

# MIGUEL ACOSTA

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Suresh Naidu [sn2430@columbia.edu](mailto:sn2430@columbia.edu)  
Placement Assistant: Amy Devine [aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu), (212) 854-6881

## FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

**PRIMARY:** Macroeconomics. **SECONDARY:** Monetary Economics and Behavioral Economics.

## EDUCATION

**Columbia University** *Ph.D. Candidate in Economics* 2016–Present  
Expected completion: May 2022  
M.Phil. in Economics 2019  
M.A. in Economics 2017  
**George Washington University** *Graduate Certificate in Mathematics* 2014–2016  
**Stanford University** *B.A. in Economics* 2010–2014  
Departmental Honors

## JOB MARKET PAPER

*The Perceived Causes of Monetary Policy Surprises* [\[Latest version\]](#)

**ABSTRACT.** I estimate the macroeconomic effects of two critical aspects of Federal Reserve (Fed) communications: forward guidance regarding the path of interest rates and the provision of macroeconomic information. To estimate these effects, I identify two new series of shocks: monetary policy shocks and “information shocks.” I recover the shocks by estimating a model of how Fed announcements determine interest-rate and GDP expectations in high frequency, using a measure of GDP forecast revisions I construct from the text of newspaper articles. To identify the model, I use a discrete change in the Fed’s communication policy: the introduction of interest-rate forward guidance. I find that the identified monetary shock has macroeconomic effects that are consistent with New Keynesian models, and fall at the upper end of previous estimates. Additionally, information shocks resemble aggregate demand shocks and have effects of similar (absolute) magnitude as monetary shocks, which highlights the importance of the Fed’s role in providing macroeconomic information.

## AWARDS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND GRANTS

### AWARDS

2019 Vickrey Prize: best third year paper (Columbia University)  
2018 Harriss Award: best second year paper (Columbia University)  
2014 Firestone Medal: Excellence in Undergraduate Research (Stanford University)

### FELLOWSHIPS

2021 Thomas J. Sargent Dissertation Fellow (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco)  
2020–2022 Pre-doctoral Fellowship in Behavioral Macroeconomics (Alfred P. Sloan Foundation; NBER)  
2017–2020 Program for Economic Research (Columbia University) Summer Fellow

2016–2022 Provost’s Diversity (2016–17), Dean’s (2016–2021), and Dissertation (2021–2022) Fellowships (Columbia University)

## RESEARCH GRANTS

2020 Program for Economic Research (Columbia University) Data Purchase Grant for “Hysteresis in the U.S. Tariff Code” (\$1,559)

2020 Program for Economic Research (Columbia University) Data Purchase Grant for “Estimating the Effects of Monetary Policy” (\$4,500)

2019 Lab for Economic Applications and Policy (Harvard University) for “Hysteresis in the U.S. Tariff Code” (\$4,700)

2018 Washington Center for Equitable Growth for “The Consequences of Extending Unemployment Benefits During Recessions” (\$41,087)

## RESEARCH WORKING PAPER

2021 *A New Measure of Central Bank Transparency and Implications for the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy*  
Conditionally accepted, *International Journal of Central Banking*

ABSTRACT. Transparency has been posited as a channel through which monetary policy is made more effective. This paper presents a new time-varying measure of the transparency of Federal Reserve deliberations, derived from the documents that the Fed uses to record and summarize each of its meetings. The measure—the similarity of the minutes and transcripts of each Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting—is largely, though not entirely, shaped by FOMC leadership. Monetary policy shocks have about a 40 percent larger effect on nominal and real interest rates when the prevailing level of transparency is high, suggesting an important role for transparency in determining the efficacy of monetary policy. These effects are primarily driven by transparency about monetary policy strategies conditional on the state of the economy. A simple model of FOMC announcements consistent with these results highlights that high transparency enhances monetary policy’s effectiveness by increasing the FOMC’s signaling ability, but diminishes the ability for policymakers to generate market surprises.

## WORK IN PROGRESS

◇ *The Consequences of Extending Unemployment Benefits During Recessions*  
with Andreas Mueller, Emi Nakamura, and Jón Steinsson

ABSTRACT. We estimate the effect of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit extensions on unemployment during recessions using newly constructed data on state-level legislation and extensions over the period 1976–2021. We exploit variation in UI “trigger rule” options, which give rise to large and persistent differences in UI benefit durations across states. We find that UI extensions initially raise the number of people collecting UI, but subsequently lead the total unemployment rate to decline. Our estimates are similar for the Great Recession and pre-Great Recession periods. These results suggest that Keynesian forces may ultimately overcome the effects of UI extensions on the incentives for workers to work and firms to post vacancies.

- ◇ *Rationally Confused: On the Aggregate Implications of Information Provision Policies*  
with Hassan Afrouzi

ABSTRACT. Managing inflation expectations is an essential aspect of monetary policy. But how does communicating about inflation affect the decisions of price-setting firms? Cross-country evidence from randomized control trials provides a seemingly contradictory picture of how providing firms with news about inflation affects their decisions, where both contractionary and expansionary responses are observed. In this paper, we develop a rational inattention model that reconciles this evidence. In our model, firms' optimal information sets do not allow them to fully distinguish between supply and demand shocks. Accordingly, the model predicts that an exogenous increase in inflation expectations should be contractionary for economies where supply shocks are more volatile, and vice versa. We find supporting evidence for this mechanism by comparing output-inflation correlations in the data. These findings highlight the significant role that the broad economic environment can play in determining the effects of information provision policies.

- ◇ *Hysteresis in the U.S. Tariff Code: Origins and Implications*  
with Lydia Cox

ABSTRACT. There is substantial variation in U.S. tariff rates within narrowly-defined goods. For example, tariff rates on handbags range from 5 to 16 percent, depending on their material. In this paper, we document the presence, historical origins, and consequences of this pattern. Using a newly-constructed dataset on legislated tariffs that covers all major trade agreements back to the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act, we show that this within-good variation in tariffs originated in trade agreements made in the 1930 and 40s, and has persisted over time. Early trade agreements were made primarily with other high-income nations, and concessions were made on the specific varieties of goods that those countries produced. Instead, later GATT and WTO tariff negotiations had the broader focus of bringing down the average level of tariffs. One important consequence of this hysteresis in trade policy is that, today, tariffs are systematically higher on cheaper varieties of goods relative to their more expensive counterparts. We show that failing to take this heterogeneity into account substantially alters the distributional consequences of trade policy.

- ◇ *U.S. Legislated Tariffs since 1930*  
with Lydia Cox

ABSTRACT. We present a newly-digitized dataset of legislated tariff rates in the United States that dates back to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. The dataset contains all tariff rates from 1930–1946, all rates after every round of GATT negotiations through 1988, and all rates since 1989.

## PUBLICATION

- 2015 *Using Occupation to Measure Intergenerational Mobility: Do Snapshots Matter?*  
with Bhashkar Mazumder

*The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* 657: 174-193

ABSTRACT. Scholarly investigations of intergenerational mobility typically focus on either the occupations of fathers and sons or their incomes. Using an identical sample of fathers and sons, we examine how estimates of intergenerational mobility in income and occupational prestige are affected by (1) measurement that uses long time averages and (2) varying the point in the life cycle when outcomes are measured. We find that intergenerational occupational mobility is overstated when using a single year of fathers' occupation compared to a 10-year average centered on mid-career. We also find that for both income and occupation, mobility estimates are largest when sons are in their mid-career, suggesting that this may be the ideal period in which to measure their status. Finally, we see differences in the pattern of estimates across the two types of measures: for income, estimates of intergenerational persistence are highest when fathers are in their mid-career; for occupation, estimates are much larger when fathers' occupations are accounted for late in their careers.

