these dimensions requires estimating the probability distribution of election realizations. This paper develops a strategy for doing this and applies it to data from the 2008 to 2018 general elections in North Carolina. The strategy involves estimating a structural model of potential voters' preference and turnout choices and then simulating counterfactual elections using draws from the joint distribution of parameter values. Before conducting simulations, I show that the model has strong predictive power for precinct-level vote shares, individual-level turnout decisions, and preference and turnout choices for survey respondents. Substantively, I find that a variety of recently used maps in North Carolina pack Democratic-leaning voters into uncompetitive districts and generate disproportionate seat shares for Republicans.	
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS	The relative importance of value added and prestige in school choice: evidence from a field experiment in Romanian high school markets (with Rajeev Dehejia, Cristian Pop-Eleches, and Miguel Urquiola) The effects of the competitiveness of legislative districts on turnout and partisanship: evidence from redistricting in North Carolina Supplementary local school funding and residential sorting of high-income families: private donations and school district parcel taxes in California	
WORK HISTORY	Research assistant, Cristian Pop-Eleches and Miguel Urquiola, Columbia University Litigation consultant, Red Peak Economics Consulting Research assistant, Michael Samson, Williams College	2016-2019 2013-2014 2011
TEACHING	Principles of Economics, Columbia University	2015-2016
REFeree SERVICE	<i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , <i>Journal of Human Resources</i>	
NON-ECONOMICS PUBLICATIONS	"Teaching global health in the undergraduate liberal arts: a survey of fifty colleges," (with David R. Hill and Uttara Partap), <i>American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene</i> , July 2012, pp. 11-15.	
OTHER	Computing: Stata, R, Python, Julia Citizenship: United States Personal: SAT tutor, South Bronx United, New York, NY, 2013-2019	

REFERENCES

Miguel Urquiola (sponsor)

Professor of Economics

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Suresh Naidu (co-sponsor)

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Cristian Pop-Eleches

Professor of International and Public Affairs

Columbia University

(212) 854-4476

cp2124@columbia.edu

David Alfaro-Serrano

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PLACEMENT	<i>Chairs:</i> Donald David (drd28@columbia.edu), and Martin Uribe (mu2166@columbia.edu) <i>Assistant:</i> Amy Devine (aed2152@columbia.edu , +1 (212) 854 6881)	
EDUCATION	2020 Ph.D. in Economics, Columbia University (expected) 2017 M.Phil. in Economics, Columbia University 2016 M.A. in Economics, Columbia University 2011 M.A. in Economics, University of San Andrés 2008 B.A. in Economics, Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina (<i>with honours</i>)	
TEACHING TRAINING	2019-2020 Teaching Development Program, Columbia University 2017-2018 Teaching Observation Fellowship, Columbia University 2017, 2019 CORE-Teagle Fellowship 2017 Innovative Teaching Summer Institute, Columbia University	
FIELDS	Development Economics, International Trade	
JOB MARKET PAPER	Standards and Management Practices: Evidence from Peru. <i>Abstract:</i> This paper shows that a subsidy to certify process standards, such as ISO 9001, induces the adoption of better managerial practices in addition to the aimed standard certification. In the presence of complementarity between the standard requirements and modern management practices, a subsidy for standard certification will generate an improvement in management quality. I find evidence consistent with this hypothesis in a real policy setting in Peru using a regression discontinuity design. These results compare positively with those of a parallel intervention that follows the traditional approach of subsidizing the development of new technologies rather than the adoption of already known ones, which is unable to induce technology upgrading.	
WORKING PAPER	Exports and Wage Premia: Evidence from Mexican Employer-Employee Data. (with Judith A. Frías, David S. Kaplan, and Eric Verhoogen) <i>Abstract:</i> This paper draws on employer-employee and longitudinal plant data from Mexico to investigate the impact of exports on wage premia, defined as wages above what workers would receive elsewhere in the labor market. We decompose plant-level average wages into a component reflecting skill composition and a component reflecting wage premia. Using the late-1994 peso devaluation interacted with initial plant size as a source of exogenous variation in exports, we find that exports have a significant positive effect on wage premia, and that the effect on wage premia accounts for essentially all of the medium-term effect of exporting on plant-average wages.	
PUBLICATIONS	Measuring the Effect of Cluster Development Programs. In Maffioli, A., Pietrobelli, C. and Stucchi, R. (ed.), <i>The Impact Evaluation of Cluster Development Programs</i> . Inter-American Development Bank. 2016. (with Alessandro Maffioli and Rodolfo Stucchi) Brechas de Género en el Ingreso: Una Mirada Más allá de la Media en el Sector Agropecuario [Income Gender Gap: A Look Beyond the Mean in the Agricultural Sector]. <i>Economía y Sociedad</i> No. 82, p. 31-41. Dec. 2013. (with Elmer Guerrero)	

TEACHING EXPERIENCE	<i>Columbia University:</i> Fall 2017 Intermediate Microeconomics, Teaching Assistant for Susan Elmes Spring 2017 Principles in Economics, Teaching Assistant for Sunil Gulati Summer 2017 Public Economics, Teaching Assistant for Cameron LaPoint Fall 2016 Principles in Economics, Teaching Assistant for Sunil Gulati Fall 2015 Principles in Economics, Teaching Assistant for Sunil Gulati <i>University of San Andrés (Argentina):</i> Spring 2012 Intermediate Microeconomics, Teaching Assistant for Diego Fernández Felices Spring 2012 Econometrics, Teaching Assistant for Walter Sosa Escudero & Mariana Marchionni Fall 2012 Principles in Economics, Teaching Assistant for Juan Carlos de Pablo Fall 2012 Advanced Econometrics (Masters), Teaching Assistant for Javier García-Cicco		
GRANTS AND AWARDS	2018	NSF Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant	
	2018	CDEP Student Research Grant, Columbia University	
	2018	PER Research Grant, Columbia University	
	2017	Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award (runner-up), Columbia University	
	2017	Columbia University's Development Colloquium Grant	
	2012	CIES-IDRC Resarch Grant	
	2011	Scholarship for Graduate Studies, University of San Andrés	
	2006	High Performance Scholarship, Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina	
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE	2016-2017	RA for Eric Verhoogen, Columbia University	
	2013-2014	RA for Alessandro Maffioli, Inter-American Development Bank	
	2010	RA for Juana Kuramoto, Group for the Analysis of Development (GRADE, Peru)	
OTHER WORK EXPERIENCE	2010-2011	Specialist in Capacity Building, Science and Technology Program of Peru (FINCyT)	
	2008-2009	Analyst, Castiglioni, Tiscornia & Associates (Argentina)	
REFeree SERVICES	Journal of Human Resources Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization		
COMMUNITY SERVICE	2010-2011	Volunteer, Techo Argentina	
	2010	Volunteer, Techo Peru	
	2007-2009	Volunteer, Techo Argentina	
LANGUAGES	English, Spanish		
REFERENCES	Eric Verhoogen Department of Economics and SIPA Columbia University +1 (212) 854 4428 eric.verhoogen@columbia.edu	Jonas Hjort Graduate School of Business Columbia University +1 (212) 854 5957 hjort@columbia.edu	Réka Juhász Department of Economics Columbia University +1 (212) 854 4092 rj2446@columbia.edu

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PLACEMENT COMMITTEE

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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu

EDUCATION

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Ph.D. in Economics	(expected) May 2020
M.Phil. in Economics	May 2017
M.A. in Economics	May 2016

National University of Singapore, Faculty of Science

B.S. First Class Honors in Quantitative Finance and Economics (double majors)	Jun 2014
Minor: Statistics	

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich, Department of Mathematics

Exchange Student	Sep 2012 – Jan 2013
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FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Primary Fields: Health Economics, Labor Economics

Secondary Fields: Public Economics, Industrial Organization

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

David C.F. Hsiung '34 M.A. and Vivian S.Y.W. Hsiung Fellowship in Economics, Columbia University, 2017 – 2018

Applied Micro Research Methods Colloquium Grant, Columbia University, 2017

Dean's Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University, 2014 onwards

Best Academic Exercise in the Discipline, National University of Singapore, 2014

Book Prize, National University of Singapore, 2010

WORKING PAPERS

“The Unexpected Costs of Expertise: Evidence from Highly Specialized Physicians”

(Job Market Paper)

Abstract: As labor becomes more skilled and specialized, firms must match their employees' skills to tasks they are suitable for ("skill–task matching"). This paper shows that when demand is unpredictable, maintaining good matchings can be both challenging and costly to firms, and therefore allowing a degree of skill–task mismatch can be optimal. The paper focuses on hospitals' responses to demand shocks induced by unscheduled high-risk admissions, paying special attention to the assignment of patients to physicians. In the event of unscheduled high-risk admissions, hospitals summon physicians who specialize in treating high-risk patients and have more intensive practice styles. These physicians also treat previously admitted lower-risk patients, especially when hospitals are congested, leading to increased treatment intensity for those patients. However, no improvement in health outcomes is seen. While this low productivity could potentially be viewed as inefficient, this study provides evidence that hospitals' decisions to sacrifice physicians' skill advantage can be efficient when achieving a good patient–physician matching is particularly difficult, which is likely when congestion is high. These findings underscore the importance of accounting for costs in assessing skill–task matching in highly specialized production, and provide firms and policy-makers with insights in designing job assignment schemes or creating incentives to improve efficiency.

“Perinatal Health among 1 Million Chinese-Americans” [*submitted*] with Douglas Almond
(*will be presented at 2020 ASSA “Social Determinants of Health Disparities” Paper Session*)

Abstract: The literature on “missing girls” suggests a net preference for sons both in China and among Chinese immigrants to the West. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that newborn Chinese-American girls are treated *more* intensively in U.S. hospitals: they are kept longer following delivery, have more medical procedures performed, and have more hospital charges than predicted (by the non-Chinese gender difference). What might explain more aggressive medical treatment? We posit that hospitals are responding to worse health at birth of Chinese-American girls. We document higher rates of low birth weight, congenital anomalies, maternal hypertension, and lower APGAR scores among Chinese-Americans girls – outcomes recorded prior to intensive neonatal medical care and relative to the non-Chinese gender gap. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to find that son preference may also compromise “survivor” health at birth. On net, compromised newborn health seems to outweigh the benefit of more aggressive neonatal hospital care for girls. Relative to non-Chinese gender differences, death on the first day of life and in the post-neonatal period is more common among Chinese-American girls, i.e. later than sex selection is typically believed to occur.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

“A Monolithic Motherhood Penalty? Evidence from U.S. Census LEHD Microdata” with Douglas Almond and Cecilia Machado
(*Working paper coming soon*)

“Inconsistency in Hospital Facility Reporting: Evidence from NICU Beds”

PRESENTATIONS

Applied Micro and Labor Workshop, Columbia University	2019
NBER's Education Program and Children's Program Joint Meetings	2017
Sustainable Development Colloquium, Columbia University	2017
Applied Micro Research Methods Colloquium, Columbia University	2016 – 2019

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

U.S. Census Research Assistant, Special Sworn Status	2018 – Present
Referee, <i>Economic Inquiry</i>	2017
Participant, NBER Summer Institute	2017
Student Organizer, Applied Micro Research Methods Colloquium	2016 – 2019

RESEARCH ASSISTANTSHIPS

Paola Valenti, Columbia University	May 2018 – Jan 2019
Douglas Almond, Columbia University	Mar 2016 – Mar 2019

TEACHING ASSISTANTSHIPS

Financial Economics, Harrison Hong	Spring 2019
Financial Economics, Jose Cao-Alvira	Spring 2018
Financial Economics, Gernot Muller	Fall 2017
Intermediate Microeconomics, Anna Caterina Musatti	Spring 2017
Financial Economics, Sally Davidson	Spring 2016, Fall 2016
Intermediate Microeconomics, Prajit Dutta	Fall 2015

PERSONAL

Programming & Software: Stata, R, Matlab, SQL
Languages: Chinese (Native), English (Fluent)
Citizenship: China

REFERENCES

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Assistant Professor of Health Policy and Management
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Education:

2020 (expected)	Ph.D.	Economics	Columbia University
2013	Visiting student	Economics	UC Berkeley
2013	B.A.	Economics	National Taiwan University

Honors and Awards:

2018-present	Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2014-present	Dean's Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2014	Taiwanese Government Scholarships for Study Abroad
2013	Social Science Foreign Scholarship, National Taiwan University

Fields of Specialization:

Primary Fields: International macroeconomics, Monetary economics
Secondary Field: International finance

Job Market Paper: *Macro-prudential Policy and Asset Liquidity*

Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic model to study optimal liquidity regulations that can be implemented on multiple assets that differ in liquidity. I show that optimal macro-prudential policies are affected both by the asset liquidity and the multi-asset structure. Lower asset liquidity amplifies drops of asset prices, tightens the collateral constraint during financial crises, and thus raises macro-prudential taxes to discourage the ex-ante holding. With multiple assets, the marginal benefit of investing in one asset is affected by future cross-price elasticities of all assets, whose effects depend on future trading positions and the tightness of the collateral constraint. Quantitatively, optimal macro-prudential policies favor a portfolio with more liquid assets and less borrowing. In the constrained-efficient equilibrium, agents decrease leverage by 9.4 percent and increase the liquid share of the balance sheet by 2.6 percent compared to the unregulated equilibrium. The optimal policy lowers the probability of encountering financial crises by 8 percent and increases consumption by 0.99 percent. Finally, I provide theoretical and quantitative analyses on the efficacy of the Basel III reform. Both the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio lower the probability of crises and shrink the welfare loss of the competitive equilibrium by 23 to 60 percent.

Working Papers:

R&D Investment under Currency Depreciation: Should We Beggar-thy-neighbor?

