

# JOHN W.E. CREMIN

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Placement Chairs: Sandra Black & Suresh Naidu  
Placement Assistant: Amy Devine

## Education:

2024 (expected)	Ph.D. Economics	Columbia University
2021	MPhil Economics	Columbia University
2020	M.A. Economics	Columbia University
2018	M.A. Economics	Cambridge University

## Honors and Awards:

2015-2016, Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University

## Fields of Specialization:

*Primary Field:* Social Learning (Microeconomic Theory)  
*Secondary Field:* The Economics of Networks

## Job Market Paper: Too Much Information & The Death of Political Consensus

Abstract: Why is modern political polarization so extreme, even on purely factual questions, despite greater access to information than ever? In a model of sequential social learning with a binary state, I study the impact of motivated reasoning, which is a belief formation process in which agents trade-off accuracy against ideological/emotional convenience, on information aggregation. I find that even Bayesian agents only learn under extremely connected network structures (those that satisfy ‘Expanding Sample Sizes’), where agents have arbitrarily large neighborhoods asymptotically. This is driven by the fact that motivated agents sometimes reject their social information, and with any finite neighborhood, there is always some probability that all neighbors of a given agent observes will have rejected their social information. Moreover, I establish that in such a model consensus, where asymptotically agents of all types choose the same action, is only possible with relatively uninformative private signals and low levels of motivated reasoning, whatever the network structure.

## Working Paper: Learning through Anonymous Speech

Abstract: The intense partisanship of social media is often remarked upon in modern political discourse, here I show that exaggerated partisanship is to be expected when non-partisan agents dislike to be caught making incorrect statements publicly. This is exacerbated by more limited

information, and more extreme punishment for errors. I suggest the introduction of *partial* anonymous commenting as a solution.

### **Research and Work Experience:**

Research Assistant for Evan Sadler Academic Year 2022-23

Research Assistant for Navin Kartik Spring 2022

Research Assistant for Andrew Kosenko Fall 2021

### **Teaching Experience:**

I have worked as a Teaching Fellow for the following classes:

Fall 2019: Introduction to Econometrics UN3412, Professor Jushan Bai

Spring 2020: Introduction to Economics UN3412, Professor Thomas Piskula

Fall 2020: Principles of Economics UN1105, Professor Sunil Gulati

Spring 2021: Market Design GU4260, Professor Guillaume Haeringer

Fall 2021: Market Design GU4260, Professor Guillaume Haeringer

Spring 2022: Behavioral Economics GU4840, Professor Mark Dean

Teaching Evaluations are available upon request.

### **Languages:**

English (Native), French (Intermediate)

### **References:**

#### **Evan Sadler**

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