## POLICY NOTE

2015 *Hanging on Every Word: Semantic Analysis of the FOMC's Postmeeting Statement*  
with Ellen E. Meade  
*FEDS Notes*, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

## RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE

2019 – 2021 **Columbia Business School**  
Research Assistant (RA) for Professors Pierre Yared and Christian Moser

2016 – 2018 **Columbia University**  
RA for Professors Andreas Mueller, Emi Nakamura, and Jón Steinsson

2014 – 2016 **Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System**  
RA, Monetary Affairs Division, Monetary Studies Unit

2013 **Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago**  
Intern, Economic Research Department, Microeconomic Studies

## TEACHING ASSISTANCE

2019 Summer Global Economic Environment (Executive MBA) with Nicolas Vincent

2019 Spring Intermediate Macroeconomics (Undergraduate Level) with Martín Uribe

2018 Fall Macroeconomic Analysis I (Masters Level) with Ronald Miller

2017 Fall Principles of Economics (Undergraduate Level) with Sunil Gulati

## PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

### DISCUSSIONS

2019 “Deep Learning Bank Distress from News and Numerical Financial Data,” by Cerchiello, Nicola, Ronnqvist, and Sarlin, *Nontraditional Data, Machine Learning, and Natural Language Processing in Macroeconomics*, Federal Reserve Board

2020 “Narrative Fragmentation and the Business Cycle,” by Bertsch, Hull, and Zhang, *14<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Computational and Financial Econometrics*

### REFEREE

*American Sociological Review*; *Journal of Banking and Finance*; *Journal of Monetary Economics*; *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking*; *North American Journal of Economics and Finance*; *Springer Nature: Business and Economics*; *Quarterly Journal of Economics*

## CONFERENCES & SEMINARS

2021 UC Berkeley, European Economic Association Annual Congress

2020 14<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Computational and Financial Econometrics

2019 Midwest Macroeconomics Meetings

2016 Federal Reserve Board, International Conference on Computational Social Science

## PERSONAL

**FULL NAME AND CITIZENSHIP** José Miguel Acosta, U.S. Citizen

**LANGUAGES** English, some Spanish and French

## PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES

Familiar: Matlab, Stata, Python, Julia, R, T<sub>E</sub>X, Linux shell scripting, Dynare, R

Exposure: SQL, GAUSS, Git, Java, C++, VBA, HTML, SAS

## REFERENCES

**Michael Woodford** (Sponsor)

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**Jennifer La'O**

Associate Professor of Economics

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**Emi Nakamura**

Chancellor's Professor of Economics

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# Motaz Al-Chanati

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	+1 (401) 340-9664	New York, NY 10027

EDUCATION	<b>Ph.D. in Economics</b>	2016 – 2022 (expected)
	Columbia University, New York, NY	
	<b>Sc.B. in Applied Math-Economics, <i>magna cum laude</i></b>	2011 – 2015
	Brown University, Providence, RI	

RESEARCH	Applied Microeconomics, Industrial Organization (primary)
INTERESTS	Urban Economics, Health and Education (secondary)

WORKING PAPERS	<b><a href="#">Residential Segregation and the Demand for Schooling</a></b> <b><a href="#">Job Market Paper</a></b>
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How do schools affect where families choose to live and does its effect contribute to residential segregation? I study these questions using unique administrative microdata from Auckland, New Zealand, an ethnically diverse – but segregated – city. I develop and estimate a dynamic model of residential choice where forward-looking families choose neighborhoods based on their children’s schools, local amenities, and moving costs. Previous studies typically estimate school quality valuation using a boundary discontinuity design. I apply this methodology here to derive both a reduced form and structural estimate for the valuation of school quality. The structural model estimates show that the valuation of school quality varies by the child’s school level and the family’s ethnicity; the reduced form approach cannot capture this heterogeneity. Moreover, I find that the reduced form estimates are aligned only with white families’ valuations of quality. The model estimates also show that families experience a high disutility from moving houses if it results in their child changing school. In counterfactuals, I show that residential segregation increases as the link between housing and schools weakens.

## What Drives the Efficiency in Ridesharing Markets?

(with *Vinayak Iyer*)

Ridesharing platforms, who act as intermediaries in transport markets, improve upon traditional taxis along two key dimensions: surge pricing and centralized matching. We study how and why existing inefficiencies are solved by these two features and evaluate how alternate pricing and matching rules can improve outcomes. To this end, we develop a structural model of the ridesharing market with three components: (1) dynamically optimizing drivers who make entry, exit and search decisions; (2) stochastic demand; and (3) a matching technology. We evaluate the welfare effects of surge and matching separately. We also implement a simple change in the pricing rule by making it more flexible which is able to address both static and dynamic inefficiencies, thus generating large welfare gains for all agents. We conclude by drawing policy implications for improving the competitiveness of traditional taxis.

## Cutoff from Support: The Effects of Losing Cash Welfare

(with *Lucas Husted*)

We evaluate a policy reform in Michigan, which unexpectedly removed over 10,000 families from TANF. Affected families increase their employment by 4 percentage points (20% relative to the control mean), but become poorer as they are unable to offset the loss of welfare benefits.

WORK IN  
PROGRESS      Lunches for Loyalty: The Effect of Direct-to-Physician Advertising in New Drug Markets

The Efficiency Effects of Drug Acquisitions from Access to Sales Representatives (with *Kritika Goel*)

ACADEMIC	Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University	2021
AWARDS	NSF Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant [\$24,300]	2020
	Lewis A. Sanders Endowed Fellowship in Economics	2020
	Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University	2016–2020
	Program for Economic Research Research Grant [\$5,000]	2019
	Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award, Runner-Up	2019
	Phi Beta Kappa, Brown University	2015
	Omicron Delta Epsilon, Brown University	2015
	Undergraduate Teaching and Research Award	2015

TEACHING AWARDS	Wueller Teaching Award (Best Teaching Assistant)	
	Undergraduate Core Courses (runner-up)	2021
	Undergraduate Core Courses	2019
	Undergraduate Core Courses	2018
	Ph.D. Courses	2018
	Finalist, Presidential Teaching Award (10 of 500 nominations)	2021
	Best Ph.D. T.A., Association of Graduate Students in Economics	2019
CONFERENCES	National Tax Association Annual Conference*	2021
	Econometric Society Meeting, Delhi School of Economics*	2020
	(Nominated for Best Paper Prize)	
	Urban Economics Association Virtual Meeting*	2020
	NBER Health Economics Boot Camp	2018
	(* indicates presented by co-author)	
WORK EXPERIENCE	Research Assistant, Brown University	2015–2016
	R.A. for Professor Emily Oster and the Rhode Island Innovative Policy Lab (RIIPL)	
	Intern, New Zealand Superannuation Fund	2013
TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Columbia University	
	Labor Economics (instructor)	Summer 2019
	Intermediate Microeconomics	Fall 2020, Spring 2020
		Fall 2018, Spring 2018
	Advanced Microeconomics	Spring 2019
	Ph.D. Microeconomics	Fall 2017
	Brown University	
	Public Economics	Spring 2015
	Environmental Economics	Fall 2014
	Intermediate Microeconomics	Fall 2014
COMPUTER SKILLS	Python, R, SQL, Julia, Stata, L <sup>A</sup> T <sub>E</sub> X, QGIS, MATLAB, Excel	
	Github: <a href="https://github.com/motazAC">github.com/motazAC</a>	



PERSONAL      *Citizenship:* New Zealand  
INFORMATION   *U.S. work authorization:* Eligible for 3-year OPT  
                    *Languages:* English (native), Arabic (conversational)

REFERENCES    **Miguel Urquiola** ([msu2101@columbia.edu](mailto:msu2101@columbia.edu))  
                    Chair and Professor of Economics and International and Public Affairs,  
                    Columbia University  
  
                    **Bernard Salanié** ([bs2237@columbia.edu](mailto:bs2237@columbia.edu))  
                    Professor of Economics, Columbia University  
  
                    **Cailin Slattery** ([crs2200@columbia.edu](mailto:crs2200@columbia.edu))  
                    Assistant Professor, Columbia Business School

# Guy Aridor

November 2021

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## PLACEMENT CHAIRS:

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Suresh Naidu, 212-854-0027, [sn2430@columbia.edu](mailto:sn2430@columbia.edu)

## PLACEMENT ASSISTANT:

Amy Devine, 212-854-6881, [aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu)