Abstract: This paper focuses on the welfare analysis of currency depreciation through endogenous R&D where the economy faces a trade-off between the gain from export and disinvestment of technology. By using country-level data, regressions and panel VAR indicate that undervaluation of the exchange rate and real depreciation are negatively correlated with the R&D activity. The stylized fact can be explained by a model that features endogenous productivity in a small open economy where real depreciation raises the cost of R&D investment. Under real depreciation shock, the economy faces a short-term boom in consumption and output but a long-term bust due to sluggish productivity. Welfare increases slightly following a real depreciation shock when productivity is exogenous. However, when productivity is endogenous, welfare decreases by 0.1 percent under 1 percent real depreciation.

Optimal Monetary Policy with Endogenous Productivity in a Small Open Economy.

Abstract: This paper derives the optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with endogenous productivity. The optimal policy is a targeting rule of inflation, output gap, and the terms of trade, which generates a trade-off between the international purchasing power and the cost of importing R&D. Under a positive technology shock, an expansionary monetary policy, which leads to depreciation, speeds up the convergence of the technology process via a decline in R&D investment. To take advantage of this mechanism, central banks have an incentive to adjust the interest rate more aggressively. Quantitatively, the variation of the optimal monetary policy is three times larger than the domestic deflation-based Taylor rule and two times larger than the optimal monetary policy under an exogenous productivity process. The optimal monetary policy can improve welfare by 0.52 percent compared to the standard Taylor rule.

Research in Progress:

Flip or Flop? Real Estate Transaction Taxes as Macroprudential Policy, with Cameron LaPoint and Ming-Jen Lin

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of property transaction taxes on real estate prices and taxpayers' investment decisions using a tax reform in Taiwan which required sellers of non-owner-occupied real estate to pay large percentages of the full selling price for properties resold within one year (15%) or resold after one year but within two years (10%) from the original purchase date. We link the universe of personal tax returns to transaction records to show bunching at the 12-month and 24-month holding period thresholds under this tax, but no such bunching prior to implementation, suggesting that owners were highly attentive to the tax. We apply a sharp RD to examine the effect on prices, exploiting the fact that the tax applied retroactively to properties purchased prior to the implementation date. While average transaction prices do fall immediately after implementation, this is due to a decline in the number of high-end property sales that would have been subject to the tax. Our

initial results suggest limited effects of the transaction tax towards curbing the rapid rise in real estate prices in recent years.

Life-Cycle Patterns of Portfolio Diversification, with Chih-Ching Hung and Ming-Jen Lin

Academic Experience:

Research Assistant for Prof. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe, Columbia University, Summer 2016

Teaching Experience:

Teaching Assistant, Financial Economics, Columbia University, Fall 2015- Spring 2017; Fall 2015; Fall 2018

Teaching Assistant, Economic Growth & Development, Columbia University, Fall 2017

Teaching Assistant, Global Economics, Columbia University, Spring 2016; Spring 2018

Conference and Seminar Presentations:

2019 Midwest Macro conference (MSU, scheduled)

2018 Taiwan Economics Research (Taipei)

Programming Experience:

Matlab, R, Stata, LaTeX

Personal:

Citizenship: Taiwan

Languages: Mandarin (native), English (fluent)

References:

Andres Drenik
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Columbia University
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Martin Uribe, mu2166@columbia.edu.

Placement Assistant:

Amy Devine, aed2152@columbia.edu.

Education

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Ph.D. Economics

Sept. 2014 – May 2020

May 2020 (expected)

M.Phil. Economics

May 2017

M.A. Economics

May 2016

RENMIN UNIVERSITY OF CHINA

Courseworks in Hanqing M.A. in Economics Program

Sept. 2008 – June 2014

Sept. 2012 – June 2014

B.A. Economics

June 2012

B.S. Mathematics

June 2012

Research Interest

Econometrics (Primary), Applied Microeconomics, Causal Inference, Machine Learning.

Job Market Paper

"Matching Points: Supplementing Instruments with Covariates to Identify and Estimate Non-parametric Triangular Models", 2019.

Abstract: We develop a novel approach to nonparametrically identify models with (a) a discrete endogenous variable and (b) an IV possibly taking on fewer values. When the order condition fails, we show how covariates can supplement the IV and restore identification. This is the first approach that achieves nonparametric identification with (a) and (b). Critical to it are the *matching points*; shifting the covariates from a fixed value to them offsets the effect of the IV on selection. We show the matching points can be obtained under a general class of selection models. Given identification, we construct consistent and asymptotic normal estimators. Monte Carlo simulations are conducted and two empirical applications illustrate the usefulness of the approach.

Working Papers

"Robust Principal Components Analysis with Non-Sparse Errors" (with Jushan Bai), *arXiv working paper*, 2019.

Abstract: We show that when a high-dimensional data matrix is the sum of a low-rank matrix and a random error matrix with independent entries, the low-rank component can be consistently estimated by solving a convex minimization problem. We develop a new theoretical argument to establish consistency without assuming sparsity or the existence of any moments of the error matrix, so that fat-tailed continuous random errors such as Cauchy are allowed. The results are illustrated by simulations.

"Regularized Quantile Regression in Models with Factor Structures", *working paper*, 2019.

Abstract: We consider nuclear-norm penalized quantile regression for panel data models with latent factor structures. Not needing the number of factors, we show that both the regression coefficients and the low-rank common component matrix are consistently estimated and we derive the rate of convergence. The commonly made boundedness assumption for factors in the related literature is not required. Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to illustrate the estimator's finite sample performance.

Conference Presentations

2019: Econometrics Society Asian Meeting (Xiamen, China).

Research Assistantship

Research Assistant to Jushan Bai: 2016-2019.

Teaching Assistantship

Econometrics II (M.A. level, instructor Ronald Miller): Spring 2017.

Introduction to Econometrics (Ph.D. level, instructor Jushan Bai): Fall 2016.

Introduction to Econometrics (instructor Seyhan Erden): Spring 2016.

Intermediate Microeconomics (instructor Susan Elmes): Fall 2015.

Fellowships & Awards

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Dissertation Fellowship, 2019-2020.

Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University, 2014-2020.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Dhrymes Econometrics Award, 2018.

Annual Wueller Teaching Award for Ph.D. Courses (runner-up), 2017.

Annual Wueller Teaching Award for M.A. Courses (runner-up), 2017.

Harriss Prize for Best Second Year Paper (runner-up), 2016.

Miscellaneous

Programming Languages: Matlab, R, Stata, L^AT_EX.

References

Professor Jushan Bai
(Co-Chair)
Columbia University
jb3064@columbia.edu

Professor Sokbae (Simon) Lee
(Co-Chair)
Columbia University
sl3841@columbia.edu

Professor Bernard Salanié
Columbia University
bs2237@columbia.edu

EVAN FRIEDMAN

September 2019

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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, Columbia University

Expected 2020

Sc.B. in Applied Mathematics-Economics, Brown University

May 2012

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Microtheory, Behavioral and Experimental Economics

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Stochastic Choice and Noisy Beliefs in Games” with Jeremy Ward

We study the primitive mappings that underlie most solution concepts for games: (i) the mapping from beliefs over opponents’ behavior to a distribution over actions and (ii) the mapping from opponents’ behavior to a distribution over beliefs. In our laboratory experiment, we collect actions and elicit beliefs for a family of asymmetric 2-player games with systematically varied payoffs, allowing us to “trace out” these mappings. We organize our results around testing the behavioral axioms of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and noisy belief equilibrium (NBE), models that generalize Nash equilibrium by injecting noise into actions and beliefs, respectively. We find that, while both sources of noise are important in explaining observed behaviors, there are systematic violations in both sets of axioms. The data (actions and beliefs jointly) are well described by a modified version of cognitive hierarchy plus risk aversion. Structural estimates suggest that the player role itself induces a higher degree of strategic sophistication in the player with more asymmetric payoffs.

WORKING PAPERS

“Stochastic Equilibria: Noise in Actions or Beliefs?”

Revise and resubmit, [American Economic Journal: Microeconomics](#)

“Endogenous Quantal Response Equilibrium”

Revise and resubmit, [Games and Economic Behavior](#)

“Range Effects in Multi-Attribute Choice: an Experiment” with Tommaso Bondi and Dániel Csaba

“The Cost of Capital of the Financial Sector” with Tobias Adrian and Tyler Muir

WORKS IN PROGRESS

“Incomplete Preferences and Preference for Flexibility” with Marina Agranov, Mark Dean, Han

Huynh, and Pietro Ortoleva

“Mediating Conflict in the Lab” with Alessandra Casella, Massimo Morelli, and Manuel Perez Archila

“Learning to Ignore Non-Rationalizable Actions” with Dilip Ravindran and Jeremy Ward

AWARDS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND GRANTS

Dissertation fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University	2019 – 2020
CELSS Dissertation Grant	2018
CELSS Research Grant	2018
Wueller Teaching Award, Best TA for an undergraduate elective	2017
NSF Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, SES-1730399	2017
Vickrey Prize for Best 3 rd year paper	2017
Harriss Prize for Best 2 nd year paper (runner-up)	2016
CELSS Research Grant	2016
Dean’s fellowship, Columbia University	2014 – 2019
Samuel Lamport Prize for Best Economics Thesis (Brown)	2012
Award for Best Paper, 11 th Annual Carroll Round	2012

RESEARCH ASSISTANTSHIP

Alessandra Casella and Massimo Morelli	Spring 2018
Mark Dean	Summer 2018
David Weil (Brown)	2011 – 2012

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Analyst, Federal Reserve Bank of New York	2012 – 2014
RA for Tobias Adrian and Ernst Schaumburg	

TEACHING ASSISTANTSHIP

Principles of Economics, Prajit Dutta	Fall 2018
The American Economy, Claudia Halbac	Fall 2017
Behavioral Economics, Mark Dean	Spring 2017
Economics of Uncertainty and Information, Pierre-André Chiappori	Fall 2016
Intermediate Microeconomics, Mark Dean	Spring 2016
Intermediate Macroeconomics, Irasema Alonso	Fall 2015
Intermediate Finance, George Borts (Brown)	Spring 2011, 2012

INVITED PRESENTATIONS

NYU Student Micro Lunch, Student Workshop in Experimental Economics Techniques*	2019
PSE Summer School Bounded Rationality Workshop,	2018
Student Workshop in Experimental Economic Techniques	
Stony Brook Game Theory, Summer School of the Econometric Society,	2017
NYU Student Micro Lunch	
Stony Brook Game Theory, Columbia-NYU-Wharton Graduate Students Conference	2016
in Experimental Economics, EconCon	
EconCon	2015

PERSONAL

Citizenship: USA

Languages: English (Native), French (Basic)

REFERENCES

Alessandra Casella

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Mark Dean

Associate Professor

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Navin Kartik

Professor

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Columbia University

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September 30, 2019

JUAN HERREÑO

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PLACEMENT	Chairs: Donald Davis drd28@columbia.edu and Martín Uribe mu2166@columbia.edu Assistant: Amy Devine aed2152@columbia.edu ; Phone: (212) 856-6881	
EDUCATION	Ph.D. in Economics, Columbia University (expected) M.Phil. in Economics, Columbia University M.A. in Economics, Universidad de los Andes B.A. in Economics, Universidad de los Andes B.S. in Industrial Engineering, Universidad de los Andes	2020 2019 2012 2010 2009
HONORS AND AWARDS	Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University Doctoral Student Grant, Clausen Center, (with Mathieu Pedemonte) Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award, Columbia University Dean's Fellow, Columbia University Juan Luis Londoño Award, Best M.A. thesis, Univ. de Los Andes	2019-2020 2018 2017 2014 2012
FIELDS	Macroeconomics, Finance	
JOB MARKET PAPER	The Real Effects of Bank Lending Cuts A large body of cross-sectional evidence has established that cuts in the supply of bank lending affect firm outcomes and the allocation of credit. However, it is unclear what these results imply for the effect on aggregate output of a cut in aggregate bank lending. I estimate this aggregate effect using a new general equilibrium model with multibank firms, relationship banking, endogenous credit dependence, and bank market power. I use a set of cross-sectional patterns to estimate the key structural parameters of the model. The effect of an aggregate lending cut on aggregate output is large: a one percent decline in aggregate bank lending supply reduces aggregate output by 0.2 percent. The structure of labor and credit markets is important to reach this answer. Under an alternative parametrization of the model that ignores input markets frictions the response of aggregate output is three times smaller. Under my preferred parametrization, the cross-sectional effects survive aggregation in general equilibrium. Instead, with frictionless input markets the cross-sectional patterns overestimate the aggregate response by a factor of five.	
RESEARCH	The Slope of the Phillips Curve: Evidence from U.S. States	

with Jonathon Hazell, Emi Nakamura, and Jón Steinsson

Subsistence Entrepreneurship and Aggregate Productivity

with Sergio Ocampo

We document three facts about self-employment in developing economies. First, self-employment is prevalent in the left tail of the income distribution. Second, transitions in-and-out of self-employment are common, with liquidity-constrained agents transitioning more to self-employment. Finally, when salaried work opportunities emerge, self-employment rates go down. Models that predict positive selection into self-employment are at odds with these facts. We augment a workhorse macro-development model with a mechanism supported by the data, generated by interacting unemployment risk and credit frictions. Low wealth, unemployed agents choose self-employment to earn subsistence income, regardless of their entrepreneurial ability. Low job-finding rates from self-employment make subsistence entrepreneurs stay self-employed. As a result, large shares of the labor force own low-productive businesses. Improving the generosity of safety nets in the model increases welfare by 2%. Also, self-employment goes down, salaried work goes up, the unemployment rate rises.

Price Dispersion and Frictions in the Physical Capital Market

with Andrés Drenik and Pablo Ottonello

This paper studies the physical-capital market with an approach similar to that developed in the labor-market for the question: Why are similar workers paid differently? (Mortensen, 2005). Using a unique dataset on a panel of capital structures posted for sale or rent, we document a large degree of heterogeneity in prices of capital units to be traded. We show that a quarter of price differences cannot be explained by observable characteristics included in the listings: location, size, and age of the unit. We provide empirical evidence and a model of frictional trading in the physical-capital market suggesting this residual price dispersion can be explained by the presence of asymmetric information and search frictions. Mapping our model to the data, we quantify a large degree of asymmetric information and discuss policies aimed at improving market efficiency.

