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PLACEMENT	Chairs: Donald Davis drd28@columbia.edu and Martín Uribe mu2166@columbia.edu Assistant: Amy Devine aed2152@columbia.edu ; Phone: (212) 856-6881	
EDUCATION	Ph.D. in Economics, Columbia University (expected) M.Phil. in Economics, Columbia University M.A. in Economics, Columbia University B.A. in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE), University of Pennsylvania; <i>summa cum laude</i>	2020 2017 2016 2011
HONORS AND AWARDS	Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University CORE-Teagle Fellow, CORE USA CDEP Student Research Grant, Center for Development Economics and Policy Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award (runner-up), Columbia University Lead Teaching Fellow in Economics, Columbia University Wueller Teaching Award, Columbia University Ford Foundation Predoctoral Fellow, National Academy of Sciences Provost Diversity Fellow, Columbia University Dean's Fellow, Columbia University Goldstone Prize for Best Senior Honors Thesis, University of Pennsylvania Phi Beta Kappa	2019-2020 2019 2018, 2017 2017 2017 2016 2014 2014-2019 2014-2019 2011 2011
FIELDS	Labor Economics, Development Economics, and Public Economics	
JOB MARKET PAPER	<p>Labor Market Institutions and the Structure of Work Compensation: The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Wages and Amenities in Brazil [Full draft coming soon]</p> <p><i>Abstract:</i> Labor market institutions—unions in particular—affect the structure of work compensation. While there has been considerable work on the effects of unionization on wages, both the role of collective bargaining and the amenity component of work compensation have often been overlooked. This paper studies how a collective bargaining institution affects workers' wages and amenities. The particular institution of interest is automatic extensions, which dictate that negotiated benefits cannot be phased out except through new collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). The introduction of automatic extensions in Brazil shocked the collective bargaining process by 1) allowing unions to holdout during negotiations; 2) expanding the time horizons over what is negotiated; and 3) increasing the relative value of amenities to wages. I find that mean wages fall at establishments with extended CBAs. Considering that workers also value non-pay job characteristics, I build a model where unions allocate bargaining effort between wages and amenities. The model predicts that automatic extensions incentivize unions to focus on amenities, especially when the union is strong enough to overcome push-back from employers. As predicted by the model, I find that bargaining units with strong unions secure additional amenities valued above the decrease in wages. Focusing on worker flows, I find that an increase in hiring rates brings an influx of low-skill workers to affected establishments. These results are rationalized as compression in the value of jobs within firms.</p>	

WORKING PAPERS

Assortative Matching or Exclusionary Hiring? The Impact of Firm Policies on Racial Wage Differences in Brazil (joint with François Gerard, Edson Severnini, and David Card) [NBER Working Paper # 25176](#); *R&R*, *American Economic Review*

Abstract: A growing body of research shows that firms' employment and wage-setting policies contribute to wage inequality and pay disparities between groups. We measure the effects of these policies on racial pay differences in Brazil. We find that nonwhites are less likely to work at establishments that pay more to all race groups, a pattern that explains about 20% of the white-nonwhite wage gap for both genders. The pay premiums offered by different employers are also compressed for nonwhites relative to whites, contributing another 5% of the overall gap. We then ask how much of the under-representation of nonwhites at higher-paying workplaces is due to the selective skill mix at these establishments. Using a counterfactual based on the observed skill distribution at each establishment and the nonwhite shares in different skill groups in the local labor market, we conclude that assortative matching accounts for about two-thirds of the under-representation gap for both men and women. The remainder reflects an unexplained preference for white workers at higher-paying establishments. The wage losses associated with unexplained sorting and differential wage setting are largest for nonwhites with the highest levels of general skills, suggesting that the allocative costs of race-based preferences may be relatively large in Brazil.

Violence and Credit Use: Evidence from MSEs in Mexico's Drug War [[Full draft pending CNBV approval](#)]

Abstract: This project studies how micro and small enterprises (MSEs) use credit when facing violence. Leveraging administrative data on working capital credit lines issued to MSEs in Mexico, I exploit geographic variation in homicide rates as well as exogenous kingpin captures to identify the causal effects of violence on credit use. I find that firms significantly increase the amounts drawn from their credit lines after experiencing violence shocks. This result could be motivated by rising short-term liquidity needs (*distress story*) or increasing risk of holding cash (*substitution story*). Rising default probabilities indicate signs of distress, although heterogeneity analyses reveal cash for credit substitution among non-revolving borrowers. I also find evidence that rising liquidity needs among distressed MSEs are likely driven by decreased economic activity rather than theft or extortion. As such, this paper highlights the important role that financial products play in terms of helping MSEs absorb violence shocks as well as providing convenient alternatives to cash holdings under insecure environments.

Workers on Probation: Evidence from Job Security Legislation in Brazil

Work in progress: This paper exploits simultaneous kinks and notches in firms' choice sets regarding separation decisions to uncover firing cost elasticities of layoffs. Using matched employer-employee data from Brazil, I estimate a dynamic model of employer learning in order to quantify employment responses along the entire nonlinear choice set. The non-linearities in question are generated by probationary periods, which impose tenure-based discontinuities (in both levels and slope) in the firing cost schedule of job matches.

The Minimum Wage, Unions, and Racial Wage Differentials in Brazil (joint with Ellora Derenoncourt, François Gerard, and Claire Montialoux)

Work in progress: This paper seeks to estimate the impact of the minimum wage on racial wage differentials in Brazil with a particular focus on wage readjustments negotiated in industry-level collective bargaining agreements.

RESEARCH AND
WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for François Gerard, Columbia University	2015-2016
Research Assistant for Supreet Kaur and Massimo Morelli, Columbia University	2013-2014
Intern for Shannon K. O'Neil, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)	2013
Analyst, First Manhattan Consulting Group (FMCG)	2011-2012
Intern, Mexican Federal Competition Commission (Cofece)	2010

TEACHING EXPERIENCE	<u>Instructor</u>	
	Labor Economics (Undergraduate)	Summer 2018
	<u>Teaching Assistant</u>	
	Econometrics I (Masters) with Steven Olley [<i>Wueller Teaching Award</i>]	Fall 2016
	Public Economics (Undergraduate) with François Gerard	Spring 2017
	Economics of Race (Undergraduate) with Brendan O’Flaherty	Fall 2019
	Principles of Economics (Undergraduate) with Sunil Gulati	Spring 2019
OTHER ACTIVITIES	Referee service: <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i>	
	Community service: Tutor at South Bronx United (2015) and West Philly Tutoring Project (2010)	
	Leadership: President of Mexican Student Association at the University of Pennsylvania, Head of Organizing Committee for <i>Convergencias</i> Conference (2009-2011)	
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