## Education

Ph.D. Economics, Columbia University, 2016-2022 (expected)  
B.A. Computer Science, Pure/Applied Mathematics, Economics, Boston University, 2014  
*Honors in Economics, summa cum laude*  
*College Prize for Excellence in Economics*

## Fields of Specialization

Industrial Organization, Economics of Digitization, Behavioral/Experimental Economics

## Job Market Paper

Drivers of Digital Attention: Evidence from a Social Media Experiment, [Draft](#)

*Abstract:* I study demand for social media services by conducting an experiment where I comprehensively monitor how participants spend time on digital services. I shut off access to Instagram or YouTube on their mobile phones and investigate how participants substitute their time allocations during and after the restrictions. During the restriction period I observe substitution towards a wide range of alternatives including across product categories and off digital devices and relate these findings to market definition in attention markets. Participants with the Instagram restriction had their average daily Instagram usage decline after the restrictions are lifted. Participants with the YouTube restriction spent more time on applications installed during the restriction period both during and after the restriction period. Motivated by these results, I estimate a discrete choice model of time usage with inertia and find that inertia explains a large portion of the usage on these applications. I apply the estimates to conduct merger evaluation between prominent social media applications using an Upward Pricing Pressure Test for attention markets. I find that inertia plays an important role in justifying blocking mergers between the largest and smallest applications, indicating that digital addiction issues are important from an antitrust perspective. Overall, my results highlight the usefulness of product unavailability experiments in analysis of mergers between digital goods.

## Working Papers

1. The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR, [Draft](#)  
(w/ Yeon-Koo Che, Tobias Salz)  
*Revision Requested, RAND Journal of Economics*  
[Abstract](#) at ACM EC'21  
*Short Abstract:* We use novel data from the online travel industry to characterize the causal impact of GDPR on the data that firms can collect as well as their advertising revenues and ability to predict consumer behavior.
2. Competing Bandits: The Perils of Exploration under Competition, [Draft](#) (Submitted)  
(w/ Yishay Mansour, Alex Slivkins, Steven Wu)  
An [earlier version](#) *The Perils of Exploration under Competition: A Computational Modeling Approach* (w/ Kevin Liu, Alex Slivkins, Steven Wu) was at ACM EC '19  
*Short Abstract:* We study the tension between exploration and competition and ask whether competition incentivizes the adoption of better exploration algorithms.
3. Recommenders' Originals: The Welfare Effects of the Dual Role of Platforms as Producers and Recommender Systems, [Draft](#) (w/ Duarte Gonçalves)  
*Revision Requested, International Journal of Industrial Organization*  
*Short Abstract:* We characterize the equilibrium effects of the increased tendency for online platforms to both produce their own content and utilize recommender systems.
4. Adaptive Efficient Coding: A Variational Autoencoder Approach, [Draft](#)  
(w/ Francesco Grechi, Michael Woodford)  
*Short Abstract:* We study a model of neural coding that is based on the structure of a variational auto-encoder.

## Refereed Conference Proceedings

5. Deconstructing the Filter Bubble: User Decision-Making and Recommender Systems  
(w/ Duarte Gonçalves, Shan Sikdar)  
*14th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems 2020 (RecSys '20)*, [Proceedings Link](#)  
*Short Abstract:* We study a model of user decision making in the context of recommender systems. We show that user beliefs and risk-aversion levels are important for rationalizing existing empirical evidence and emphasize the usefulness of belief data in recommender system design and evaluation.

## Works In Progress

6. The Value of Recommender Systems: Decomposing the Informational and Discovery Gains  
(w/ Duarte Gonçalves, Ruoyan Kong, Daniel Kluver, Joseph Konstan)  
*Data collection completed*, [Pre-Registration Link](#)  
*Short Abstract:* We conduct a longitudinal field experiment on the movie recommendation platform MovieLens where we randomize the set of recommended movies and elicit beliefs about unseen movies. We use the data to decompose the influence that recommender systems have on consumption choices in terms of their informational and product discovery value.
7. Shopping Alone: The Impact of The Decline of the American Mall  
(w/ Louise Guillouet, Howard Zhang)

## Presentations

### The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR

Statistical Methods for Computational Advertising, October 2021, BIRS / Online

ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, July 2021, Budapest / Online

FTC PrivacyCon, July 2020, Online

Big Tech & Antitrust - Competition Policy in the Digital Age, October 2020, Yale Law / Online

International Industrial Organization Conference, March 2020, Drexel / *cancelled due to COVID-19*

### Competing Bandits: The Perils of Exploration under Competition

INFORMS Annual Meeting, October 2021, Anaheim / Online

MIT Conference on Digital Experimentation, November 2020, Online

ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, June 2019, Phoenix

ACM EC Workshop on ML and Strategic Behavior, June 2019, Phoenix (Poster / Lightning Talk)

### Drivers of Digital Attention: Evidence from a Social Media Experiment

MIT Conference on Digital Experimentation, November 2021, Online

International Conference on Computational Social Science, July 2021, ETH Zurich / Online

### Deconstructing the Filter Bubble: User Decision-Making and Recommender Systems

ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, September 2020, Online

ICML Workshop on Participatory Approaches to Machine Learning, July 2020, Online (Poster)

### Recommenders' Originals: Welfare Effects of the Dual Role of Platforms as Producers and RecSys

World Congress of Game Theory, July 2021, Budapest / Online

Young Economists Symposium, August 2019, Columbia University

## Research Grants and Fellowships

Program for Economic Research Award for Field or Experimental Research, Columbia University, 2021

Amount: \$19,625.00

Program for Economic Research Summer Fellowship, Columbia University, 2018,2020

College Prize for Excellence in Economics, Boston University, 2014

Hariri Institute for Computing Summer Research Award, Boston University, 2013

Tuition Exchange Scholarship, Boston University, 2010-2014

## Research Assistant

Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University, Economics), Fall 2019-Fall 2020

Tobias Salz (Columbia University, Economics), Summer, Fall 2018

Michael Woodford (Columbia University, Economics), Summer 2017

Henry Lam (Boston University, Mathematics), Summer 2013

Robert King (Boston University, Economics), Summer 2012

## Invited Summer School / Instructional Workshops

NBER Economics of Digitization Tutorial, 2021

NBER Young Scholars Workshop on the Economics of Artificial Intelligence, 2018

Summer School on Cognitive Foundations of Economic Behavior, 2018

## Teaching Experience

“Data TA” - help honors thesis students with programming and econometrics (Spring 2018, 2020)

Teaching Assistant for Introduction to Econometrics for Simon Lee (Spring 2019)

Teaching Assistant for Economic Growth and Development for Xavier Sala-i-Martin (Fall 2017)

## Work Experience

Software Engineer at HubSpot, 2015-2016

Software Engineer at Nutonian, 2014-2015

Co-founder at RequestNow, 2012-2014

Received initial funding from Rough Draft Ventures

## Miscellaneous

*Nationality:* Israel, United States

*Programming Languages:* Julia, Python, JavaScript, Java, C++, SQL, R, MATLAB, STATA

*Human Languages:* English (native), Hebrew (intermediate), Spanish (beginner)

*Open-Source Software:* PlanOut.js, react-experiments, Scientist4J (~ 1 million total downloads)

*Other Awards:* BattleHack Boston Winner / 3rd Place World Finals, 2014

## References

YEON-KOO CHE (Co-Sponsor)

Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory

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212-854-8276

TOBIAS SALZ (Co-Sponsor)

Castle Krob Career Development Assistant

Professor of Economics

Department of Economics

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MICHAEL WOODFORD

John Bates Clark Professor of Political Economy

Department of Economics

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ANDREY SIMONOV

Associate Professor

Marketing Division

Columbia Business School

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## Tatyana V. Avilova

### CONTACT INFO

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### PLACEMENT CHAIRS

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Suresh Naidu [sn2430@columbia.edu](mailto:sn2430@columbia.edu)

### PLACEMENT ASSISTANT

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### REFERENCES

**Douglas Almond** Department of Economics and School of International and Public Affairs  
Columbia University  
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**Sandra Black** Department of Economics and School of International and Public Affairs  
Columbia University  
[sblack@columbia.edu](mailto:sblack@columbia.edu)