Overborrowing and Information

with Carlos Rondón-Moreno

We relax the perfect information assumption in a small open economy with collateral constraints. Agents observe income growth but do not perceive whether the underlying shocks are permanent or transitory. The likelihood and severity of financial crises are increased by the interaction between the information friction and a pecuniary externality that emerges when agents use as collateral an asset valued at market prices. Due to a more significant welfare loss, the optimal tax to restore constrained efficiency is six times larger than under perfect information.

The Price Pass-Through of Local Shocks and the Effectiveness of Fiscal Devaluations

with Mathieu Pedemonte

ACADEMIC
EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant: Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson
Research Assistant: Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and Martin Uribe

2015 - 2018
2015

TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Macroeconomic Analysis II (PhD), Columbia for Hassan Afrouzi, Emi Nakamura, and Jón Steinsson	Spring 2018
	Intermediate Macroeconomics (Undergraduate), Columbia for Irasema Alonso	Fall 2018
	Principles of Economics (Undergraduate), Columbia for Nicola Zaniboni	Fall 2015
	Advanced Macroeconomics II, (Master), Universidad de los Andes for Andrés Fernández and Marc Hofstetter	Fall 2011

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS	Young Economist Symposium (2019), MFM Summer Session (2018), LACEA - LAMES (2016), Canadian Economic Association (2013), Central Bank of Colombia (2012)
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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE	Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department, Research Fellow Lumni, Inc., Research Department, Research Analyst	2012-2014 2010-2012
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OTHER INFORMATION	Software Knowledge: Matlab, Stata, SAS, R, Python Professional Service: Monetary Colloquium Organizer, Young Economist Symposium organizing committee member Languages: Spanish (Native), English (Fluent)
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ACADEMIC REFERENCES	Jennifer La'O Associate Professor of Economics Department of Economics Columbia University jenlao@columbia.edu	Emi Nakamura Chancellor's Professor of Economics Department of Economics UC Berkeley enakamura@berkeley.edu
	Jón Steinsson Chancellor's Professor of Economics Department of Economics UC Berkeley jsteinsson@berkeley.edu	

HAN HUYNH

September 2019

CONTACT	Department of Economics Columbia University 420 W 118th Street, New York, NY 10027	k.huynh@columbia.edu 917-292-9059
EDUCATION	Ph.D. in Economics, Columbia University M.Phil. in Economics, Columbia University M.A. in Economics, Columbia University B.Soc.Sci. in Economics, National University of Singapore B.Sci. in Mathematics, National University of Singapore	(Expected) May 2020 May 2017 May 2016 Dec 2013 Dec 2013
FIELDS	Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Microeconomics	
ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE	<i>Research Assistance</i> Allison Carnegie, Columbia University Yeon-koo Che, Columbia University Mark Dean, Columbia University Tomoo Kikuchi, National University of Singapore <i>Participant</i> , Summer Institute in Behavioral Economics Russell Sage Foundation <i>Lab Manager</i> , Columbia Experimental Laboratory in the Social Sciences (CELSS)	2017 2016 2016 2013 Summer 2018 Sep 2017 - May 2019
TEACHING EXPERIENCE	<i>Teaching Fellow</i> , Columbia University Microeconomic Analysis II, Ph.D. 1st Year Game Theory Economic Development of Japan <i>Teaching Assistant</i> , National University of Singapore Quantitative Methods for Economics Analysis	Spring 2017 Spring, Fall 2016 Fall 2015 Spring, Fall 2013, Fall 2012
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE	<i>Economist</i> , Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry <i>Intern</i> , Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry	Jan - Aug 2014 May - Jul 2012
RESEARCH GRANTS	<i>External Grant</i> Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant, Award 1919483, National Science Foundation <i>Columbia University</i> Student Grant for Dissertation Chapter, CELSS Student Research Grant, Center for Development Economics and Policy Student Grant for Experimental Project, CELSS	2019 - 2020 2019 2019 2018

**HONORS &
AWARDS**

Columbia University
Dissertation Fellowship 2019 - 2020
Dean's Fellowship 2014 - 2019
Research Fellowship, Program for Economic Research 2019
AGES Best Teaching Assistant for a Ph.D. Course (Runner-Up) 2018

National University of Singapore

Lim Tay Boh Memorial Medal (Best Economics Student) 2013
Rachel Meyer Book Prize (Best Woman Student in the Faculty) 2013
Letter of Commendation for Teaching 2013
Singapore Economic Review Book Prize (Best Economics Student in Third Year) 2012
Shell Bronze Medal (3rd Student in the Faculty in First Year) 2010
NUS - ASEAN Undergraduate Scholarship (covering tuition and living expenses) 2009 - 2013

Other

ASEAN Scholarship, GCE O- & A-Level (covering tuition and living expenses), 2005 - 2008
Singapore Ministry of Education

**CURRENT
PROJECTS***Effects of Incentives and Education on Financial Choices: An Experiment*

Abstract: This project uses an experiment to decompose the effects of incentives and education on financial choices. Mounting evidence reveals a puzzle in consumer finance: people leave substantial amount of money on the table despite the availability of educational materials to help them make better choices. Besides, they seem insensitive to some variations of incentives. This project implements an experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk, randomizing subjects into 8 treatment arms designed to tease out the channels through which incentives and education affect health insurance choices in hypothetical scenarios. Surprisingly, incentives have limited effects on measured effort, but significant effects on performance. Meanwhile, education leads to increase in measured efforts in both low and high incentive treatments, but increase in performance only in high-incentive treatments. The joint evidence on effort and performance suggest that in financial choices, choice difficulty may play a very important role.

Identifying Incomplete Preferences

(with Marina Agranov, Mark Dean, Evan Friedman and Pietro Ortoleva)

Competing for Influence

(with Tomoo Kikuchi)

OTHER

Deputy Project Director, Chancellor's Challenge Shield, 2011
NUS Students' Political Association

Co-leader, Youth Expedition Project to Hangzhou, China Winter 2010
National University of Singapore

PERSONAL

Software: Stata, MatLab, R, SQL, Python, LaTeX
Language: English, Vietnamese, Spanish (intermediate)
Citizenship: Vietnamese, Singapore PR

JAY HYUN

September 2019

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Columbia University
New York, NY 10027

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Placement Chairs: Donald Davis, drd28@columbia.edu ; Martín Uribe, mu2166@columbia.edu

Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, +1 (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu

EDUCATION

Columbia University

Ph.D. in Economics	2015-2020 (Expected)
M.Phil. in Economics	2018
M.A. in Economics	2017

Seoul National University

M.A. in Economics	2015
B.A. in Economics, <i>Summa Cum Laude</i>	2013

Presidential Award for being ranked 1st in SNU College of Social Sciences graduating class

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Primary: Macroeconomics

Secondary: International Economics, Regional Economics

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Spillovers and Redistribution through Intra-Firm Networks: The Product Replacement Channel”,
with Ryan Kim (Johns Hopkins SAIS)

Abstract: We study how regional shocks spill over across counties and states through intra-firm spatial networks of multi-market firms, and discuss how they reshape households’ welfare across local markets. We construct a detailed micro-data combining barcode-region level prices and quantities with their producer-level information and regional house prices. Exploiting a sharp differential drop in regional house prices in 2007-09 and a variation in firms’ initial exposure to these local markets, we show that a firm’s local sales decrease in response to not only the direct negative local demand shock but also the average negative local demand shock originating from the firm’s other markets. In particular, such intra-firm spillover effect is mostly attributed to the extensive margin response from product creation and destruction, while the direct local shock solely affects the intensive margin from continuing products. We show that such extensive margin response arises due to *synchronized* product replacements across many markets within firms, as newly introduced products have lower values—sales per product, unit price, and organic sales shares—relative to destroyed products. To discuss aggregate implications of our findings, we develop a multi-region model with firms’ endogenous quality adjustments that reflect product replacements. In the model, producers facing negative demand shocks downgrade their product quality due to (i) the scale effect and (ii) the nonhomothetic preferences. And in doing so, they replace products in multiple markets simultaneously including a market that did not face direct shock, generating intra-firm spillover. Through the counterfactual analysis using the estimated model, we show that the identified intra-firm spillover serves as a redistributive mechanism across local markets and mitigates the *quality-adjusted* regional consumption inequality by 8% to 29%.

“Propagation of Housing Market Disruptions during the Great Recession: Supply Chain Network Channel”,

with Ryan Kim (Johns Hopkins SAIS)

Abstract: This paper investigates a role of supply chain network in transmitting housing market disruptions during the Great Recession. We build up a unique micro-level data that combines local housing market condition, firms’ sales in each local market, and firm-level supply chain network information. Exploiting firm-specific demand shock stemming from cross-market variation in house price changes and an initial difference in firms’ local sales, we find that such shock not only affects downstream firms but also transmits to their suppliers. The estimated supplier-level elasticity is quantitatively large, reflecting larger role of downstream firms with higher elasticity in the network structure. To quantify such propagation at the aggregate level, we build up a parsimonious network model calibrated to match the micro-level data. Our counterfactual analysis shows that approximately 18% of the observed drop in the aggregate output can be attributed to the propagating role of the supply chain network.

“Business Cycles with Input Complementarity”,

with Ryan Kim (Johns Hopkins SAIS)

Abstract: We study the business cycle with a Translog production function. We empirically identify a complementarity between labor and energy that leads to procyclical returns to scale, which is not compatible with the tightly parameterized production function commonly used in the literature (Cobb-Douglas and CES). We therefore propose a flexible Translog production function that not only features complementarity-induced procyclical returns to scale but is also consistent with a balanced growth path. A simple calibrated business cycle model with the proposed production function generates strikingly data-consistent dynamics following demand shock without relying on either nominal rigidities or countercyclical markups. First, the model features procyclical real wage, investment, and capital with respect to demand-side shock. Second, it produces a stronger amplification effect with respect to both supply-side and demand-side shocks than the model without complementarity. Third, our model calibrated with micro-consistent Frisch elasticity generates sizable labor fluctuation comparable to that generated by conventional neoclassical model with macro-consistent Frisch elasticity. Finally, under certain parametrization, our model features indeterminacy.

“Import Competition and Internal Firm Network: Establishment-level Analysis”,

with Ziho Park (University of Chicago)

Abstract: Using a dataset of US establishments with their firm affiliation, we find that establishments owned by multi-sector parent companies are more likely to reduce employments if the parents are more exposed to import competition from China (“China shock”). This finding holds (i) conditional on establishments’ direct exposure to the China shock and (ii) by measuring parent-level exposure by only considering parent-owned establishments with different industry codes (at SIC 4-digit level). Also, this finding holds for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing establishments. This implies that establishment-level employments are strongly affected shocks from different sectors through within-firm sectoral networks created by multi-sector parent companies. Finally, we construct a sector-level measure of exposure to Chinese import competition from other sectors arising through internal firm networks, and show that the spillover effects even hold at the sectoral aggregate level. This implies that general equilibrium adjustments within-sector do not neutralize our findings.

SELECTED WORKS IN PROGRESS

“The Distributional Effects of Regional Shocks during the Great Recession: A General Equilibrium Analysis”

“Capital Controls and Time-varying Margin Requirement”,
with Owen Nie (World Bank Group) and Gustavo Pereira (Columbia University)

PRE-DOCTORAL PUBLICATIONS

“Competition in Two-sided Platform Markets with Direct Network Effect”, *Seoul Journal of Economics*, 2016, 29(3), pp. 331-377.

“The Relevance of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level in Korea”, *Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics*, 2015, 26(1), pp. 1-34.,
with Jung Yi Hong (Handong Global U.), Jae Won Lee (University of Virginia), and Yeji Sung (Columbia University)

HONORS, AWARDS, AND GRANTS

Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University	2019-2020
Research Grant, Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies : USD 13,000 ($\times 3$)	2018-2020
Trudy and Paul Woodruff Fellowship (by Graduate School of Arts and Sciences), Columbia University	2018-2019
PER Travel Grants, Columbia University : USD 400	2019
Wueller Travel Scholarship, Columbia University : USD 500	2019
Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University	2015-2018
GSAS Conference Matching Travel Fund ($\times 2$), Columbia University : USD 300 ($\times 2$)	2018
Presidential Award (Ranked 1st), Seoul National University	2013
Tae Sung Kim Memorial Fellowship, Best Undergraduate, Seoul National University	2009

SEMINAR AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS (* SCHEDULED)

SBFC* (University of Sydney), Midwest Macro* (Michigan State), EGSC* (WashU in St. Louis), MMF (LSE), KER International (Sogang), WEAI Annual (San Francisco), Seoul National University, Yonsei University, GCER (Georgetown), HenU/INFER (Kaifeng), WEAI International (Keio), EEA Annual (New York)	2019
LACEA-LAMES (ESPOL), Midwest Macro (Vanderbilt), EMCON (Northwestern), YES (NYU), WEAI Annual (Vancouver)	2018
EGSC (WashU in St. Louis), YES (Yale)	2017

DISCUSSIONS

“Trade Linkages and International Business Cycle Comovement: Evidence from Korea” (by Lee), WEAI Int'l	2019
“Retirements, Vacancy Chains, and the Secular Decline in Worker Reallocation” (by Murray), EMCON	2018
“Flow-Based Borrowing Constraints and Macroeconomic Fluctuations” (by Drechsel), YES	2018
“The Heterogeneous Effects of Global and National Business Cycles on Employment in U.S. States and Metropolitan Areas” (by Chudik, Koech, and Wynne), WEAI Annual	2018

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant, Andres Drenik, Columbia University	2017-2018
Research Assistant, Pierre Yared, Columbia University Business School	2016-2017
Research Assistant, In Ho Lee, Seoul National University	2013-2015
Research Assistant, Jae Won Lee, Seoul National University	2014

