DANIEL MARK DEIBLER

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Placement Chairs

Don Davis drd28@columbia.edu

Suresh Naidu sn2430@columbia.edu

Research Interests

Labor Economics, Public Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Law and Economics

References

Professor W. Bentley Macleod Columbia University bentley.macleod@columbia.edu Professor Suresh Naidu Columbia University sn2430@columbia.edu Professor and Chair Miguel Urquiola Columbia University msu2101@columbia.edu

Education

2015-PRES. Columbia University

Doctor of Philosophy in Economics, Expected: May 2022 Dissertation Title: What Makes a Good Job? Essays in Labor Economics Masters of Philosophy, 2018 Masters of Arts, 2017

2010-2014 Washington University in St. Louis

Bachelor's of Arts: Summa Cum Laude, 2014

Job Market Paper

The Effect of Outsourcing on Remaining Workers, Rent Distribution, and Inequality

Firms can decide whether to produce some goods and services in-house or purchase them from the market. Firms are increasingly purchasing from the market – using subcontractors, temp agencies, and other outsourced labor. Low-wage workers' wages decline when they are outsourced. Workers who remain after an outsourcing event are also affected by it because outsourcing changes the internal structure of the firm. However, little is known about how remainers are affected. I analyze the impact of occupational layoff (OL) outsourcing on remainers using matched employer-employee data based on German social security records. OL outsourcing increases remaining workers' earnings by 5% in a sample of 249 outsourcing events. Remainers are also more likely to stay at the outsourcing firm in the long-term. These results are consistent with the theory that firms reallocated rents to the remainers. Additionally, outsourcing firms are largely unionized, and the earnings gains are slightly larger among low-wage remainers, suggesting unionization plays a role in which workers receive higher earnings. Finally, I analyze the impact of OL outsourcing on inequality. OL outsourcing reduces within-firm inequality as the lowest-wage workers leave. Using Recentered Influence Functions, I show that a 1% increase in the share of workers in an OL outsourcing event increases earnings at the top of the distribution by approximately 10%, and aggregate inequality increases as well. The effect on the top of the wage distribution suggests prior estimates underestimate the impact of outsourcing on wage inequality, by not accounting for increased wages among high-wage remaining workers.

Placement Assistant

Amy Devine aed2152@columbia.edu What's in a Name? How Definitions of "Employee" Shape Worker-Firm Relationships" [joint with Elliott Ash. Supported by NSF Award Number 1949415]

This paper provides causal evidence on how changing the legal boundaries of employment – whether a worker is defined as a firm's "employee" versus an outside contractor – affects labor market outcomes. We introduce a dataset of all U.S. Circuit Court cases making substantive employment determinations for the years 1990-2018 and link them to state- and occupation-level data on employment and earnings. Our difference-in-differences analysis reveals how employee definitions impact firm structure: when courts give workers additional legal rights by declaring them "employees", low-wage workers are more likely to be outsourced. For occupations where effort is more easily monitored (e.g. janitors, guards), "is-employee" determinations increase outsourcing and reduce earnings. For occupations where effort cannot be monitored easily (e.g. doctors, scientists, engineers), employment declines and workers are more likely to be independent contractors.

"Why Choose Alternative Work Arrangements? The Effect of Labor Demand Shocks on AWAs in the U.S. Labor Market" [supported by the DOL Scholars Program]

"Keep Going to School: The Effect of Social Promotion on Wage Response to Childhood Labor"

Grants and Awards

- 2020 National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement Grant
- 2019 Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award, Columbia University
- 2018 Runner up Columbia University Vickrey Award for Best 3rd Year Paper
- 2017 Department of Labor Scholars Program Grant
- 2015 Columbia University Graduate Fellowship
- 2015 Columbia University Graduate Summer Fellowship
- 2014 Adam Smith Prize for Excellence in Economics, Washington University

Presentations (including upcoming)

2021	Columbia University Applied Micro Workshop
2021	Society of Labor Economics (SOLE)
2020	ETH Zurich
	Columbia University Applied Micro Workshop
	Society of Institutional and Organizational Economics
2019	Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium
	W.E. Upjohn Institute Visiting Presentation
	3rd IZA Conference on Contract Work
	Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium
2018	Midwestern Economics Association
	Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium

Briq Workshop on Firms, Jobs, and Inequality

Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium

- 2017 Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium
- 2016 Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium

Research and Professional Experience

2019	W.E. Upjohn	Institute,	Visiting	Researcher

- 2018-2019 Columbia University, Research Assistant for Professor Francois Gerard
- 2016-2019 Columbia University, Research Assistant for Professor W. Bentley MacLeod
- 2014-2015 NERA Economic Consulting, Research Associate

Teaching Experience

Fall 2021	Intermediate Microeconomics Professor: Prajit Dutta Position: Teaching Assistant
Fall 2020	Introduction to Microeconomics Professor: Prajit Dutta Position: Teaching Assistant
Spring 2019 Seminar in Political Economy Professor: W. Bentley MacLeod Position: Teaching Assistant	
Spring 2019 Intermediate Microeconomics Professor: Jonathan Vogel Position: Teaching Assistant	
Fall 2016	Intermediate Microeconomics Professor: Pietro Ortoleva Position: Teaching Assistant

Teaching Experience

Skills: STATA, R, MATLAB