**Adam Sacarny** Department of Health Policy and Management  
Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health  
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### EDUCATION

Columbia University	
Ph.D. in Economics	2022 (expected)
M.Phil in Economics	2019
M.A. in Economics	2018
Harvard University	
B.A. in Economics, <i>magna cum laude</i>	2013

### FIELDS

Applied Microeconomics, Health Care and Education

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### JOB MARKET PAPER

Regulation Attenuation: Cross-Border Spillovers and Policies in the Opioid Epidemic

**Abstract:** Prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs)—online systems that health care providers and pharmacists can use to query patient prescription records—are one of

the most widely-used state tools in regulating the prescribing and dispensing of opioids. However, the staggered adoption of PDMPs over time has created opportunities for patients to evade monitoring by going to a state that does not have a PDMP. This paper evaluates how spillovers attributable to policy non-coordination between neighboring states impact the effectiveness of PDMPs. I find that after prescribers gain access to PDMPs, opioid volume and prescription opioid deaths decrease in counties with a PDMP that are insulated from opportunities for evasion. I find a similar effect in counties with a PDMP that are exposed to evasion. This suggests that exposure to evasion through proximity to non-PDMP areas does not significantly attenuate the policy effect. I also find evidence that opioid volume and prescription opioid deaths decrease in counties without a PDMP that are exposed to spillovers from counties with the policy. Illicit opioid deaths are not affected in any counties with a PDMP but decrease in counties without a PDMP that are exposed to spillovers. I discuss the potential mechanisms through which spillovers may operate.

## PUBLICATIONS

### What Can UWE Do for Economics?

with [Claudia Goldin](#). *AEA Papers and Proceedings*. 2018;108: 186-190.

**Abstract:** Men outnumber women as undergraduate economics majors by three to one nationwide. Even at the best research universities and liberal arts colleges men outnumber women by two to one or more. The Undergraduate Women in Economics Challenge began in 2015 as an RCT with 20 treatment schools and at least 30 control schools to evaluate whether better course information, mentoring, encouragement, career counseling, and more relevant instructional content could move the needle. Although the RCT is still in the field, results from several within treatment-school randomized trials demonstrate that uncomplicated and inexpensive interventions can substantially increase women in economics.

## WORK IN PROGRESS

### Nudging Providers to Curtail Dangerous Opioid Prescribing: A Trial to Investigate Mechanisms

with [Mireille Jacobson](#), [Weston Merrick](#), [David Powell](#), [Adam Sacarny](#), and [Ian Williamson](#)

**Abstract:** Nearly all states have Prescription Monitoring Programs (PMPs) to facilitate safer prescribing of opioids and other drugs, but research suggests that these systems only deliver benefits when health care professionals are required to use them. Even with PMP mandates in place, providers may be unaware of the dangers of co-prescribing opioids with benzodiazepines or gabapentinoids, which include increased risk of overdose and death. We conduct a randomized clinical trial of 12,000 prescribers in Minnesota whose patients had filled an opioid prescription and either a benzodiazepine or gabapentinoid prescription in the four months prior to randomization. Prescribers received an initial and follow-up letter highlighting either 1) a new PMP use requirement, 2) a list of up to five patients with opioid co-prescriptions, 3) both the PMP use requirement and the patient co-prescription list or 4) control (no letters). Using administrative data, we track effects of the letters on prescriptions and PMP usage and queries. Results will inform future work by state and local policymakers to make opioid prescribing safer.

Impact of New Curriculum for Introductory Economics Courses on Student Opinions and Economic Knowledge with [Rena Rosenberg](#) and [Sarah Thomas](#)

**Abstract:** Curriculum Open-access Resources for Economics (CORE) is an alternative curriculum to teach introductory economics. The goal of the CORE USA Project is to expand student reach and to inspire a more diverse student body to pursue economics long-term by making course content more relevant and accessible. We conduct two confidential surveys with students enrolled in spring 2020 introductory economics courses at Columbia University and Barnard College. The two surveys, conducted at the start and end of the semester, ask students about their reasons for enrolling in the course, their interest in the field of economics and career aspirations, and their opinions about markets and traits important for success as an economist. The surveys also assess their knowledge of economic concepts and data literacy. We compare responses for student enrolled in courses that use CORE to those of students enrolled in courses that follow a more traditional curriculum. We complement our quantitative research with qualitative findings from focus groups conducted in spring 2020 and spring 2021.

Income Shocks and Consumer Response: Evidence from the 2018-19 US Government Shutdown

**Abstract:** The US federal government shutdown for 35 days from December 2018 to January 2019, the longest shutdown in the country's history. The shutdown caused a disruption in the administration of several federal benefit programs, including the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). The disruption resulted in a positive liquidity shock to SNAP beneficiaries, who received some benefits earlier than scheduled. While providing slack in how beneficiaries could spend other income, the disruption potentially exacerbated the "end-of-cycle gap" that occurs when benefits run out before the end of the month. Using Nielsen Consumer Panel data, I study how consumption of SNAP-eligible goods responds to the positive liquidity shock in areas with low share vs. high share of SNAP beneficiaries.

Patient Cost Sharing and Prescription Drug Trends: Evidence from Japan

**Abstract:** This paper studies the impact of patient cost sharing on the number of drug prescriptions and on the overall costs of prescription drugs by exploiting a feature of the Japanese health care system, where an individual's coinsurance rate is determined primarily by their age. I contribute to the previous research by investigating heterogeneous effects due to patient sex and drug therapeutic class (two "essential" classes, cardiovascular and antibiotics, and two "non-essential" classes, vitamins and antihistamines). Using publicly available aggregate data, I find that for the whole sample of drugs, price elasticity of demand ranges from  $-0.42$  to  $-0.86$ , and price elasticity for medical spending ranges from  $-0.31$  to  $-0.67$ , depending on the model specification. These estimates stand in contrast to previous estimates of price elasticity of demand ( $-0.16$  to  $-0.2$ ) and spending ( $-0.2$ ), suggesting that patients have higher elasticity for prescription drugs than for other medical services. I also find that there are no heterogeneous effects by sex over the whole sample of drugs, but there are notable differences by sex for certain therapeutic classes of drugs. Finally, the data suggests that Japanese patients are more likely to be prescribed brand-name medications, but patients on generics may be more price sensitive to changes in patient cost sharing. Research on the topic has implications for designing more targeted government policy that could reduce health care costs, but more work is needed to assess patient health outcomes.



## Hospital Implementation of Work-Life Balance Programs and Nurse Stress, Work-Family Conflict, and Work Satisfaction in Ibaraki Prefecture

**Abstract:** The high nurse turnover rate is an acute issue for Japan's health care system. In the recent decades, the government has promoted the Child Care and Family Care Leave Law and the work-life balance (WLB) programs outlined in it as tools to alleviate workplace stress and retain workers. I conduct a cross-sectional study of hospitals and nurses in Ibaraki Prefecture to learn about the implementation of the WLB programs and factors associated with nurse stress and work satisfaction. I design and run two surveys: a survey of all hospitals in the prefecture and a follow-up survey of nurses at six of these hospitals. I do not find a strong association between the nurse turnover rate and WLB program implementation, WLB program use, or the prioritization of nurse WLB in the workplace. I do find that hospitals that place a higher priority on nurses' WLB are more likely to implement certain types of WLB programs and to report nurses using them. The nurse survey identifies correlated sources of stress for nurses. I also find that greater social support from supervisors and coworkers is strongly correlated with fewer workplace conflicts as well as lower scores on various stress measures.