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Andres Drenik, <i>Advanced Macroeconomics</i> , Columbia University	Fall 2018
Teaching Assistant, Simon Lee, <i>Introduction to Econometrics</i> , Columbia University	Spring 2018
Teaching Assistant, Gregory Cox, <i>PhD Core Econometrics</i> , Columbia University	Fall 2017
Teaching Assistant, In Ho Lee, <i>Advanced Economic Theory ; Game Theory and Its Application ; Microeconomics ; Financial Intermediation and Regulation</i> , Seoul National University	Fall 2013-Spring 2015

COMPUTER SOFTWARE

Proficient in MATLAB, FORTRAN, DYNARE, STATA, R

PERSONAL

Citizenship	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
Legal Name	Jungsik Hyun
Marital Status	Married, One child
Language	Korean (Native), English (Fluent), French (Basic) (<i>Alumnus of International Community School in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire</i>)
Military Service	Sergeant, Republic of Korea Air Force (Osan US Air Force Base, 2010-2012)

REFERENCES

Martín Uribe (Advisor)
Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
Columbia University
International Affairs Building, New York
Email: mu2166@columbia.edu
Tel. +1 (212) 851-4008

Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé
Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
Columbia University
International Affairs Building, New York
Email: ss3501@columbia.edu
Tel. +1 (212) 851-4010

Andres Drenik
Assistant Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
Columbia University
International Affairs Building, New York
Email: ad3376@columbia.edu
Tel. +1 (650) 888-8349

NANDITA KRISHNASWAMY

October 2019

ACADEMIC INSTITUTION

Department of Economics and INET,
University of Southern California
3620 South Vermont Ave.
Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0253

CONTACT INFORMATION

Email: nanditak@usc.edu
Website: <http://nanditakrishnaswamy.com>

EXPERIENCE AND AFFILIATIONS

Post-doctoral Research Associate, Department of Economics and Institute for New Economic Thinking,
University of Southern California, Fall 2018-Present
Fellow, Center for Development Economics and Policy, Fall 2017-Present

EDUCATION

PhD, Economics, Columbia University, 2018
M. Phil, Economics, Columbia University, 2015
M.A., Economics, Columbia University, 2014
B.A. *summa cum laude*, Economics and Mathematics, Wellesley College, 2012

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Development Economics, Labor Economics, Industrial Organization

PUBLICATIONS

[“Voter Response to Peak and End Transfers: Evidence from a Conditional Cash Transfer Experiment.”](#)

(with Sebastian Galiani, Nadya Hajj, Patrick J. McEwan, and Pablo Ibararán)

***American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 11 (3): 232-60.**

NBER Working Paper #22588 [[Link to Paper](#)]

Additional coverage: **[“Electoral Reciprocity in Programmatic Redistribution: Experimental Evidence”](#)**, VoxEU Post, 10/22/2016

Abstract: In a Honduran field experiment, sequences of cash transfers to poor households varied in amount of the largest (“peak”) and last (“end”) transfers. Larger peak-end transfers increased voter turnout and the incumbent party’s vote share in the 2013 presidential election, independently of cumulative transfers. A plausible explanation is that voters succumbed to a common cognitive bias by applying peak-end heuristics. Another is that voters deliberately used peak-end transfers to update beliefs about the incumbent party. In either case, the results provide experimental evidence on the classic non-experimental finding that voters are especially sensitive to recent economic activity.

WORKING PAPERS

“Missing and Fired: Worker Absence, Labor Regulation, and Firm Outcomes” [Job Market Paper]

Abstract: Estimates from labor market surveys across various developing countries suggest that anywhere between 5-25% of scheduled worker days are lost to absence. High worker absenteeism may adversely impact firm outcomes as firms bear large costs in coping with unanticipated absences. Simultaneously, common labor regulations implemented for workers’ welfare could have the unintended consequence of dampening firms’ coping strategies. Guided by a model of workers’ decisions about absence and firms’ decisions about worker turnover, I examine the impact of absenteeism on firm outcomes, and its dependence on labor regulations. I use a large panel dataset from manufacturing firms in India, where worker absenteeism remains a severe problem despite strong economic growth in recent years. First, I show, using both a fixed effects and instrumental variables approach, that firms’ coping mechanisms cannot fully make up for workers’ absences: firms lose about 0.14% of mandays worked for a 1% increase in absenteeism, primarily from the workers who work directly on the production lines. Correspondingly, firm revenue and profits fall by 0.21% and 0.30% respectively, for every percent increase in absenteeism. These effects are even greater in magnitude than other inputs risks faced by the firm, including credit and import shocks. Then, interacting absence with spatial variation in the regulatory structure that governs hiring and firing of workers, I find that firms fire more workers and hire new workers in response to absenteeism, particularly in states with less stringent labor regulations. Firms in states with less stringent regulations are able to mitigate between a third and half of the negative impact of worker absence.

“Scabs: The Social Suppression of Labor Supply” (with Emily Breza and Supreet Kaur)

NBER Working Paper #25880 [[Link to Paper](#)] [[Online Appendix](#)]

Additional coverage: [VoxDev](#), 10/07/2019

Abstract: Social norms can serve as a powerful force for conformity, producing collective behaviors among decentralized individuals. We test for this force in the labor market: whether norms prevent workers from supplying labor at wage cuts, generating cartel-like behavior in the absence of explicit collusion. We partner with 183 existing employers, who offer jobs to 502 workers in informal spot labor markets in India. Unemployed workers are privately willing to accept jobs below the prevailing wage, but rarely do so when this choice is observable to other workers. In contrast, social observability does not affect labor supply at the prevailing wage. Workers give up 38% of average weekly earnings in order to avoid being seen as breaking the social norm. In addition, they are willing to pay to punish anonymous laborers who have accepted wage cuts--indicating that collective labor supply behavior is reinforced through the threat of social sanctions. Finally, consistent with the idea that social conformity could have aggregate implications, measures of social cohesion correlate with downward wage rigidity and business cycle volatility across India.

“At What Price? Price Supports, Agricultural Productivity, and Misallocation”

Abstract: Agricultural price support policies are a popular way to alleviate the risk inherent in volatile prices, but, at the same time, may distort input allocation responses to agricultural productivity shocks across multiple sectors. This could reduce productivity in the agricultural sector in developing countries. I empirically test for misallocation in the Indian agricultural setting, with national price supports for rice and wheat. I first motivate the setting using a two-sector, two-factor general equilibrium model and derive comparative statics. I then use annual variation in the level of the national price supports for rice and wheat relative to market prices, together with exogenous changes in district-level agricultural productivity through weather shocks, in a differences-in-differences framework. I derive causal effects of the price supports on production patterns, labor allocation, wages, and output across sectors. I find that rice area cultivated, rice area as a share of total area planted, rice yields, and rice production all increase, suggesting an increase in input intensity (inputs per unit area) dedicated to both staple crops. Wheat shows a similar increase in input intensity. The key input response is a reallocation of contract labor from the non-agricultural sector during peak cultivation periods, which results in an increase in wages in equilibrium in the non-agricultural sector (especially in response to price supports for the labor-intensive crop, rice, of 23%). The reallocation of labor reduces agricultural productivity by 82% of a standard deviation, and simultaneously reduces gross output in non-agricultural firms by 8.5 %. I also find that rice- and wheat-producing households do not smooth consumption more effectively in response to productivity shocks in the presence of price supports.

SELECTED RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

“Economic Opportunity and Motivation for Crime: Theft From Oil Pipelines in Nigeria”

Abstract: Nigeria is Africa's largest (and the world's thirteenth-largest) producer of oil. At the same time, the country loses at least 4% of daily production (and likely even more) to theft, largely spearheaded by militia groups. These groups recruit local youth for help with stealing oil efficiently. In this paper, I show that access to crime (proxied by households' geographic proximity to pipelines) is used as a mechanism to hedge against agricultural risk. Using data on oil spills (since precise data on theft alone is not available), and a detailed map of oil pipelines in the country that I digitized, I find an increase of 0.66 spills per month (0.13 when restricted to large spills of over 1000 barrels – suggestive of militia activity) when percentage losses in anticipated agricultural yields are above 50% for households within 15km of pipelines. Non-food expenditures are the hardest hit in times of shock to agricultural output, for an average impact of about 28K Naira. I find that households close to pipelines do not face decreases in non-food expenditure when they face agricultural shocks (in fact, they make up for this shortfall by almost 200% (about half of median non-food expenditure in the sample)). Future work on this topic will ask whether access to crime can have a long-lasting effect on the educational outcomes of at-risk youth.

“Demand for Flexible Work and Contract Choice” (with Suanna Oh and Yogita Shamdasani)

ADDITIONAL RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Fellow, Economics Department, Columbia University (Fall 2014- Spring 2016)

Conducted data analyses and field interviews for Supreet Kaur, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley.

Short-Term Consultant, Development Research Group, World Bank (June 2013 – August 2013)

Research Associate for the World Development Report 2015 Team. Developed a background paper on the economic implications of implicit associations (our subconscious biases). Created overview of the Young Lives dataset for use by the team.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Fellow, Economics Department, Columbia University (Fall 2013 – Spring 2018)

Game Theory (Undergraduate), Principles of Economics (Undergraduate, includes both Micro and Macroeconomics)

Instructor, Introductory Intensive Math Course for Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences Masters Program, Columbia University (Fall 2016 – Fall 2017)

Teaches a 12-hour course covering the basics of linear algebra, calculus, and probability and statistics for incoming Master's students in the QMSS program

Innovative Teaching Summer Institute, Columbia University (June 2016)

Participated in a four-day intensive workshop focused on developing innovative assignments for undergraduate courses in economics.

CONFERENCE/SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

2019: USC Applied Microeconomics Group (Los Angeles, CA), PacDev (USC, CA) World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty (Washington, DC), Women in Economics Conference (New York, NY), NEUDC (Evanston, IL)

Scheduled: Scripps College (Claremont, CA), Oberlin College (Oberlin, OH), California State University – Long Beach (Long Beach, CA), University of Massachusetts, Boston (Boston, MA), Wellesley College (Wellesley, MA), Williams College (Williamstown, MA), University of San Francisco (San Francisco, CA)

2018: Cornell University (Ithaca, NY), Cornerstone Research (Boston, MA), PacDev (UC Davis, CA), SEEDEC (Wageningen, NL), Development Economics and Policy Conference (Zurich, CH), NEUDC (Ithaca, NY), CEPR Growth and Macroeconomics Conference (Manchester, GB), USC INET Seminar (Los Angeles, CA), USC Applied Microeconomics Group (Los Angeles, CA), PEDL Conference (London, GB)

2012- 2017: Columbia University, Liberal Arts College Development Conference 2017 (discussant), Wellesley College

FELLOWSHIPS & FUNDING

INET and Department of Economics Research Grant, University of Southern California, (Fall 2018 – Present)

Dean's Fellow, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University (Fall 2012 –Spring 2018)

Center for Development Economics and Policy Research Grant (Summer 2017)

Research funding allocated to implement a survey among agricultural landowners and daily-wage workers in India to assess the impact of price supports for staple crops in India on farmers' production decisions, labor allocation, and income.

Caswell L. Johnson Fellow, Columbia University (Fall 2015- Spring 2016)

Nominated by the economics department for this institution-wide fellowship based on dissertation research proposal.

HONORS

Wueller Award for Excellence in Teaching, Department of Economics, Columbia University (August 2013- May 2014, August 2016- May 2017)

Selected as the best teaching assistant for an undergraduate elective course for the academic year 2013-2014, and as the best teaching assistant for an undergraduate core course for the academic year 2016- 2017, based on student evaluations.

Phi Beta Kappa Honors Society (Summer 2011)

One of only 11 students in a class of 598 elected to Phi Beta Kappa as a Junior.

SERVICE

Association of Graduate Economics Students, Columbia University

Upper-year Representative, 2015-2016, President, 2014-2015, Vice-President, 2013-2014, First-year Representative, 2012-2013

CONTACT INFORMATION	Department of Economics Columbia University 420 West 118th Street New York, NY 10027	Phone: (267) 253-0386 Email: lorenzo.lagos@columbia.edu Website: econ.columbia.edu/e/lorenzo-lagos Citizenships: Mexico and USA
PLACEMENT	Chairs: Donald Davis drd28@columbia.edu and Martín Uribe mu2166@columbia.edu Assistant: Amy Devine aed2152@columbia.edu ; Phone: (212) 856-6881	
EDUCATION	Ph.D. in Economics, Columbia University (expected) M.Phil. in Economics, Columbia University M.A. in Economics, Columbia University B.A. in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE), University of Pennsylvania; <i>summa cum laude</i>	2020 2017 2016 2011
HONORS AND AWARDS	Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University CORE-Teagle Fellow, CORE USA CDEP Student Research Grant, Center for Development Economics and Policy Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award (runner-up), Columbia University Lead Teaching Fellow in Economics, Columbia University Wueller Teaching Award, Columbia University Ford Foundation Predoctoral Fellow, National Academy of Sciences Provost Diversity Fellow, Columbia University Dean's Fellow, Columbia University Goldstone Prize for Best Senior Honors Thesis, University of Pennsylvania Phi Beta Kappa	2019-2020 2019 2018, 2017 2017 2017 2016 2014 2014-2019 2014-2019 2011 2011
FIELDS	Labor Economics, Development Economics, and Public Economics	
JOB MARKET PAPER	<p>Labor Market Institutions and the Structure of Work Compensation: The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Wages and Amenities in Brazil [Full draft coming soon]</p> <p><i>Abstract:</i> Labor market institutions—unions in particular—affect the structure of work compensation. While there has been considerable work on the effects of unionization on wages, both the role of collective bargaining and the amenity component of work compensation have often been overlooked. This paper studies how a collective bargaining institution affects workers' wages and amenities. The particular institution of interest is automatic extensions, which dictate that negotiated benefits cannot be phased out except through new collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). The introduction of automatic extensions in Brazil shocked the collective bargaining process by 1) allowing unions to holdout during negotiations; 2) expanding the time horizons over what is negotiated; and 3) increasing the relative value of amenities to wages. I find that mean wages fall at establishments with extended CBAs. Considering that workers also value non-pay job characteristics, I build a model where unions allocate bargaining effort between wages and amenities. The model predicts that automatic extensions incentivize unions to focus on amenities, especially when the union is strong enough to overcome push-back from employers. As predicted by the model, I find that bargaining units with strong unions secure additional amenities valued above the decrease in wages. Focusing on worker flows, I find that an increase in hiring rates brings an influx of low-skill workers to affected establishments. These results are rationalized as compression in the value of jobs within firms.</p>	

WORKING PAPERS

Assortative Matching or Exclusionary Hiring? The Impact of Firm Policies on Racial Wage Differences in Brazil (joint with François Gerard, Edson Severnini, and David Card) [NBER Working Paper # 25176](#); *R&R, American Economic Review*

Abstract: A growing body of research shows that firms' employment and wage-setting policies contribute to wage inequality and pay disparities between groups. We measure the effects of these policies on racial pay differences in Brazil. We find that nonwhites are less likely to work at establishments that pay more to all race groups, a pattern that explains about 20% of the white-nonwhite wage gap for both genders. The pay premiums offered by different employers are also compressed for nonwhites relative to whites, contributing another 5% of the overall gap. We then ask how much of the under-representation of nonwhites at higher-paying workplaces is due to the selective skill mix at these establishments. Using a counterfactual based on the observed skill distribution at each establishment and the nonwhite shares in different skill groups in the local labor market, we conclude that assortative matching accounts for about two-thirds of the under-representation gap for both men and women. The remainder reflects an unexplained preference for white workers at higher-paying establishments. The wage losses associated with unexplained sorting and differential wage setting are largest for nonwhites with the highest levels of general skills, suggesting that the allocative costs of race-based preferences may be relatively large in Brazil.

