

# Louise Guillouët

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## PLACEMENT CHAIRS:

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## EDUCATION

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<b>Ph.D.   <i>Economics</i></b> Columbia University	Aug. 2016 – present New York, NY
<b>M.Sc. <i>Summa Cum Laude</i>   <i>Analysis and Policy in Economics</i></b> Paris School of Economics	2016 Paris, France
<b>B.A. and B.Sc. <i>Cum Laude</i>   <i>Science and Social Science</i></b> Sciences Po and Université Pierre et Marie Curie	2013 Paris, France

## JOB MARKET PAPER

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### **The Demand Side of Firm Growth: Evidence from Mexico**

*with Enrique Seira*

*Abstract:* We study the demand side of firm-level upgrading: in order for firms to sell higher-priced or more products, they must convince customers of the value of their products. One way to do this is to build reputation over time, but this process may take a long time if consumers have low priors and learning is slow. We study this question in the context of the consumer goods industry in Mexico, where small domestic firms compete with large multinationals who start out with much better reputations. Leveraging scanner data, we show that although consumers of domestic products seem satisfied, they are more reluctant to try new goods introduced by the same domestic firms than new goods introduced by multinationals. Government-mandated labeling appears to increase consumers' willingness to experiment, including with new domestic products.

## WORKING PAPERS

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### **Language Barriers in Multinationals and Knowledge Transfers**

**Draft**

*with Amit Khandelwal, Rocco Macchiavello and Matthieu Teachout*

A feature of MNCs is a three-tier organizational structure: foreign managers (FMs) supervise domestic managers (DMs) who supervise production workers. Language barriers between FMs and DMs could impede knowledge transfers. We develop a model in which DMs learn general skills by communicating with FMs, but communication effort is non-contractible. These conditions generate sub-optimal communication within the MNC. If communication is complementary with language skills, the planner could raise welfare by subsidizing foreign language acquisition. We experimentally assess the validity of these assumptions in Myanmar, a setting where FMs and DMs communicate in English. The first experiment examines the general skills assumption by asking prospective employers at domestic firms to rate hypothetical job candidates. They value candidates with both higher English proficiency and MNC experience, a premium driven, in part, by frequent interactions with FMs. The second experiment examines the complementarity assumption by providing English training to a random sample of DMs working at MNCs. At endline, treated DMs have higher English proficiency, communicate more frequently with their FMs, are more involved in firm management, and perform better in simulated management tasks.

## Precaution and Information in a World of Deep Uncertainty

Draft

with David Martimort

We consider a dynamic decision-making problem under irreversibility and uncertainty. A decision-maker enjoys surplus from his current actions but faces the possibility of an irreversible catastrophe, an event that follows a non-homogeneous Poisson process with a rate that depends on the stock of past actions. Passed a tipping point, the probability of a disaster increases once for all. For such a context, the *Precautionary Principle* has repeatedly been invoked to regulate risk. We ask whether such an institutional commitment to prudent actions in a world of incomplete social contracts has any value and we answer negatively. When only the distribution of possible tipping points is known, the optimal feedback rule should *a priori* determine actions in terms of first the stock of past actions and second, the beliefs on whether the tipping point has been passed or not. We nevertheless show that *Stock-Markov Equilibria*, which are sustained with feedback rules that only depend on stock and only allow commitment to actions for infinitesimally short periods of time, suffice to implement an optimal path. Yet, committing to such limited feedback rules once for all is suboptimal; pointing out at the negative value of the *Precautionary Principle*.

## WORKING PAPERS

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**The Unequal Gains from Entry at the Top: Estimating the Whole Foods Effect**

**Shopping Alone: The Impact of the Decline of the American Mall**

with Guy Aridor and Howard Zhang

## RESEARCH GRANTS

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<b>Supply-Chain Linkages with FDI Firms: Experimental Evidence from Myanmar (returned)</b>	2020
International Growth Centre (IGC), £175,394, with Amit Khandelwal and Rocco Macchiavello	
<b>Evaluating a novel approach for expanding the pool of entrepreneurs in Myanmar (returned)</b>	2020
IGC's Small and Growing Business Fund, £19,774, with Réka Zempléni	
<b>The Social Quality of Goods</b>	2020
NSF Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant, \$25,000	

## CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

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CEPR's Structural Transformation and Economic Growth Conference,	2021
Society for Institutional and Organizational Economics Annual Conference	
CEPR/EBRD's Economics of Transition Seminar, Northeastern Universities Development Consortium, Empirical Management Conference	2020
French Association of Environmental and Resource Economics Annual Conference, Sciences Po	2019
Paris Friday Seminar, University of Warwick Economics PhD Conference	
World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economics, IPA Small and Medium Enterprise Program Meeting, NYU Abu Dhabi and PEDL Workshop on the Frontiers of Research	2018

## HONORS AND AWARDS

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<b>Global Priorities Institute Fellowship</b>	Spring 2021
Oxford University and the Forethought Foundation	
<b>Wueller Fellowship</b>	Spring 2020
Best pre-dissertation proposal in Economics, Columbia University	
<b>Alliance Mobility Fellowship</b>	Spring 2019
To fund research visit at Sciences Po	
<b>International Study Fellowship</b>	Spring 2016
American Foundation for the Paris School of Economics	

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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<b>Intermediate macroeconomics (Teaching assistant)</b> Columbia University	Spring 2018, Fall 2019, Fall 2020 New York, NY
<b>Economic development (Teaching assistant)</b> Columbia University	Spring 2020 New York, NY
<b>Industrial Organization (Teaching assistant)</b> Columbia University	Fall 2018, Spring 2019 New York, NY

## WORK EXPERIENCE

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<b>Research Assistant to Francois Gérard</b> Columbia University	Summer 2017 New York, NY
<b>Strategy analyst (intern)</b> ENGIE Headquarters, Strategy department	March 2015 – August 2015 Paris, France
<b>Research officer (intern)</b> NERA Economic Consulting, Environments, Energy and Networks practice	September 2014 – February 2015 Paris, France
<b>Research officer (intern)</b> French Treasury Department, Region Economic Service in China	June 2014 – August 2015 Shanghai, China
<b>Research Assistant to Denis Cogneau</b> Paris School of Economics	February 2014 – May 2014 Paris, France

## MISCELLANEOUS

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**Languages:** French (Native), English (fluent), Spanish (B2)  
**Programming:** Stata, Python, MATLAB, Mathematica  
**Personal:** French Citizen, Woman, DOB 12/13/1993

## REFERENCES

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JACK WILLIS  
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