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### **FELLOWSHIPS, GRANTS & HONORS**

2021-22	<i>Dissertation Fellowship</i> (Columbia University)
2020-21	<i>Wueller Teaching Award</i> , runner-up for best teaching assistant for undergraduate electives (Department of Economics, Columbia University)
2019-20	<i>Wueller Teaching Award</i> , best teaching assistant for undergraduate electives (Department of Economics, Columbia University)
2018-19	<i>Alison Hanson Jones Fellowship for Economics and History</i> (Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University)
2018-19	<i>Wueller Teaching Award</i> , runner-up for best teaching assistant for principles of economics (Department of Economics, Columbia University)
2018	<i>Harriss Prize</i> , runner-up for best 2 <sup>nd</sup> year PhD paper (Department of Economics, Columbia University, for "Patient Cost Sharing and Prescription Drug Trends: Evidence from Japan")
2017-18	<i>Wueller Teaching Award</i> , best teaching assistant for principles of economics (Department of Economics, Columbia University)
2013-14	<i>Fulbright Research Fellowship</i> , University of Tsukuba
2013	<i>Phi Beta Kappa</i>
2013	<i>ACTR National Post-Secondary Russian Essay Contest</i> , Second Place (Heritage Learners, Level 3)
2012-13	<i>Tazuko Ajiro Monane Prize</i> (Harvard University, for outstanding achievement in the study of the Japanese language)
2009-10	<i>Harvard College Scholar</i>

## CONFERENCE & SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

- 2021      *LACDev (Liberal Arts College Development) Conference, Oberlin College (discussant)*
- 2020      *Allied Social Sciences Association Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA (“Promoting Female Participation in Undergraduate Economics” paper session)*
- 2019      *CORE USA 2019 Workshop, Barnard College*
- 2018      *Undergraduate Women in Economics Conference, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign*
- 2018      *Allied Social Sciences Association Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, PA (“Gender Issues in Economics” paper session)*

## CONFERENCE & SEMINAR ORGANIZING

- 2017-2020    *Student Research Breakfast, Department of Economics, Columbia University*
- 2020      *Diverse Economics Conference: People, Perspectives, Careers, with the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and Robins School of Business, University of Richmond*
- 2019      *Diverse Economics Conference: People, Perspectives, Careers, with the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and Robins School of Business, University of Richmond*
- 2019      *Young Economists Symposium, Department of Economics, Columbia University*
- 2018      *Undergraduate Women in Economics Conference, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign*
- 2017      *Undergraduate Women in Economics Conference, Colorado State University*
- 2016      *Undergraduate Women in Economics Conference, University of Virginia*

## APPOINTMENTS

- Jan – May 2021      Research Assistant for Adam Sacarny, Columbia University
- Jan – May 2020      Research Assistant for CORE USA Project, Barnard College
- Aug 2014 – 2020      Project Manager, Undergraduate Women in Economics Challenge, for Claudia Goldin, National Bureau of Economic Research
- Jun – Jul 2012      Research Assistant for Kazuo Yamaguchi, Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI), Japan
- Jun – Aug 2011      Research Assistant for Claudia Goldin, Harvard University
- Jun – Aug 2011      Research Assistant for Nathan Nunn, Harvard University

## REFEREEING

- Journals:**            *Southern Economic Journal*
- Conferences:**      *Young Economists Symposium (2018, 2019, 2020)*

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE & TRAINING****Columbia University***Principles of Economics*

Instructor, Summer 2020

Teaching assistant, S2019 (with Prof. Brendan O'Flaherty)

Teaching assistant, S2018 (with Prof. Sunil Gulati)

*Economic Development of Japan*

Teaching assistant, F2020 (with Prof. David Weinstein)

Teaching assistant, F2019 (with Dr. Edward Lincoln)

Teaching assistant, F2018 (with Prof. David Weinstein)

Teaching assistant, F2017 (with Prof. David Weinstein)

**Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health***Analysis of Large Scale Data*

Teaching assistant, F2019 (with Prof. Adam Sacarny)

Teaching assistant, F2018 (with Prof. Adam Sacarny)

**Training**

Spring 2021

*Pedagogies of Race and Oppression Learning Community*, Columbia GSAS Office of Academic Diversity and Inclusion and Columbia's Center for Teaching and Learning

Spring 2021

*Inclusive Teaching Seminar*, Columbia's Center for Teaching and Learning

Summer 2018

*Innovative Teaching Summer Institute (ITSI)*, Columbia's Center for Teaching and Learning**SERVICE & MENTORING**

Spring 2021

Undergraduate Mentoring Program, Department of Economics, Columbia University

2018-2019

Association of Graduate Economics Students (AGES) President, Department of Economics, Columbia University

2017-2020

AGES 2<sup>nd</sup> year cohort co-representative

2017-2019

AGES Graduate Mentoring Program, Dept. of Economics, Columbia University

2016-2017

AGES 1<sup>st</sup> year cohort co-representative

Spring 2016

Non-Resident Tutor in Economics, Harvard University

**PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS***National Economic Association, Undergraduate Women in Economics***PERSONAL****Citizenship**

USA, Russian Federation

**Languages**

Russian (native), English (native), Japanese (JLPT N2), French (conversational), Spanish (conversational)

# IAIN BAMFORD

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Columbia University  
Department of Economics  
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*Last updated: 11/11/2021*

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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, [aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu)

## Fields of Specialization

Primary Field: Urban/Regional Economics

Secondary Fields: Applied Microeconomics, Labor Economics, International Trade

## Education

Ph.D. in Economics, Columbia University	2015-2022 ( <i>expected</i> )
M.Phil. in Economics, Columbia University	2018
M.A. in Economics, Columbia University	2017
M.Sc. in Economics, London School of Economics (with Distinction)	2014
B.Sc. in Economics, University of St Andrews	2013

## Job Market Paper

### Monopsony Power, Spatial Equilibrium, and Minimum Wages

**Abstract:** What role does labor market competitiveness play in determining the spatial distribution of economic activity? To answer this question, we develop a model of monopsony power in spatial equilibrium. Workers and firms are free to locate in any labor market, and the degree of market power a firm enjoys depends on the number of competing firms in its location. We show the model can rationalize concentrations of economic activity and the city-size wage premium through an endogenous labor market competitiveness channel. Using administrative data from Germany, we estimate that labor markets are more competitive in larger cities. Calibrating the model to match this reduced-form evidence, we find endogenous labor market competitiveness can explain 37% of the city-size wage premium and 14% of all agglomeration. We use our new framework to study the spatial and welfare implications of the 2015 German national minimum wage law. A traditional spatial model that ignores variation in monopsony power across space predicts large unemployment effects in smaller, lower-wage labor markets, contradicting the reduced-form

evidence on the law. Accounting for spatially-varying monopsony power, we find the enacted national law outperforms an alternative policy with a lower level of the minimum wage in East Germany, while a law that takes into account variation in productivity and competitiveness significantly outperforms both.

## **Work in Progress**

Pedestrianization and Business Visits: Evidence from NYC Open Streets (with Pablo Warnes)

Persistence in Segregation: Evidence from City Segregation Ordinances

The Right to Buy: Migration and Gentrification

## **Research Experience**

Research Assistant for Donald Davis (Columbia University)	<i>Fall 2021, Summer 2018, Summer 2017</i>
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Research Assistant for Bentley Macleod (Columbia University)	<i>Spring 2018</i>
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Research Assistant for Francois Gerard (Columbia University)	<i>Fall 2016</i>
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Research Assistant for Daniel Sturm (London School of Economics)	<i>Fall 2014, Spring 2015</i>
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Research Assistant for Johannes Spinnewijn (London School of Economics)	<i>Spring 2015</i>
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Research Assistant for Reka Juhasz (London School of Economics)	<i>Spring 2015</i>
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## **Teaching Fellowships**

Economics of New York City Instructor: Donald Davis	<i>Spring 2021, Spring 2020, Spring 2019</i>
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Financial Economics Instructor: Tamrat Gashaw	<i>Fall 2018</i>
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Intermediate Microeconomics  
Instructor: Qingmin Liu

*Fall 2017*

International Trade  
Instructor: Reka Juhasz

*Spring 2017*

## **Honors and Awards**

Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University	2019-2020
Program for Economic Research: Field or Experimental Research Grant Award (\$3,800)	2020
Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award: Best Fourth Year Application (runner-up)	2018
Dr. Edwin P. and Dr. Beatrice G. Reubens Travel and Research Fund, Columbia University	2018
Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University	2015-2020