Violence and Credit Use: Evidence from MSEs in Mexico's Drug War [[Full draft pending CNBV approval](#)]

Abstract: This project studies how micro and small enterprises (MSEs) use credit when facing violence. Leveraging administrative data on working capital credit lines issued to MSEs in Mexico, I exploit geographic variation in homicide rates as well as exogenous kingpin captures to identify the causal effects of violence on credit use. I find that firms significantly increase the amounts drawn from their credit lines after experiencing violence shocks. This result could be motivated by rising short-term liquidity needs (*distress story*) or increasing risk of holding cash (*substitution story*). Rising default probabilities indicate signs of distress, although heterogeneity analyses reveal cash for credit substitution among non-revolving borrowers. I also find evidence that rising liquidity needs among distressed MSEs are likely driven by decreased economic activity rather than theft or extortion. As such, this paper highlights the important role that financial products play in terms of helping MSEs absorb violence shocks as well as providing convenient alternatives to cash holdings under insecure environments.

Workers on Probation: Evidence from Job Security Legislation in Brazil

Work in progress: This paper exploits simultaneous kinks and notches in firms' choice sets regarding separation decisions to uncover firing cost elasticities of layoffs. Using matched employer-employee data from Brazil, I estimate a dynamic model of employer learning in order to quantify employment responses along the entire nonlinear choice set. The non-linearities in question are generated by probationary periods, which impose tenure-based discontinuities (in both levels and slope) in the firing cost schedule of job matches.

The Minimum Wage, Unions, and Racial Wage Differentials in Brazil (joint with Ellora Derenoncourt, François Gerard, and Claire Montialoux)

Work in progress: This paper seeks to estimate the impact of the minimum wage on racial wage differentials in Brazil with a particular focus on wage readjustments negotiated in industry-level collective bargaining agreements.

RESEARCH AND
WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for François Gerard, Columbia University	2015-2016
Research Assistant for Supreet Kaur and Massimo Morelli, Columbia University	2013-2014
Intern for Shannon K. O'Neil, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)	2013
Analyst, First Manhattan Consulting Group (FMCG)	2011-2012
Intern, Mexican Federal Competition Commission (Cofece)	2010

TEACHING
EXPERIENCEInstructor

Labor Economics (Undergraduate)

Summer 2018

Teaching AssistantEconometrics I (Masters) with Steven Olley [*Wueller Teaching Award*]

Fall 2016

Public Economics (Undergraduate) with François Gerard

Spring 2017

Economics of Race (Undergraduate) with Brendan O'Flaherty

Fall 2019

Principles of Economics (Undergraduate) with Sunil Gulati

Spring 2019

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Referee service: *Journal of the European Economic Association*

Community service: Tutor at South Bronx United (2015) and West Philly Tutoring Project (2010)

Leadership: President of Mexican Student Association at the University of Pennsylvania, Head of Organizing Committee for *Convergencias* Conference (2009-2011)

REFERENCES

Suresh Naidu (Sponsor)

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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (+1) 212-854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, Columbia University, May 2020 (*expected*)

M.Phil. in Economics, Columbia University, May 2017

M.A. in Economics, Columbia University, Feb. 2016

B.A., *magna cum laude*, University of Rochester, May 2013

Economics, Mathematics, and History

Honors and Highest Distinction in Economics and History

RESEARCH FIELDS

Corporate Finance, Macroeconomics, Real Estate, Public Finance

JOB MARKET PAPER

You Only Lend Twice: Corporate Borrowing and Land Values in Real Estate Cycles

This paper uses a natural experiment in Japan to provide evidence of the feedback loop between corporate borrowing and commercial real estate investment emphasized in macro-finance models with collateral constraints. Japan enacted a series of reforms in the early 1980s which relaxed national regulatory constraints on the height and size of buildings. Combining originally-constructed local commercial price indices for over 400 localities with geocoded firm balance sheets, I show that these land use deregulations generated a boom-bust cycle in corporate real estate values, borrowing, and real estate investment. Firms located in more *ex ante* land use constrained areas both issued more debt and invested more heavily in real estate, thus amplifying the initial positive shock to commercial real estate prices. I develop a simple multi-city spatial sorting model with production externalities and real estate collateral which uses the estimated reduced form effects of my local regulatory instruments on firm outcomes to assess aggregate effects of the reform. I find that the deregulatory shock to commercial real estate markets and corporate borrowing environment amplified the real estate cycle in the 1980s and led to an increased incidence of zombie lending in the 1990s.

WORKING PAPERS

Winners, Losers, and Near-Rationality: Heterogeneity in the MPC out of a Large Stimulus Tax Rebate (*joint with Takashi Unayama*)

This paper documents heterogeneity in consumption responses to a large stimulus tax rebate based on household exposure to a housing price cycle. Linking geocoded household expenditure and balance sheet data to local housing price indices in Japan, we estimate a U-shaped pattern in the marginal propensity to consume with respect to housing price growth. Recipients living in areas with the smallest housing price gains during the 1980s spent 34% of the rebate within three months of payment, compared to 25% among recipients in areas which experienced the largest housing price gains. While we find limited

heterogeneity in marginal propensities to consume among households in less-affected areas, MPCs are higher for younger, renter households with no debt residing in more-affected areas. These findings are consistent with near-rational households for which the pricing shock was small relative to permanent income spending a larger fraction of the tax rebate. Our analysis suggests fiscal stimulus payments primarily induce spending among “winner” households who face minimal exposure to housing price cycles.

Coming in at a Trickle: The Optimal Frequency of Public Benefit Payments (*joint with Shogo Sakabe*)

The question of how governments should choose the frequency of payments has received little attention in the literature on the optimal design of public benefits programs. We propose a simple model in which the government chooses the length of the interval between payments, subject to a tradeoff between the administrative cost of providing more frequent benefits and the welfare gain from reducing deviations from full consumption smoothing. In our empirical application, we examine consumer and retailer responses to bimonthly payments from the Japanese National Pension System. We exploit variation in the duration of payment cycles using a unique retail dataset that links consumers to their purchase history. Our difference-in-differences style approach shows a clear spike in spending on payment dates for customers who are of retirement age relative to those who are not. While within-store average prices increase by 1.6% on payday, this effect is almost entirely due to consumers substituting towards higher quality goods rather than a retailer response. We use these reduced-form estimates to parameterize the model and conclude that the optimal frequency of Japanese public pension payments is less than one month, implying the government could improve welfare by increasing payment frequency.

WORKS IN PROGRESS

Microbubbles and Local Property Tax Regimes (*joint with Takashi Unayama*)

Flip or Flop? Real Estate Transaction Taxes as Macroprudential Policy
(*joint with Chun-Che Chi & Ming-Jen Lin*)

Delaying the Honeymoon: The Great Decline in American Vacation

Revisiting the Incidence of Mandated Benefits: Evidence from U.S. Sick Pay Mandates

TEACHING

Public Economics, TA for François Gerard, Columbia, Spring 2019

Economic Development of Japan, TA for David Weinstein, Columbia, Fall 2017; Fall 2018

Public Economics, Instructor, Columbia, Summer 2017

Public Economics, TA for Wojciech Kopczuk, Columbia, Fall 2016

Principles of Economics, TA for Dan O’Flaherty, Columbia, Spring 2016

Intermediate Macroeconomics, TA for Irasema Alonso, Columbia, Fall 2015

Behavioral Economics, TA for Asen Kochov, Rochester, Spring 2013

FELLOWSHIPS, GRANTS & HONORS

C. Lowell Harriss Dissertation Fellowship, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2019–20

Center on Japanese Economy and Business Doctoral Fellowship, 2017–18

GSAS Lead Teaching Fellowship, Columbia University, 2016–17

Wueller Teaching Award for best Principles of Economics TA, Columbia, 2016

Honorable Mention, NSF Graduate Research Fellowship, 2015
 GSAS Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University, 2014–19
 Fulbright Japan Research Fellowship, Kyoto University, 2013–14
 Phi Beta Kappa, 2013
 Wilder Trustee Scholarship, Rochester, 2009 – 2013

INVITED SEMINARS & PRESENTATIONS

2019: Young Economists Symposium (Columbia); 7th Annual Warwick Economics PhD Conference
 2018: National Tax Association; Hitotsubashi University: Institute of Economic Research Seminar
 2017: Hitotsubashi University

INVITED CONFERENCES & WORKSHOPS

Price Theory Summer Camp, Becker Friedman Institute, University of Chicago, 2018
 Princeton Initiative: Macro, Money, and Finance, Princeton University, 2016

RESEARCH ASSISTANTSHIPS

RA for Stephen Zeldes, Columbia University, Graduate School of Business, 2015–19
 RA for Asen Kochov, University of Rochester, Department of Economics, Summer 2012
 RA for Jonathan Pritchett, Tulane University, Department of Economics, Summer 2011

OTHER

Computing: MATLAB, R, SAS, Stata
Languages: English (native), Japanese (proficient), French (working)
Citizenship: United States

REFERENCES

David E. Weinstein (primary)

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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, aed2152@columbia.edu, (+1) 212-854-6881

EDUCATION

Department of Economics, Columbia University

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics 2020 (expected)

M.Phil. in Economics 2017

M.A. in Economics 2016

Guanghua School of Management, Peking University

B.A. in Finance 2014

Minor in Statistics 2014

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Exchange Student Spring 2013

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Primary: Macroeconomics

Secondary: International Finance, Corporate Finance

JOB MARKET PAPER

Dollar Funding, Bank Currency Mismatch and the Transmission of Exchange Rate Policy

Abstract: Banks in emerging markets fund themselves in US dollar and lend in the local currency, and bear foreign exchange risk if the hedging is imperfect. The currency mismatch exposes banking sector to exchange rate fluctuation and risks an economy to the sudden stop. This paper studies the novel transmission of exchange rate policy through financial institutions in emerging markets. I focus on a large and unanticipated currency depreciation episode following the US Fed's decision to taper the size of security purchase and exploit the heterogeneity in bank pre-determined exposure to currency risk. Using loan-level data in Taiwan during 2012-15, the article first provides evidence that the effect of depreciation on credit supply is contractionary. Banks with higher net USD liability cut more lending and are less likely to extend credit to the borrowers with existing relationship upon depreciation than the counterpart banks do. Borrowers with higher dependence on the affected lenders could hardly switch to other funding source and disproportionately decrease investment and employment as compared to other firms that rely less on these banks. The credit-supply effects of depreciation on investment and employment are economically and statistically significant beyond the conventional wisdom including the trade channel or the borrower collateral constraint channel. The findings in this paper advocate better risk management and prudential policy to regulate financial intermediation usage of dollar funding.

WORKING PAPER

Corporate Debt Substitution and Spillover of ECB Corporate Bond Purchase Program

Using the corporate bond purchase program undertaken by European countries in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis as a laboratory, this paper highlights the role that corporate bond market can play in mitigating adverse bank financial shock. The direct purchase by the central bank results in more bond issuance and less bond spread by eligible non-financial borrowers as compared with valid counterparts with equal access to the bond market. Moreover, the decreasing reliance on bank financing by firms with access to the bond market generates the pass-through to the real economy. Banks that are more related to borrowers with eligibility for the bond purchase are found to reallocate credit supply towards firms fully relying on bank financing. The financial spillover translated into positive outcomes on investment and employment of bank-based borrowers, which are more likely to be capital-constrained.

