# Decentralized Finance: Market Design and Governance Structure

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
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2 The Pros and Cons of Transparency




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#### Public Blockchain Technologies

Users

- A blockchain is a digitally distributed, decentralized, public ledger that exists across a network.
- Decentralization through validators, which process orders in batches
- Users submit **blockchain fees** to prioritize their orders.
- Orders pending in the mempools are visible to all.




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#### **Decentralized Finance**

- Second-generation blockchains support decentralized finance (DeFi)
- DeFi is a set of of disintermediated financial services
  - Utilizes open-source smart contracts
  - Provide lending, swapping, and insurance services without any centralized financial intermediary
- DeFi is widely believed to be one of the killer applications for blockchain technologies

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#### DeFi Ecosystem



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#### Key Characteristics of DeFi

#### • Transparency:

- Information on settled and pending transactions is publicly available
- DeFi protocols are hard-coded, open-sourced algorithms:
  - No ambiguity in the contract
  - Settlement of transactions enforced by the smart contract.
- Decentralization:
  - Architecture: distributed ledger
  - Governance: distributed community of token holders

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#### Transparency of Confirmed Transactions

Capponi

⑦ Transaction Hash:	0x7b54d61f6e4624bb704ccd510da460fa80301428994b45ef92f74c9b7caea222							
⑦ Status:	© Success							
⑦ Block:	13680579 41 Block Confirmations							
⑦ Timestamp:	© 9 mins ago (Nov-25-2021 01:21:11 AM +UTC)   ① Confirmed within 30 secs							
* Transaction Action:	+ Swap 235.998068 ♦ ALICE For 1.43229536454691122 Ether On 🖓 Uniswap V2							
⑦ From:	0xbf5ae133b9a0fc1a07952a7df2afa21f7f69ef58 🕼							
⑦ Interacted With (To):	Contract 0x7a250d5630b4cf539739df2c5dacb4c659f2488d (Uniswap V2: Router 2) 🥏 🗓							
⑦ Tokens Transferred: 2	From 0xbf5ae133b9a0fc To Uniswap V2: ALIC For 235.998068 (\$6,114.71)      ALICE (ALICE)     From Uniswap V2: ALIC To 0xbf5ae133b9a0fc For 1.43229536454691122 (\$6,200.86)      Wrapped Ethe							
⑦ Value:	0 Ether (\$0.00)							
⑦ Transaction Fee:	0.01677753 Ether (\$72.64)							
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#### Transparency of Pending Transactions

A total of 235,292 pending txns found (Showing the last 10000 records)

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Txn Hash	Nonce	Method ①	Last Seen	Gas Limit	Gas Price (i)	From	То	Value
0x424b6f1f5098b573bf8	31	0xc04b8d59	4 secs ago	296716	105.3884   1.5 Gwei	0x04729689f219cbd549 <b>T</b>	Uniswap V3: Router <b>T</b>	1.15 Ether 🏺
0x1f1a68ce3dd59685ed	4164316	Transfer	4 secs ago	21000	185   2 Gwei	Coinbase 5 Y	0xbcbd01a53140e26947 <b>T</b>	0.05020473 E
0x9df4927481afc763d74	13	Deposit	4 secs ago	45038	121.5063   1.5 Gwei	0x433db84f88f1944f3a5 <b>T</b>	Wrapped Ether <b>T</b>	0.5 Ether 🎙
0x18059111e7b412f3f55f	475	Set Approval For	4 secs ago	46747	110.2918   1.5 Gwei	0xf31fc1a5bfa83452184 <b>T</b>	Based Fish Mafia: BFM T Y	0 Ether 🍨
0xc733658c0a63c45c5f1	73	Swap Exact Token	4 secs ago	213798	105.3884   1.5 Gwei	0xc4f565416a9034ed52 <b>T</b>	SushiSwap: Router T	0 Ether 🍨

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#### Transparency of Smart Contracts

- DeFi protocols are hard-coded, open-sourced algorithms:
  - There is no ambiguity in the contract
  - Settlement of transactions enforced by the smart contract.

#### UniswapV2Pair.sol

This contract 2 implements the actual pool that exchanges tokens. It is the core Uniswap functionality.

```
Show all
                                                                                                              Copy
     pragma solidity =0.5.16:
     import './interfaces/IUniswapV2Pair.sol':
     import './UniswapV2ERC20.sol':
     import './libraries/Math.sol':
     import './libraries/U0112x112.sol':
     import './interfaces/IERC20.sol':
8
     import './interfaces/IUniswapV2Factory.sol';
                     uint totalSupply = totalSupply; // gas savings, must be defined here since totalSupply can
             update in mintFee
                     if ( totalSupply == 0) {
                         liquidity = Math.sqrt(amount0.mul(amount1)).sub(MINIMUM LIQUIDITY);
                        mint(address(0), MINIMUM LIQUIDITY); // permanently lock the first MINIMUM LIQUIDITY tokens
                     } else {
                         liquidity = Math.min(amount0.mul( totalSupply) / reserve0, amount1.mul( totalSupply) /
             reserve1);
        Capponi
                                                                                                   2021
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```


#### **Data Analytics**

- Does transparency provide actionable information?
  - What is the expected yield of different liquidity pools?
    - Data Analytics: Can we rate different DeFi pools or tokens, like we did for bonds or equity?
  - What is the risk of providing liquidity, or executing borrowing and lending transactions?
    - Capponi and Jia (2021) show that liquidity providers can be exploited by arbitrageurs under the current design of decentralized exchanges.
- On-chain data analytics and frameworks are needed!

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### Unintended Consequences of Transparency


#### **Users and Arbitrageurs**



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## Mitigation of Frontrunning Risk

- Transparency may lead to frontrunning attacks of DeFi transactions
- Privacy preserving channels (Flashbots, Eden Network) can mitigate these risks
  - Directly route users' transactions to validators without broadcasting
  - Pending transactions are no longer public and thus cannot be frontrun



#### Will Private Channels be Adopted?

- Capponi, Jia, and Wang (2022) develop a dynamic game theoretical model and show that
  - If the frontrunning problem **is severe**, there exists a unique equilibrium where all validators adopt the private pool
  - if the frontrunning problem **is not too severe**, some validators do not adopt the private pool to preserve *miner extractable value*
- Privacy preserving pools do not provide enough incentives to solve the frontrunning problem.
- Perhaps the solution is at the consensus protocol level? Zero knowledge proof?

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#### DeFi Governance

- Governance proposals:
  - Change of protocols (e.g. interest rate and collateral requirement for lending)
  - Allocation of funds, new features or interface, and change of governance system
- Anyone who holds enough governance tokens can submit and vote for governance proposals.

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
#### Potential of Governance Tokens

- Transparency and Efficiency:
  - Avoid empty-voting or over-voting problems of traditional proxy-vote systems
- Implement alternative governance structures:
  - Square root voting
  - Voting power as a function of holding time
  - Develop multiple classes of tokens (similar to class A and B shares)

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#### Risk of Centralization

- Few accounts (early investors, developers, big wales) hold most of the tokens
- Development team typically has control of the interface, Treasury, and development of new protocols



### Risk of Manipulation and Embezzlement.

- Tradable governance token + pseudoanymous + immutable = the best place for manipulation and embezzlement!
- Manipulators can secretly acquire governance tokens for attacks.
  - Attacker controlled True Seigniorage Dollar (TSD) and rewarded himself with 11.8b worth of TSD in 2021.

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# Thank you!

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