## **References**

[Donald R. Davis](#)  
Ragnar Nurkse Professor of  
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Columbia University  
[drd28@columbia.edu](mailto:drd28@columbia.edu)  
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[David E. Weinstein](#)  
Carl S. Shoup Professor of  
Japanese Economy  
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[Suresh Naidu](#)  
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## **Personal**

Citizenship: UK

# Paul Bouscasse

November 2021

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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, +1 (212) 854-6881, [aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu)

## EDUCATION

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**Columbia University**, New York, NY  
PhD in Economics, Expected 2022

**Ecole Polytechnique & Paris School of Economics**, Palaiseau and Paris, France  
Master in Analysis and Policy in Economics, Highest Honors (*Mention Très Bien*), 2015

**HEC Paris**, Jouy-en-Josas, France  
Master in Management (*Programme Grande Ecole*), 2014

## FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

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Macroeconomics, Monetary Economics, International Finance, Economic History

## JOB MARKET PAPER

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### Canst Thou Beggar Thy Neighbour? Evidence From the 1930s

Does an exchange rate depreciation depress trading partners' output? I address this question through the lens of a classic episode: the currency devaluations of the 1930s. From 1931 to 1936, many of the biggest economies in the world successively left the gold standard or devalued, leading to a depreciation of their currency by more than 30% against gold. In theory, the effect is ambiguous for countries that did not devalue: expenditure switching can lower their output, but the monetary stimulus to demand might raise it. I use cross-sectional evidence to discipline the strength of these two mechanisms in a multi-country model. This evidence comes in two forms: (i) causal inference of the effect of devaluation on country-level variables, (ii) new product-level data to estimate parameters that are essential to discipline the response of trade — the international elasticity of substitution among foreign varieties, and the pass-through of the exchange rate to international prices. Contrary to the popular narrative in modern policy debates, I find that devaluation did not dramatically lower the output of trading partners in this context. The expenditure switching effect was mostly offset by the monetary stimulus to foreign demand.

## WORKING PAPERS

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### **When Did Growth Begin? New Estimates of Productivity Growth in England from 1250 to 1870,** with Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson

We provide new estimates of the evolution of productivity in England from 1250 to 1870. Real wages over this period were heavily influenced by plague-induced swings in the population. We develop and implement a new methodology for estimating productivity that accounts for these Malthusian dynamics. In the early part of our sample, we find that productivity growth was zero. Productivity growth began in 1600—almost a century before the Glorious Revolution. Post-1600 productivity growth had two phases: an initial phase of modest growth of 4% per decade between 1600 and 1810, followed by a rapid acceleration at the time of the Industrial Revolution to 18% per decade. Our evidence helps distinguish between theories of why growth began. In particular, our findings support the idea that broad-based economic change preceded the bourgeois institutional reforms of 17th century England and may have contributed to causing them. We also estimate the strength of Malthusian population forces on real wages. We find that these forces were sufficiently weak to be easily overwhelmed by post-1800 productivity growth.

### **Supply or Demand: What Drives Fluctuations in the Bank Loan Market?** with Carlo Altavilla and Miguel Boucinha

We propose a new methodology to identify aggregate demand and supply shocks in the bank loan market. We present a model of sticky bank-firm relationships, estimate its structural parameters in euro area credit register data, and infer aggregate shocks based on those estimates. To achieve credible identification, we leverage banks' exposure to various sectors' heterogeneous liquidity needs during the COVID-19 Pandemic. We find that developments in lending volumes following the pandemic were largely explained by demand shocks. Fluctuations in lending rates were instead mostly determined by bank-driven supply shocks and borrower risk. A by-product of our analysis is a structural interpretation of two-way fixed effects regressions in loan-level data: according to our framework, firm- and bank-time fixed effects only separate demand from supply under certain parametric assumptions. In the data, the conditions are satisfied for supply but not for demand: bank-time fixed effects identify true supply shocks up to a time constant, while firm-time fixed effects are contaminated by supply forces. Our methodology overcomes this limitation: we identify supply and demand shocks at the aggregate and individual levels.

### **Fiscal Adjustment to Monetary Shocks**

How does the fiscal side of the US government react to monetary policy? I estimate the response of several fiscal variables to monetary shocks. Following an interest rate hike, tax receipts fall, outlays excluding interest payments are constant, and interest payments and debt increase. The fall in output that follows a monetary tightening — not legislated changes in marginal tax rates — drives the response of receipts. The fiscal authority therefore responds passively to monetary shocks, keeping spending constant and letting debt adjust to satisfy its budget constraint. In heterogeneous agent models, this scenario dampens output's response to monetary policy.

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

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**European Central Bank**, Frankfurt am Main, Germany  
Directorate General Monetary Policy, PhD Trainee, 2020-21



**Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis**, St. Louis, MO

Research Division, Dissertation Intern, Summer 2020 (canceled because of the pandemic)

**Federal Reserve Board**, Washington, DC

International Finance Division, Dissertation Fellow, Summer 2019

**Columbia University**, New York, NY

Research assistant to Jón Steinsson, Summer 2017

Research assistant to Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2016–17

**Barnard College**, New York, NY

Research assistant to David F. Weiman, Summer 2016

**Sciences Po**, Paris, France

Research assistant to Alfred Galichon, Summer 2014

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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**Columbia University**, New York, NY

Grader for Tri Vi Dang, Money and Banking (undergraduate), Spring 2020

Teaching assistant for Jennifer La’O & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Macroeconomic Analysis I (PhD), Fall 2019

Head teaching assistant for Martín Uribe, Intermediate Macroeconomics (undergraduate), Spring 2019

Head teaching assistant for S. Schmitt-Grohé, Intermediate Macroeconomics (undergraduate), Spring 2018

Teaching assistant for Jennifer La’O & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Macroeconomic Analysis I (PhD), Fall 2017

## NON-ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

---

**European Central Bank**, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

Directorate General Market Operations, Trainee, Spring 2013

**Leonardo & Co.**, Paris, France

Mergers and Acquisitions, Intern, Fall 2012

## AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

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Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University, 2021–22

Wueller Teaching Award, Best TA for first-year PhD classes (runner up), Columbia University, 2020

Program for Economic Research (PER) grant, Columbia University, 2020

Marion B. Stewart and Marcia E. Glanz Fund, Columbia University, Spring 2020

AGES Teaching Award, Best TA for first-year PhD classes (2nd runner up), Columbia University, 2019

C. Lowell Harriss Prize, Best second-year paper, Columbia University, 2017

Dean’s Fellowship, Columbia University, 2015–16

Prize for the Research Internship, Ecole Polytechnique, 2014

Oratorical Contest, First prize, HEC Paris, 2011

## PRESENTATIONS

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2021: European Central Bank  
2020: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis  
2019: Federal Reserve Board  
2018: Young Economist Symposium (YES)

## PERSONAL

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Citizenship: French  
US status: J-1 Visa (eligible to work for 3 years without sponsorship)  
Languages: French (native), English (fluent)  
Programming: MATLAB, R, Stata, SQL, Stan, Python

## REFERENCES

---

### **Jennifer La'O** (co-advisor)

Associate Professor of Economics  
Columbia University  
Department of Economics  
+1 (212) 854-0474  
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### **Michael Woodford**

John Bates Clark Professor of Political Economy  
Columbia University  
Department of Economics  
+1 (212) 854-1094  
[michael.woodford@columbia.edu](mailto:michael.woodford@columbia.edu)

### **Jón Steinsson** (co-advisor)

Chancellor's Professor of Economics  
University of California, Berkeley  
Department of Economics  
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[jsteinsson@berkeley.edu](mailto:jsteinsson@berkeley.edu)

### **Jesse Schreger**

Class of 1967 Associate Professor of Business  
Columbia Business School  
Economics Division  
+1 (212) 851-0171  
[jesse.schreger@columbia.edu](mailto:jesse.schreger@columbia.edu)

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## DANIEL MARK DEIBLER

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website: <https://sites.google.com/view/ddeibler/home>  
email: [dmd2195@columbia.edu](mailto:dmd2195@columbia.edu)  
phone: (646)710-0533  
address: 420 W 118th Street, #1022, New York, NY 10027