HONOR AND AWARD

Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University	2019-2020
Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University	2014-2019
Summer Research Fellowship, Columbia University	2017-2018
Honor Student Scholarship, Peking University	2010-2013

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Prof. Jesse Schreger	2018 - 2019
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TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Financial Economics (B.A. Level), Columbia University	Spring 2018, Fall 2018, Spring 2019
Intermediate Macroeconomics (B.A. Level), Columbia University	Spring 2016, Fall 2017
Money and Banking (B.A. Level), Columbia University	Fall 2016, Spring 2017
Introduction to Econometrics (B.A. Level), Columbia University	Fall 2015

SKILL AND PERSONAL

Programming & Software: Stata, Matlab, SAS, R
Language: Mandarin Chinese (native), English (proficient)
Citizenship: China

REFERENCES

Martin Uribe (co-sponsor) Department of Economics Columbia University (+1) 212-851-4008 mu2166@columbia.edu	Jesse Schreger (co-sponsor) Columbia Business School Columbia University (+1) 212-851-0171 jesse.schreger@columbia.edu
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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, Columbia University	2014 – 2020 (Expected)
B.A. Economics, University of California, Los Angeles	2012 – 2014
Transfer, Diablo Valley College	2010 – 2012

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Microeconomics Theory, Behavioral Economics

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Ordered Reference Dependent Choice”

We introduce a unified framework under which the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP) and domain-specific standard postulates (e.g., Independence for choices over lotteries, Stationarity for choices over future consumption) are jointly relaxed using a general reference dependence approach. This leads to four models, one for choices over generic alternatives and one each for risk, time, and social preferences, where behavioral departures from WARP and standard postulates are explained by a common source -- changing preferences due to reference dependence. In each model, reference alternatives are given by the maximization of complete and transitive order, which determine the preference parameters that explain choices.

WORKS IN PROGRESS

“Avoidable Risk: An Experiment on Context-Dependent Risk Aversion” with Silvio Ravaioli

“Consideration Sets and WARP Violations in Sequence of Real Choices”

AWARDS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND GRANTS

Dissertation fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University	2019 – 2020
Lewis A. Sanders Endowed Fellowship in Economics	2018 – 2019
Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University	2014 – 2019
CELSS Research Grant	2019
Wueller Teaching Award, Best TA for Master's Classes (Runner-Up)	2018
CELSS Research Grant	2017

TEACHING ASSISTANTSHIP

Grad MA Micro (Game Theory, Mechanism Design), Georg Noldeke, Navin Kartik	Spring 2019
Grad MA Micro (Decision Theory, General Equilibrium), Bernard Salanie	Fall 2018
Grad MA Micro (Game Theory, Mechanism Design), Qingmin Liu, Navin Kartik	Spring 2018
UG Intermediate Microeconomics, Qingmin Liu	Fall 2017
Grad MA Micro (Game Theory, Mechanism Design), Mark Dean	Spring 2017
Grad MA Micro (Decision Theory, General Equilibrium), Pietro Ortoleva, Bernard Salanie	Fall 2016
UG Intermediate Microeconomics, Qingmin Liu	Spring 2016
UG Intermediate Macroeconomics, Jasmina Arifovic	Fall 2015

PERSONAL

Place of Birth: Kuala Lumpur, 1992

Citizenship: Malaysia

Languages: Malay (Native), English (Native), Chinese (Native), Cantonese (Basic), Indonesian (Basic)

REFERENCES

Pietro Ortoleva (primary)

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Dept. of Economics & Woodrow Wilson School
Princeton University
pietro.ortoleva@princeton.edu
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Mark Dean (primary)

Associate Professor
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(212) 854-3669

Navin Kartik

Professor
Dept. of Economics
Columbia University
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XAVIER MONCASI

Department of Economics, Columbia University. New York, NY. 10027

(646) 244-7896 ◊ xavier.moncasi@columbia.edu

EDUCATION

Columbia University

Ph.D. in Economics

(expected) May 2020

M.Phil. in Economics

May 2017

M.A. in Economics

May 2016

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics

Jul 2014

M.Sc. in Economics

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Jul 2013

Bachelor's Degree in Economics

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Applied Microeconomics, Health Economics, Labor Economics

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University

2019 - 2020

Dean's Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University

2014 - 2019

Fellowship for US graduate studies, La Caixa Foundation, Spain

2014 - 2016

Scholarship for Master of Science, Catalunya La Pedrera Foundation, Spain

2013 - 2014

Award for top ten undergraduate students, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

2013

CURRENT PROJECTS

“Parental involvement laws and teenagers abortions and fertility. Evidence from Spain”

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of increasing abortion costs for minors on their behaviors, in particular, their abortions, sexual behavior, and births. We do so by exploiting a 2015 change in parental involvement (PI) laws in Spain, and rich population-level data on abortions and births. First, since the law change affected only minors, we document a decrease in 17-years-old abortions by using a difference-in-difference with the 17-years-old being the treated group, and the 18-years-old being the control. Moreover, using bunching methods, we show evidence of temporal displacement: some 17-years-old, who could wait until they turn 18 to abort to avoid involving their parents, did so. Second, we analyze how the decrease in abortions may influence related behaviors: sexual behavior and births. Our evidence suggests that some minors act “rationally” and internalize the PI cost increase: they modify their sexual behaviors to avoid getting pregnant before turning 18. This is shown by a permanent shift on the number of abortions at age 18 after removing the temporal displacement abortions. Finally, among women giving birth, the number of those who were pregnant at 17 increases relative to those who were pregnant at 18. This paper, thus, suggests that in high-stake decisions such as abortion and fertility, minors respond to PI laws.

“The effect of liberalizing abortion on sex selection. Evidence from Spain”

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Fellow, Columbia University

Intermediate Macroeconomics, Professor Alonso Spring 2017, 2019

Principles of Economics, Professor Musatti Fall 2018

Labor Economics, Professor Edlund Spring 2018

Intermediate Macroeconomics, Professor Sala-i-Martin Fall 2016, 2017

WORK EXPERIENCE

Internship at the Catalan Finance Ministry (Division of Studies and Projects) Jul 2013

OTHER

Leader and Treasurer, Scouts, L'Agrupament Escolta Pau Casals 2009 - 2011

PERSONAL

Software: Stata, R, Matlab, LaTeX

Languages: Catalan (native), Spanish (native), English (fluent)

Citizenship: Spanish

LAN NGUYEN

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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu

Education:

2020 (expected)	Ph.D.	Economics	Columbia University
2017	M.Phil.	Economics	Columbia University
2016	M.A.	Economics	Columbia University
2013	B.A. <i>Honors - Class I</i>	Economics	University of Queensland

Honors and Awards:

2019 – 2020	Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2014 – 2019	Dean's Fellowship, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University
2017 – 2018	Trudy and Paul Woodruff Fellowship, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University
2013	University Medal, University of Queensland Bachelor of Economics Honors Scholarship, School of Economics, University of Queensland Synergies Economic Consulting Honors Prize Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Economics Honors Prize
2012	Summer Research Scholarship, University of Queensland Dean's Honor Roll, Faculty of Business, Economics and Law, University of Queensland
2010 – 2012	Bachelor of Economics Scholarship, School of Economics, University of Queensland

Fields of Specialization:

Industrial Organization, Economics of Education

Job Market Paper:

Predicting the Effect of Diversity Plans in New York City Elite Public High Schools

New York City Specialized High Schools (SHS) consists of a small set of elite public high schools, which select students based on an admission exam. There have been concerns that these schools' student compositions do not adequately reflect the diversity in race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status of the city's population. This paper studies the impacts of two

possible diversity plans by estimating students' underlying preferences and then simulating their actions under the two proposed policy changes. First, the plan to guarantee SHS seats to students who placed in the top seven percent (by academic performance) of each public middle school results in considerable inflows from regular public high schools and vice versa. In contrast, a tier-based plan similar to that in Chicago mostly gives rise to reshuffling within SHS. While only the former policy significantly changes racial composition of SHS as a whole, both plans increase the school-specific percentages of Black and Hispanics in all or most SHS.

Working Paper:

Price Staggering in Cartels (with Heiko Gerlach)
[Revise and Resubmit at International Journal of Industrial Organization]

In this paper we investigate the optimal organization of staggered price increases in cartels. Staggered price increases impose a cost during cartel formation as the price leader initially loses sales. We show that for intermediate discount factors, staggered price increases can only be sustained when the increase is neither too low nor too high. When a cartel executes two consecutive price increases, the choice between using the same leader or alternating leadership depends on the initial price level in the industry. We also discuss the allocation of price leadership in the presence of cost asymmetry and consider the effect of strategic buyers on price staggering.

Works in Progress:

Matching and Learning – An Experimental Study (with Guillaume Haeringer and Silvio Ravaoli)

College Performance of Students from Rural vs. Urban Areas: Evidence from Vietnam

Presentation:

2018 45th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in
Industrial Economics (EARIE 2018)

Research Assistantships:

2016 – 2017 Mike Riordan, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2012 – 2014 Heiko Gerlach, School of Economics, University of Queensland

Teaching Assistantships:

Spring 2019 Market Design (Undergraduate), Guillaume Haeringer, Columbia University
Spring 2018 Market Design (Undergraduate), Guillaume Haeringer, Columbia University
Spring 2016 Industrial Organization (Undergraduate), Mike Riordan, Columbia University
Fall 2015 Principles of Economics (Undergraduate), Nicola Zaniboni, Columbia University

2012 – 2013	Industrial Economics (Undergraduate), Heiko Gerlach (two semesters), University of Queensland
2012 – 2013	Benefit-Cost Analysis & Project Evaluation (Undergraduate & Master), Richard Brown (two semesters), University of Queensland
2013	Behavioural and Evolutionary Economics (Undergraduate), Paul Frijters, University of Queensland,
2012	Quantitative Economic & Business Analysis B (Undergraduate), Do Won Kwak (two semesters), University of Queensland

Personal:

Citizenship: Vietnam

Languages: Vietnamese (native), English (fluent), French (passive)

Programming and Software: Python, Stata, R, Mathematica, Matlab

References:

Yeon-Koo Che (co-advisor)

Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory

Department of Economics, Columbia University

(212) 854-8276

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Miguel Urquiola (co-advisor)

Professor and Chair, Department of Economics

Professor, School of International and Public Affairs

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Bernard Salanié

Professor

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SUANNA OH

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, Columbia University	Expected 2020
Exchange Scholar Program, UC Berkeley	Spring 2018
M.A. in Economics, Doctoral Stream, University of Toronto	May 2012
B.S. in Economics and B.A. in Mathematics, Duke University	Dec 2010
<i>Magna cum laude</i> , Distinction in Research, Distinction in Economics	

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Primary field: Development

Secondary fields: Behavioral, Labor

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Does Identity Affect Labor Supply?”

Although research in psychology and sociology suggests that one’s sense of identity affects labor supply, this relationship is difficult to establish empirically. This project examines how caste identity affects job-specific labor supply using a field experiment in rural India. Casual laborers interested in a one-day job opportunity are presented with a set of potential job offers and asked to indicate their choices regarding whether to take up or decline each offer, one of which is randomly implemented. While all offers involve working on a default manufacturing task, they also require spending some time privately on one additional task, which changes across the offers. Using separately-collected survey information on the caste associations of the tasks and the perceived hierarchy of local caste groups, predictions are made of which worker-offer combinations would involve identity violations. Working on a task associated with another caste group lowers the offer take-up rate by 23 percentage points and by an additional 24 percentage points if the associated caste group ranks lower than the worker’s own in the caste hierarchy. The effects are invariant to whether the workers’ choices are publicized to their neighbors or not, suggesting that the role of identity, rather than social image, is paramount.

WORKING PAPERS

“Does Financial Strain Lower Productivity?” with Supreet Kaur, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Frank Schilbach

This paper empirically tests for a direct causal impact of financial strain on worker productivity. We randomize the timing of income receipt among Indian workers who earn piece rates for manufacturing tasks: some workers receive their wages on earlier dates, altering when cash constraints are eased while

holding overall wealth constant. Workers increase productivity by 5.3% on average in the days after cash receipt. The impacts are concentrated among poorer workers in the sample, who increase output by over 10%. This effect of cash on hand on productivity is not explained by mechanisms such as gift exchange, trust in the employer, or nutrition. We present positive evidence that productivity increases are mediated through lower attentional errors in production, indicating a role for improved cognition after cash receipt. Finally, directing workers' attention to their finances via a salience intervention produced mixed results—consistent with concerns about priming highlighted in the literature. Taken together, our results indicate a direct relationship between financial constraints and worker productivity and suggest that psychological channels mediated through attention play a role in this relationship.

WORKS IN PROGRESS

“Gender Norms in Marriage and Female Labor Productivity”

“Demand for Flexible Work and Contract Choice” with Nandita Krishnaswamy and Yogita Shamdasani

FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS

Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University	2019 – 2020
NSF Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, SES-1919139	2019
Research Fellow Grant, Program for Economic Research (PER)	2019
Student Research Grant, Center for Development Economics and Policy (CDEP)	2019
Eric M. Mindich Research Fund for the Foundations of Human Behavior with Supreet Kaur, Sendhil Mullainathan, Frank Schilbach	2017
Weiss Family Program for Research in Development Economics Grant with Supreet Kaur, Sendhil Mullainathan, Frank Schilbach	2017
Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University	2014 – 2019
University of Toronto Fellowship	2011 – 2012
Davies Fellowship, Department of Economics, Duke University	2010

WORK EXPERIENCES

Research Analyst, Northwestern University RA for Seema Jayachandran	2012 – 2014
Summer Intern, Innovations for Poverty Action Uganda	2013

RESEARCH ASSISTANTSHIP

Supreet Kaur, UC Berkeley and NBER	2018
Eric Verhoogen, Columbia University	2017
Emi Nakamura and Jon Steinsson, Columbia University	2015
Loren Brandt, University of Toronto	2012

TEACHING ASSISTANTSHIP

Columbia University Programming and Data (Bernard Salanie and Michael Best), Economics of NYC (Donald Davis), Money and Banking (Perry Mehrling), Intermediate Microeconomics (Robert Barron)	2015 – 2019
University of Toronto Microeconomic Theory (Ajaz Hussain), Macroeconomic Theory (Gustavo Indart)	2011 – 2012

Duke University Intermediate Microeconomics I (Thomas Nechyba)	2010
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INVITED PRESENTATIONS

SEEDC (UC Berkley), AFE (U Chicago), NEUDC (Northwestern), Summer School in International and Development Economics (U Milan)	2019
Financial Consumer Agency of Canada National Research Symposium (Rotman)	2018

REFeree SERVICE

The World Bank Economic Review

PERSONAL

Citizenship: Canada
Languages: English (fluent), Korean (native)

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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (+1-212-854-6881, aed2151@columbia.edu)

Education

2020 (expected)	Ph.D. in Economics	Columbia University
2012	B.A. in Economics (<i>Valedictorian</i>)	Sungkyunkwan University

Fields of Specialization

Primary Field: Macroeconomics
Secondary Field: International Finance

Job Market Paper

“Consumption Volatility and Housing”

Abstract: This paper links the two stylized facts of business cycle observed in emerging countries --- higher house price volatility and relative consumption volatility --- by providing an evidence of a positive relationship between two volatilities across countries. I build up a real business cycle model with housing for small open economy by incorporating new features into the existing theoretical framework to explain it. Specifically, the model explicitly accommodates a housing rental market and its price whose role has been overlooked in explaining consumption volatility though housing consumption whose corresponding price measure is the rent accounts for non-negligible portion of total consumption. Moreover, the disaggregation of housing and non-housing consumption brings new stylized facts for emerging countries: first, housing consumption is more volatile than non-housing consumption in emerging countries; second, non-housing consumption still shows excessiveness in emerging countries. The result of the model suggests that the variation of credit shock volatility is a driving force in generating the relationship between house price volatility and relative consumption volatility, and this paper provides qualitative evidences for cross-country discussion. The mechanism relies on a financial friction of housing collateral constraint, the degree of which gives an account of excess non-housing consumption volatility in emerging countries. I also discuss another key friction, a rental market friction, which explains the higher housing consumption volatility for emerging countries.