### Placement Chairs

Don Davis  
[drd28@columbia.edu](mailto:drd28@columbia.edu)

Suresh Naidu  
[sn2430@columbia.edu](mailto:sn2430@columbia.edu)

### Placement Assistant

Amy Devine  
[aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu)

### Research Interests

Labor Economics, Public Economics, Economics of Education, Law and Economics

### References

Professor W. Bentley Macleod  
Columbia University  
[bentley.macleod@columbia.edu](mailto:bentley.macleod@columbia.edu)

Professor Suresh Naidu  
Columbia University  
[sn2430@columbia.edu](mailto:sn2430@columbia.edu)

Professor and Chair Miguel Urquiola  
Columbia University  
[msu2101@columbia.edu](mailto:msu2101@columbia.edu)

### Education

---

#### 2015-PRES. **Columbia University**

*Doctor of Philosophy in Economics, Expected: May 2022*  
*Dissertation Title: What Makes a Good Job? Essays in Labor Economics*  
*Masters of Philosophy, 2018*  
*Masters of Arts, 2017*

#### 2010-2014 **Washington University in St. Louis**

*Bachelor's of Arts: Summa Cum Laude, 2014*

### Job Market Paper

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#### “The Effect of Outsourcing on Remaining Workers, Rent Distribution, and Inequality”

Firms can decide whether to produce some goods and services in-house or purchase them from the market. Increasingly, they are purchasing from the market—using subcontractors, temp agencies, and other outsourced labor. Low-wage workers’ wages decline when they are outsourced, but little is known about how outsourcing affects remaining workers. If firms are rent sharing, outsourcing might increase remaining workers’ earnings because there are more rents or fewer workers to share them with. This paper measures the impact of occupational layoff (OL) outsourcing, where firms outsource some occupations, on the earnings and separations of workers who remain employed by those firms. Using employer-employee data based on German social security records in a dynamic difference-in-differences design, outsourcing increases remaining workers’ long-run earnings by 6% in a sample of 260 OL outsourcing events. Remainders are also more likely to stay at the outsourcing firm—outsourcing decreases the probability of remainders switching firms by 7.5 percentage points. Higher earnings and fewer separations are consistent with remainders receiving additional rents. Earnings gains are larger for workers in the bottom-half of the within-firm earnings distribution. Outsourcing only increases remainders’ earnings in firms with collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). In firms with CBAs, outsourcing increases remainders’ long-term earnings by 6%. In firms without CBAs, outsourcing lowers short-term earnings by 3%. The results are consistent with a model of wage setting where outsourcing firms with CBAs need to compensate remainders. When there is no CBA, firms do not compensate remainders and can lower their wages.

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Analyzing the impact of outsourcing on within-firm and overall wage inequality, a typical outsourcing event in the sample lowers the within-firm Gini index by 2.5% as low-wage workers leave the firm and low-wage remainers are compensated. Using Recentered Influence Functions, increasing the share of workers part of an outsourcing event by 10 percentage points (from a baseline of 11.7%) increases the top of the earnings distribution by approximately 1-1.5%, and the overall Gini index by 1%. Remainders are relatively high-wage, and outsourcing increases their earnings. By not accounting for this effect, prior studies likely underestimate the total impact of outsourcing on earnings inequality in Germany.

## Working Papers

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*“What’s in a Name? How Definitions of “Employee” Shape Worker-Firm Relationships” [joint with Elliott Ash. Supported by NSF Award Number 1949415]*

This paper provides causal evidence on how changing the legal boundaries of employment—whether a worker is defined as a firm’s “employee” versus an outside contractor—affects labor market outcomes. We introduce a dataset of all U.S. Circuit Court cases making substantive employment determinations for the years 1990-2018 and link them to state- and occupation-level data on employment and earnings. Our difference-in-differences analysis reveals how employee definitions impact firm structure: when courts give workers additional legal rights by declaring them “employees”, low-wage workers are more likely to be outsourced. For occupations where effort is more easily monitored (e.g. janitors, guards), “is-employee” determinations increase outsourcing and reduce earnings. For occupations where effort cannot be monitored easily (e.g. doctors, scientists, engineers), employment declines and workers are more likely to be independent contractors.

*“Why Choose Alternative Work Arrangements? The Effect of Labor Demand Shocks on AWAs in the U.S. Labor Market” [supported by the DOL Scholars Program]*

Alternative work arrangements (AWAs) are employment contracts where workers have fewer legal protections relative to traditional employment. I analyze the effect of economic downturns on AWA prevalence using two negative labor demand shocks. In a framework with uncertainty and fixed labor costs, I find that negative labor demand shocks reduce the probability that workers are in AWAs. The largest declines in AWAs occur in industries most affected by the shocks. This result suggests that AWAs are more marginal employment contracts, and are mostly let go during downturns.

*“Keep Going to School: The Effect of Social Promotion on Wage Response to Childhood Labor”*

Research has shown that when wages increase, families are less likely to send their children to school. I explore whether the uncertainty about children’s success in school can explain part of this behavior. India’s “No Detention Policy”, enacted in 2010, required Social Promotion – automatic promotion regardless of test results – up to grade 8. I exploit pre-2010 variation in states with Social Promotion, and random wage shocks, to explore whether families are less likely to respond to wage shocks after Social Promotion is implemented. I find that without Social Promotion, higher wages increased dropout probability by 5%. With Social Promotion, higher wages decreased dropout probability by 1.1%, a sign switch and 80% decline in absolute effect. I find no effect on attendance, suggesting no intensive-margin response. These results illustrate that responses to wage shocks can depend on existing education policy, and that families internalize the likelihood of schooling success.

## Grants and Awards

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2020	National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement Grant
2019	Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award, Columbia University
2018	Runner up – Columbia University Vickrey Award for Best 3rd Year Paper
2017	Department of Labor Scholars Program Grant
2015	Columbia University Graduate Fellowship
2015	Columbia University Graduate Summer Fellowship
2014	Adam Smith Prize for Excellence in Economics, Washington University

## Presentations (including upcoming)

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2021	Columbia University Applied Micro Workshop
2021	Society of Labor Economics (SOLE)
2020	ETH Zurich
	Columbia University Applied Micro Workshop
	Society of Institutional and Organizational Economics
2019	Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium
	W.E. Upjohn Institute Visiting Presentation
	3rd IZA Conference on Contract Work
	Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium
2018	Midwestern Economics Association
	Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium
	Briq Workshop on Firms, Jobs, and Inequality
	Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium
2017	Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium
	Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium
2016	Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium

### **Research and Professional Experience**

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2019	W.E. Upjohn Institute, Visiting Researcher
2018-2019	Columbia University, Research Assistant for Professor Francois Gerard
2016-2019	Columbia University, Research Assistant for Professor W. Bentley MacLeod
2014-2015	NERA Economic Consulting, Research Associate

### **Teaching Experience**

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Fall 2021	Intermediate Microeconomics Professor: Prajit Dutta Position: Teaching Assistant
Fall 2020	Introduction to Microeconomics Professor: Prajit Dutta Position: Teaching Assistant
Spring 2019	Seminar in Political Economy Professor: W. Bentley MacLeod Position: Teaching Assistant
Spring 2017	Intermediate Microeconomics Professor: Jonathan Vogel Position: Teaching Assistant
Fall 2016	Intermediate Microeconomics Professor: Pietro Ortoleva Position: Teaching Assistant

### **Other Skills**

---

Skills: STATA, R, MATLAB

## Dong Woo Hahm

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New York, NY 10027

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Webpage: <https://www.dongwoohahm.com/>  
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**Placement Chairs:** Donald Davis, [drd28@columbia.edu](mailto:drd28@columbia.edu), Suresh Naidu, [sn2430@columbia.edu](mailto:sn2430@columbia.edu)

**Placement Administrator:** Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881, [aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu)

### EDUCATION

#### Columbia University in the City of New York

New York, USA

Ph.D. Candidate, Economics

2016 – 2022 (expected)