Working Papers

“A New Angle on Excess Consumption Volatility in Emerging Countries: Does House Price Matter?”

Abstract: This paper focuses on house prices in order to explain *excess consumption volatility*, which is one of the stylized facts of the business cycle observed in emerging countries. The relative consumption volatility compared to output volatility is higher in emerging countries than in rich countries. Because house prices in emerging countries are more volatile than in advanced countries, this paper suggests house price fluctuation as a driving source of excess consumption volatility. To begin, I construct a cross-country dataset and suggest several findings. First, there is a positive relationship between house price volatility and relative volatility of consumption across countries. Second, house price volatility is also positively correlated with disaggregated consumption --- housing consumption and non-housing consumption — though housing consumption is more volatile than non-housing consumption in emerging countries. Then, I build a real business cycle model with two agents (homeowners and renters) to capture the above empirical findings. The result of the model suggests that house price volatility is a key factor in understanding excess consumption volatility and that the mechanisms behind it are a collateral effect and a rental price pass-through. The former is related to the borrowing capacity affected by house price change, and the latter is related to the link between house prices and housing consumption volatility.

“Can Monetary Policy Influence Household Consumption through Housing Prices?: Empirical Analysis of the Homeowner Balance Sheet Channel” (with Yejin Kim)

Abstract: Under the circumstance of increasing concerns regarding debt deflation with a recent housing price decrease, this paper studies the impacts of a monetary policy shock such as a change in base rate of the central bank on household consumption through homeowner balance sheet channel — wealth effect and collateral effect. We estimate household consumption function using Korean Labor and Income Panel Data (2001-2012) with the instrument of housing supply in order to figure out the homeowner balance sheet channel in Korea, and find there is a significant effect of monetary policy through both wealth effect and collateral effect. Therefore, a central bank has to consider the homeowner balance sheet channel in addition to traditional monetary policy transmission mechanisms. Especially, the wealth effect shows a significant result across all income quantile groups whereas the collateral effect is significant in the low- and middle-income quantile groups, which implies the low- and middle-income quantile groups are more sensitive to the change in value of real estate assets. Thus, the monetary policy authority should take care of those groups in episode of housing price fall.

Honors and Awards

2014-2019	World Star Grant, Sungkyunkwan University [<i>5-year Ph.D. fellowship</i>]
2019-2020	Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University
2017	Wueller Teaching Award (runner-up), Columbia University
2014	Bank of Korea Research Competition, Bank of Korea
2005-2012	World Star Scholarship, Sungkyunkwan University [<i>undergraduate</i>]

Research and Work Experience

2012-2014 Junior Economist, Bank of Korea
2006-2008 Military Service, Republic of Korea

Teaching Experience

Spring 2017 TA for 1st-year Ph.D. Macroeconomics (Prof. Schmitt-Grohé, Prof. Steinsson, Prof. Nakamura), Columbia University **[Evaluation: 5.12/6.00]**
Fall 2016 TA for Intermediate Macroeconomics (Prof. Sala-I-Martin), Columbia University
 [Evaluation: 5.78/6.00, Wueller Teaching Award]
2012-2014 Lecture Series on Financial Stability Report (Jeju National University, Pusan National University, University of Ulsan, Chonbuk National University, Kangwon National University, Woosong University)

Presentations

House Prices, Frictions, and Consumption Volatility (Job market paper)

Midwest Macroeconomics Meetings (University of Georgia, 2019), Georgetown Center for Economic Research Conference (Georgetown University, 2019), Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (Xiamen University, 2019), Young Economists Symposium (Columbia University, 2019), Midwest Macroeconomics Meetings* (Michigan State University, 2019)

A New Angle on Excess Consumption Volatility in Emerging Countries: Does House Price Matter?

Economics Graduate Student Conference (Washington University in St. Louis, 2018)

Refereeing

Journal of International Economics

Personal

Languages: Korean (native), English (fluent)
Programming: Matlab, Python, R, Stata

References

Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé (main sponsor)
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Jesse Schreger
Assistant Professor of
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Divya Singh

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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu

EDUCATION

Last updated: October 4, 2019

Columbia University in the City of New York

Ph.D. in Economics, Expected May 2020.

Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Master of Science in Quantitative Economics, 2014.

Miranda House, University of Delhi

B.A. Honors in Economics, 2012.

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Primary field: Public Economics

Secondary fields: Development Economics, Urban Economics

AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

Awards

Harriss Prize, Best Second Year Paper, Columbia University, 2016.

Teaching Fellow, Columbia University, 2015-19.

Dean's Fellow, Columbia University, 2014-19.

Honorary Book Grant $\times 4$, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, 2012-2014.

Sumana Dutta Gold Medal for Best student in economics, Miranda House, Delhi University, 2012.

Fellowships and grants

Dissertation fellowship, Columbia University, 2019-20.

Center for Development Economics and Policy, Columbia University, 2016, 2018.

GSAS Matching Travel Grant, 2018.

Dr. Edwin P. and Dr. Beatrice Reubens Fellowship, 2017.

RESEARCH

Job Market Paper

WP1 "Do Property Tax Incentives for New Construction Spur Gentrification? Evidence from New York City"

This paper uses a natural experiment to estimate whether property tax incentives for new construction lower the rents paid by tenants. In 2006, the New York City government decided to make property tax incentives for new construction less generous, starting in 2008. Developers responded by rushing to apply for these benefits and began building before the deadline. The magnitude of excess housing starts at the deadline suggests that a 1% increase in the future property tax increased current residential investment by 0.4%. A naive demand-supply model indicates that these new units brought to the market by the reform should lower rents in nearby incumbent units. On the contrary, I find that the rents in nearby incumbent units increased. Using the baseline land availability within a small radius around an incumbent unit as an instrument, I find that an additional new tax-exempt unit during the bunching period increased the incumbent unit rent by 2.3%. I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that new residential investment made neighborhoods more desirable by attracting affluent households, facilitating the entry of businesses and consumption

Working Papers

WP2. “Merging to Dodge Taxes? Unexpected Consequences of VAT Adoption in India”

This paper investigates whether tax evasion creates incentives among firms to reorganize their production. Value Added Tax (VAT) is the world's most popular consumption tax and is considered revenue efficient since cross-reporting of firm-to-firm transactions leads to self-enforcement. However, the ability to evade tax on firm to consumer transactions creates incentives for the last two firms in the production chain to integrate vertically. I test this hypothesis by using a quasi-experiment in India where sales tax was replaced with VAT in a staggered manner between 2003 and 2008 and provided exogenous shock to tax evasion opportunities along the production chain. Difference-in-difference analysis reveals that post reform, treated firms sourced more ‘upstream’ products and had greater vertical mergers, indicating increased vertical integration under VAT. In addition, the effect is largest for firms which are closest to final demand indicating that tax-evasion is one of the channels. Overall, the results suggest that VAT is no longer production efficient in settings of low compliance.

WP3. “Safer Elections, Women Turnout and Political Outcomes: Evidence from India.”

This paper estimates the effects of increasing security at the polling booths on the election day. Using detailed voting and political outcomes dataset at the polling booth-level, and a regression discontinuity design, we find that greater security at the polling booths increases women share in total turnout by 1.4 percentage points. There is suggestive evidence that booths with a higher probability of security treatment are associated with a lower vote share of the incumbent party candidate, corrupt candidates, and a higher vote share of educated candidates. The evidence suggests that safer elections affect outcomes through an increase in women turnout.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Conference presentations (* indicates scheduled)

	<i>Paper</i>	<i>Year</i>
Urban Economics Association Meetings*, Philadelphia	WP1	2019
National Tax Association Meetings*, Tampa, Florida	WP1,2	2019
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management*, Denver	WP1	2019
Young Economists Symposium, Columbia, New York	WP1	2019
Independent Budget Office, New York	WP1	2019
NY Fiscal Policy Breakfast, Federal Reserve, New York	WP1	2019
The Mayor’s Office of Management and Budget, New York	WP1	2019
ZEW, Advances in Empirical Public Economics, Mannheim, Germany	WP1	2019
Conference on Value Added of Value Added Taxes, World Bank, DC	WP2	2019
Conference on Public Finance in Developing countries, Zurich	WP2	2018
Poster at National Tax Association meeting, New Orleans	WP2	2018
Young Economists Symposium, NYU	WP2	2018
Development and Political Economy Conference, UC Berkeley	WP2	2018
PhD Conference, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK	WP2	2018
PhD Conference, George Washington University, Washington D.C.	WP3	2018
Poster at Women in Science at Columbia	WP3	2018
Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development, ISI Delhi	WP3	2017
APPAM Regional Student Conference, Washington, D.C.	WP3	2017

Attendance

NBER Graduate student workshop and Conference in Business Taxation, 2018.

(Co)-organization

Summer reading group in Public finance, Columbia University, 2018.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistantships

Professor Francois Gerard, Columbia University, Summer & Fall, 2016.

Professor Suresh Naidu, Columbia University, Summer 2015.

Professor Tridip Ray, Indian Statistical Institute, Summer 2013.

Internships

Consultant, World Bank, D.C., Summer 2016.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Full instructor

- International trade, 2017.

Teaching assistant:

- Public Economics, Fall 2017 and 2018.
- Economic development, Spring 2018, Spring 2019.
- American Economy, Fall 2016.
- Principles of Economics, Fall 2015, Spring 2016, Summer 2018.

PERSONAL

Languages: English (fluent), Hindi (native)

Citizenship: India

REFERENCES

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Donald R. Davis, (212) 854-4037, drd28@columbia.edu
Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu

Education

- Ph.D. Economics, Columbia University, 2020 (expected).
- B.S. Mathematics and Economics, *First Class Honor*, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), 2014.

Fields of Specialization

Macroeconomics, International Finance

Job Market Paper

“Foreign Exchange Reserves and FDI.”

Abstract: Why do emerging market economies hold high levels of foreign exchange reserves? What is the optimal level of reserves, and do economies accumulate reserves over this optimal level? I argue that foreign exchange reserves help emerging markets attract foreign direct investment inflow. This incentive should be taken into account when analyzing central banks’ reserve accumulation. I study the interaction between foreign exchange reserves and foreign direct investment to explain the level of reserves through a small open economy model. The model features domestic social planners and foreign investors. The optimal level of reserve-over-GDP ratio generated by the model is close to the level of East-Asian economies. Additionally, the model generates positive co-movement between technology growth and current account. This suggests high technology growth corresponds to net capital outflow, speaking to the ‘allocation puzzle’ in cross-economy comparisons. The model also generates positive co-movement between foreign exchange reserves and foreign debt, speaking to the puzzle of why countries borrow and save simultaneously. Finally, compared with a fixed reserve regime, optimal reserve policy features instantaneous or lagged buildups of reserves upon different kinds of technology shocks. Both responses prolong the shocks’ positive impacts on output and consumption, delaying them from going back to the steady state.

Work in Progress

“Do FDI firms create more jobs than domestic firms for each dollar of asset?” (with Sakai Ando)

This paper studies whether FDI firms hire more employees than domestic firms for each dollar of asset. Based on the firm-level data from Orbis, we show that, in most economies, domestic firms hire more

employees per asset than FDI firms. The analysis of the industry composition suggests that domestic firms create more jobs per asset when a larger share of domestic firms are in construction, wholesale trade, and service industries. The analysis of switchers shows that domestic firms create fewer jobs per asset after switching the ownership to become FDI firms. These suggest the policy space for job creation is bigger for FDI firms.

“Liability Dollarization and Contractionary Devaluation: A model based evaluation”

Abstract: This paper explores how devaluation of domestic currency imposes a contractionary effect on small open economies who have a significant amount of debt denominated in foreign currencies. Economists and policymakers express concern about the “Original Sin” situation in which most of the economies in the world cannot use their domestic currencies to borrow abroad. A devaluation will increase the foreign currency denominated debt measured in the domestic currency, which will lead to contractions in the domestic economy. However, previous literature on currency denomination and exchange rate policy predicted limited or no contractionary effect of devaluation. In this paper, I present a new model to capture this contractionary devaluation effect with non-financial firms having foreign currency denominated liability and domestic currency denominated asset. When firms borrow from abroad and keep part of the asset in domestic cash or cash equivalents, the contractionary devaluation effect is exacerbated. The model can be used to discuss the performance of the economy in interest under exchange rate shocks and interest rate shocks. Future directions for empirically assessing the model and current literature are suggested. This assessment will thus provide policy guidance for economies with different level of debt, especially foreign currency denominated debt.

“Monetary policy in emerging markets: Can liability dollarization explain contractionary devaluations? : Comment”

Cook (2004) presents a model with the financial accelerator mechanism to discuss the devaluation effect on small open economies with foreign currency denominated external debt. The main conclusion in the paper is that upon an increase in the world interest rate, the monetary policy with an exchange rate peg is better for the economy than flexible exchange rate with inflation targeting, when comparing the magnitude of the decrease in output and investment after the shock. I find that the ranking of the two policies are reversed once certain parameter values are changed. I also perform welfare analysis and base on which discuss the ranking of different monetary policies, providing a method of quantifying the loss of monetary policies under shocks.

Research and Work Experience

1. Research Assistant for Prof. Martin Uribe and Prof. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé
Columbia University, Sep 2018 – Jun 2019, Jun 2015 – Aug 2015
2. Summer Research Intern – Fund Internship Program
International Monetary Fund, Statistics Department, Balance of Payment Division, Jun 2019 – Aug 2019
3. Ph.D Summer Intern
Barings, Emerging Markets Debt, Jun 2017 – Aug 2017

Honors & Awards

Faculty Fellowship, Columbia University, 2014 – 2019

Summer Fellowship, Columbia University, 2015 – 2019

8th Epsilon Fund Award–Honors in Mathematics, HKUST, 2013

Dean’s List–Honors in Academic Achievement, HKUST, 2010 – 2014

Teaching

Globalization and its Risks (TA for Professor Graciela Chichilnisky), Spring 2018

Advanced Macroeconomics (TA for Professor Andres Drenik), Fall 2017, Fall 2016

Introduction to Econometrics (TA for Professor Simon Lee), Spring 2017

International Macroeconomics (TA for Professor Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé), Spring 2016

Intermediate Macroeconomics (TA for Professor Danilo Guitoli), Fall 2015

Personal

Programming Languages: C++, Java, R, Matlab, Stata

Language: Mandarin (Native), English (Fluent)

References

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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, aed2152@columbia.edu, (+1) 212-854-6881

Education

Department of Economics, Columbia University

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics	2020 (expected)
M.Phil. in Economics	2017
M.A. in Economics	2016

School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University

B.A. <i>magna cum laude</i> in Economics and Finance	2014
Honors Class of Mathematics and Physics in College of Sciences	

Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley

Exchange Student, Berkeley Economics Semester Abroad Program	Fall 2012
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Fields of Specialization

Primary: Macroeconomics

Secondary: Monetary Economics, International Economics, Behavioral Macroeconomics

Working Papers

"Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction under Limited Foresight", *Job Market Paper*.

Abstract: Analyses of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy often turn crucially on assumptions that are made about outcomes far in the future, sometimes infinitely far. This is a problematic feature of rational-expectations analyses, given the limited basis for assumptions about the distant future. This paper instead considers both short-term effects and long-run consequences of alternative monetary and fiscal policies under an assumption of bounded rationality. In particular, it assumes that explicit forward planning extends only a finite distance into the future, with anticipated situations at that horizon evaluated using a value function learned from past experience. Such an approach makes announcements of future policies relevant, but avoids the debates about equilibrium selection that plague rational-expectations analyses. The combined monetary-fiscal regimes that result in stable long-run dynamics are characterized, and the effectiveness of temporary changes in either type of policy as a source of short-run demand stimulus is analyzed. The effectiveness of a coordinated change in monetary and fiscal policy is shown to be greatest when decision makers' degree of foresight is intermediate in range (average planning horizons on the order of ten years), rather than shorter or longer.

“The Wedge of the Century: Understanding a Divergence between CPI and PPI Inflation Measures”,
with Shang-Jin Wei (Columbia Business School and NBER), *NBER Working Paper No. w24319*.

Abstract: Two strands of the literature suggest that PPI inflation, rather than CPI inflation, should be the targeting variable in a monetary policy rule. The distinction between these two rules would only be important if the two inflation indices do not co-move strongly. The first contribution of this paper is to document that the two inflation gauges did co-move strongly in the last century but the correlation has fallen substantially since the start of this century. The second contribution is to propose a structural explanation for this divergence based on lengthening of world production chains since 2000. This theory implies that the decline in the correlation is likely to be permanent and a rethinking of the monetary policy rules has become more important. Our multi-stage multi-country production model has additional predictions on the behavior of CPI and PPI inflation beyond a fallen correlation, and these predictions are also confirmed in the data.

“Monetary Policy in an Era of Global Supply Chains”,
with Shang-Jin Wei (Columbia Business School and NBER), *Working Paper, under review*.

Abstract: We study the implications of global supply chains for the design of monetary policy, using a small-open economy New Keynesian model with multiple stages of production. Within the family of simple monetary policy rules with commitment, a rule that targets separate producer price inflation at different production stages, in addition to output gap and real exchange rate, is found to outperform alternative policy rules. As an economy becomes more open, measured by export share, the optimal weight on the upstream inflation rises relative to that on the final stage inflation. If we have to choose among aggregate price indicators, targeting PPI inflation is significantly better than targeting CPI inflation alone. As the production chain becomes longer, the optimal weight on PPI inflation should also rise. Finally, a trade cost shock such as a rise in the import tariff can alter the optimal weights on different inflation variables.

Publications

“Policy Options at the Zero Lower Bound When Foresight is Limited”,
with Michael Woodford (Columbia University and NBER), *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, 109 (2019): 433–437.

Abstract: This paper reviews a variety of alternative policy options under zero lower bound (ZLB) when the foresight of decision makers is limited. The existing theoretical analysis are mostly built upon rational expectations equilibrium (or model-consistent expectations), which is crucial to the predicted strong policy effects at the ZLB. By relaxing the assumption of perfectly model-consistent expectations in a particular way as in Woodford (2018), we find that recognizing that people’s planning horizons are finite can reduce, and may substantially reduce, the predicted effects of some much-discussed policies at the ZLB. Predicted “multiplier effect” of government purchases is reduced by short planning horizons. It remains the case that a commitment to monetary accommodation of fiscal stimulus can make it more effective. Recognizing that planning horizons may be relatively short for some strengthens the efficacy of systematic price-level targeting, as opposed to an ad hoc price-level targeting (temporary price-level targeting). The alternative policy options considered include strict inflation targeting; government purchases; debt-financed government transfer with strict inflation targeting, and with accommodative monetary policy; ad hoc price-level targeting (temporary price-level targeting); and systematic price-level targeting.

“Machiavellian Experimentation”,

with Yang Xie (UC Riverside), *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 45, no.4 (2017): 685-711. (Lead article)

Abstract: This paper proposes the following mechanism whereby polarization of beliefs could eliminate political gridlock instead of intensifying disagreement: the expectation of political payoffs from being proven correct by a policy failure could drive decision makers who do not believe in the new policy to agree to policy experimentation, because they are confident that the experiment will fail, thus increasing their political power. We formalize this mechanism in a collective decision making model in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs in which any decision other than the default option requires unanimity. We show that this consideration of political payoffs can eliminate the inefficiency caused by a unanimous consent requirement when beliefs are polarized, but could also create under-experimentation when two actors hold beliefs that differ only slightly from one another. We further show that this under-experimentation can be reduced when the political payoffs become endogenous. We illustrate the empirical relevance of the mechanism in two examples with historical narratives: we focus on the decision making process of the Chinese leadership during the country’s transition starting in the late 1970s, and we further apply the model to the disagreement within the leadership of the Allied Forces on the Western Front of World War II in the autumn of 1944.

Selected Work in Progress

1. “Monetary Policy and the Maturity of Corporate Debt”
2. “Information Effect of Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Uncertainty”, with John Rogers (Fed Board) and Bo Sun (Fed Board)

Honors and Awards

Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University	2019 - 2020
The Wuller Travel Scholarship, Columbia University	2019
The Program for Economic Research Travel Grant, Columbia University	2018
GSAC Travel Grant Award, Columbia University	2018
Econometric Society World Congress Travel Grant	2015
Dean’s Fellowship, Columbia University	2014 - 2019
Summer Research Fellowship, Columbia University	2014 - 2019
Award for the Best Honors Thesis in Economics and Finance, Tsinghua University	2014
The First Prize for Comprehensive Excellence Scholarship, Tsinghua University	2013
Honors for Undergraduate Economics Research, Tsinghua University	2012, 2013
Outstanding Academic Achievement Award, Tsinghua University	2012

Conferences and Seminars

2019 (non-Job Market): Columbia, Fed Board, AEA*, Reserve Bank of Australia*, Univ. of Melbourne*, International Seminar on Macroeconomics (NBER)*, Banque de France*, China International Conference in Macroeconomics*, UIBE*

2018: Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference, Columbia (PhD Seminar), RES Symposium of Junior Researchers, ES China Meeting, IMF*, CEPR*, Univ. of Tokyo*, UIBE*

*presentation by coauthor

Research and Teaching Experiences

Refereeing

Journal of Comparative Economics

Research Assistant

Research Assistant for Prof. Shang-Jin Wei, Columbia Business School	May 2016 - Jun 2019
Research Assistant for Prof. Yao Lu, Tsinghua University	May 2013 - Oct 2014
Research Apprentice for Prof. Ulrike Malmendier, UC Berkeley	Sep 2012 - Jan 2013

Research Internship

Dissertation Fellow, International Finance Division, Federal Reserve Board	Summer 2019
Research Intern, Chief Economist Office, Asian Development Bank	Summer 2016
Spring Intern, Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy, The Brookings Institution	Spring 2013

Teaching Assistant

Principles of Economics (B.A. level), Columbia University	Fall 2017
Money and Banking (B.A. level), Columbia University	Spring 2017, Fall 2018, Spring 2019
Intermediate Macroeconomics (B.A. level), Columbia University	Spring 2016
Public Economics (B.A. level), Columbia University	Fall 2015
Tsinghua-INSEAD Executive MBA 2015 Class, 2016 Class	Spring 2014

Skills and Personal

Programming & Software: MATLAB, Stata, Python, R, C++
Languages: Mandarin Chinese (native), English (proficient)
Citizenship: China

References

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John Bates Clark Professor of Political Economy
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Placement Chairs: Martín Uribe, (212) 851-4008, mu2166@columbia.edu
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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu

Education

Ph.D. Economics, Department of Economics, Columbia University, Expected 2020
B.A., Economics, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, 2014

Fields of Specialization

Primary: International Trade, Urban Economics
Secondary: Development Economics, Applied Microeconomics

Job Market Paper

“Land Use Regulation and Economic Development: Evidence from the Farmland Red Line Policy in China.”

Best paper (runner-up) at the European Meeting of the Urban Economics Association, 2019 (for recent graduates and current students)

Abstract: Land use is tightly regulated worldwide, yet there is limited empirical evidence on the consequences of land use regulation on economic development. This paper studies a major national policy restricting land use in China - the Farmland Red Line Policy - to provide causal evidence on the reduced form local effect of urban land-use regulation on GDP and population growth. First implemented in 1999, the policy imposes a constraint on rural-to-urban land conversion, the stringency of which depends on exogenous local geographical features. These constraints on urban land development are estimated to have sizable effects on local economic development. They reduce urban land development, lower GDP, and decrease the local population. To understand the aggregate impacts of the policy, I develop a quantitative spatial equilibrium model that features an endogenous land use decision. Through the lens of the model, the policy causes an over-supply of farmland and an under-supply of urban land; the degree of land misallocation varies across locations due to the local geographical features. Land misallocation leads to labor misallocation due to labor mobility both between agriculture and manufacturing and across space. I estimate that the welfare of workers would have been 5.8% higher in 2010 if the policy had not been implemented.

Work in Progress

“Agglomeration within Knowledge Hubs: Evidence from Economics Research Institutions.”

Abstract: In the post-Internet era, does being around with more active researchers in the workplace increase one’s innovation activity? This paper tests the impact of team size on one’s publication output among US university economists from 1996 to 2016. I construct a database of affiliation and publication history for all US university economists using the publication information from the Scopus database. University funding revenue from private gifts and government appropriation is used to instrument the total number of economists at a university in a specific year. Estimates suggest a 10% increase of team

size raises one's annual output measured by citation weighted number of publications by 4.6%. Agglomeration effect disappears once crossing the affiliation border: having more economists in a nearby affiliation does not affect one's output. Increasing chances to coauthor with colleagues when being at a larger team helps explain the agglomeration effect.

"Expansion of High Speed Railway and Firm Export in China", (with Lin Tian)

Honors and Awards

2019 - 2020 Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
Spring 2019 ASGC, GSAS, and Department of Economics Travel Grants, Columbia University
Spring 2019 Wueller Travel Scholarship, Columbia University
2014 - 2019 Dean's Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2010 First Prize of Freshman Scholarship, Peking University

Conference Presentations

2019 *The European Meeting of the Urban Economics Association* (Amsterdam), *The American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association International Meeting* (Milan), *The Econometric Society Summer Meetings* (Xiamen), *Young Economists Symposium* (Columbia), *IPWSD 2019* (Columbia)

Research Experiences

2017-2018 Research Assistant of Réka Juhász, Columbia University

Teaching Assistantships

Spring 2019 The Global Economy, Ronald Miller
Fall 2018 International Trade, Waseem Noor
Spring 2017 Economics of New York City, Donald R. Davis
Fall 2016 Intermediate Macroeconomics, Xavier Sala-i-Martin
Spring 2016 Economics of Money and Banking, Tri Vi Dang
Fall 2015 Economics of Money and Banking, Perry Mehrling

Personal

Languages: Mandarin (Native), English

Programming: Proficient in Stata, ArcGIS, and Matlab; Python

References

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