M.Phil., Economics

2019

M.A., Economics

2018

#### Seoul National University

Seoul, South Korea

B.A., Economics *Summa Cum Laude*

2009 – 2015

### FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Applied Microeconomics, Economics of Education, Market Design

### JOB MARKET PAPER

#### “A Dynamic Framework of School Choice: Effects of Middle Schools on High School Choice”

(with [Minseon Park](#))

**Abstract:** This paper explores the dynamic relationship of school choices made at different educational stages and its implication on racial segregation across schools. We use New York City public school choice data to ask: “How does the middle school a student attends affect her high school application and assignment?” We take two approaches to answer the question. First, we exploit quasi-random assignments to middle schools generated by the tie-breaking feature of the admissions system. We find causal evidence that students who attend high-achievement middle schools apply and are assigned to high-achievement high schools. Second, we develop and estimate a dynamic two-period model of school choice to decompose this effect and analyze the equilibrium consequences of counterfactual policies. In our setup, students applying to middle schools are aware that their choices may affect which high schools they eventually attend. Specifically, the middle schools that students attend can change how they rank high schools (the *application* channel) and how high schools rank their applications (the *priority* channel). We find that the *application* channel is quantitatively more important. Using the estimated model, we ask if an early affirmative action policy can address segregation in later stages. We find that a middle school-only affirmative action policy can alter students’ high school applications and thus assignments, contributing to desegregating high schools. This finding suggests that policy interventions for desegregation should start early.

### WORKING PAPERS

#### “Leveraging Uncertainties to Infer Preferences: Robust Analysis of School Choice”

(with [Yeon-Koo Che](#) and [YingHua He](#))

*draft available on request*

**Abstract:** Recent evidence suggests that market participants make mistakes even in a strategically straightforward environment but seldom with significant payoff consequences. We explore the implications of such payoff-insignificant

mistakes for inferring students’ preferences from school-choice data. Uncertainties arise from the use of lotteries or other sources in a typical school choice setting; they make certain mistakes more costly than others, thus making some preferences—those whose misrepresentation would be more costly and would thus be avoided by students—more reliably inferable than others. We propose a novel method of exploiting the structure of the uncertainties present in a matching environment to robustly infer student preferences under the Deferred-Acceptance mechanism. We then apply our methods to estimate student preferences through a Monte Carlo analysis capturing canonical school choice environment with single tie-breaking lotteries, and also to New York City’s high school assignment data. We then evaluate the effects of an affirmative action policy on disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students.

**“Sorting, Commuting, and School Choice”** (with [Minseon Park](#)) *draft available on request*

Abstract: This paper studies how families use two margins to get a seat in their preferred school under school choice - 1) sorting into neighborhoods (choosing where to live) and 2) commuting to school (choosing which school to apply to). Using New York City student-level data, we present the evidence of both margins. We find a sharp discontinuity at school district boundaries: middle school applicants residing on the side of the boundary with better schools are 5pp less likely to be eligible for Free or Reduced Lunch compared to their peers on the other side. At the same time, students take advantage of choice options actively with significant heterogeneity. 24% of Black students commute across school district boundaries while 12% of White students do. We build and estimate a structural model where a household chooses where to live and then which school to apply to. Location and schools are tied through commuting cost and geography-based priority. We extend the Expectation-Maximization algorithm with Sequential Maximization step (Arcidiacono and Jones, 2003) to estimate the model. We incorporate Boundary Discontinuity Design to deal with the endogeneity of school characteristics. We find that families sort into neighborhoods based on both observable/unobserved taste over school characteristics. There is large individual heterogeneity in terms of which neighborhood gives the higher expected utility. The decomposition exercise shows that heterogeneity in location demand explains 80 percent of the gap in the mean test score of schools Black and White students are assigned to. Both extending the bus service across school districts and adopting free borough-wide choice undo the gap by 10 percent.

**“What Makes NYC Specialized High Schools So Special?”** *draft available on request*

Abstract: New York City (NYC) specialized high schools are highly selective and popular among students and parents. Nevertheless, the reason why those schools are so popular compared to non-specialized high schools has not been studied yet. This paper aims to answer the question in the context of academic performance, by studying the relationship among three factors: preferences of specialized high schools applicants, peer qualities and causal effectiveness of schools. First, a unique feature of NYC public high school admission system enables one to link preferences on specialized high schools and non-specialized high schools and hence to jointly estimate those using students’ rank-ordered lists. Next, I estimate the value-added of schools that corrects endogenous selection following Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2017), and finally link them to the estimated preference in the first step. I preliminarily find the additional valuation that students and parents put on specialized high schools relative to non-specialized high schools is mostly related with higher peer quality at specialized high schools.

**WORK IN PROGRSS**

**“Prestige Concerns in College Major Choice”** *draft coming soon*  
(with [Yeon-Koo Che](#), [Jinwoo Kim](#), [Se-jik Kim](#), [Olivier Tercieux](#))

**GRANTS AND AWARDS**

Runner-up, Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award, Columbia University	2020
Winner and Runner-up, Wueller Teaching Awards: Best TA, Columbia University	2019
Runner-up, Vickrey Prize: Best 3rd year Paper in Economics, Columbia University	2019
PER Summer Research Fellow, Columbia University	2018, 2019, 2020, 2021
Young-Iob Chung Fellowship, Columbia University	2018 – 2019
Dean’s Fellow, Columbia University	2016 – 2021

**PRESENTATIONS**

12th World Congress of the Econometric Society, August 2020

## TEACHING AND WORK EXPERIENCE

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### *Teaching Assistant:*

Introduction to Econometrics (Seyhan Erden, Simon Lee)	2017 Fall, 2018 Spring
— <a href="#">2017 Evaluation</a> , <a href="#">2018 Evaluation</a>	
Intermediate Microeconomics (Susan Elmes)	2018 Fall, 2019 Fall
— Runner-up of Wueller Teaching Awards (2019), <a href="#">2018 Evaluation</a> , <a href="#">2019 Evaluation</a>	
Introduction to Econometrics II (Ph.D. level, Jushan Bai and Simon Lee)	2019 Spring
— Winner of Wueller Teaching Awards (2019), <a href="#">2019 Evaluation</a>	

### *Research Assistant:*

Research Assistant for Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University	2018 – present
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## OTHER INFORMATION

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Citizenship: South Korea

Language: English (fluent), Korean (native)

Programming: STATA, MATLAB, R, Excel and  $\LaTeX$

Other: Sergeant, Republic of Korea Army 2010 – 2012

## REFERENCES

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### **Yeon-Koo Che (co-sponsor)**

Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory  
Department of Economics  
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[yc2271@columbia.edu](mailto:yc2271@columbia.edu)  
+1 (212) 854-8276

### **Miguel Urquiola (co-sponsor)**

Professor and Chair  
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+1 (212) 854-3769

### **Pierre-André Chiappori**

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## LUCAS FRANCISCO HUSTED

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PLACEMENT CHAIRS: Donald Davis, [drd28@columbia.edu](mailto:drd28@columbia.edu); Suresh Naidu, [sn2430@columbia.edu](mailto:sn2430@columbia.edu)

PLACEMENT ASSISTANT: Amy Devine-Keum, [aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu)

**Education**

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY	NEW YORK, NY, USA
Ph.D. Candidate, Economics	Expected 2022
<i>Fields: Public Economics, Applied Micro</i>	
M.Phil, Economics	2019
M.A., Economics	2018
BROWN UNIVERSITY	PROVIDENCE, RI, USA
B.Sc. Applied Mathematics-Economics (Advanced Economics Track)	2013
<i>Honors in Economics, Magna Cum Laude, Phi Beta Kappa, Omicron Delta Epsilon</i>	

**Professional Experience**

2021–21	<b>Amazon</b> in Seattle, WA. <i>PhD Intern, Promise Research, Supply Chain Optimization.</i>
2020–20	<b>RAND Corporation</b> in Santa Monica, CA. <i>Summer Associate.</i>
2020–20	<b>World Bank</b> in Washington, D.C. <i>Short Term Consultant.</i>
2017–19	<b>Columbia University</b> in New York, NY. <i>Research Assistant (For: Michael Best, Suresh Naidu).</i>
2014–16	<b>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</b> in Washington, D.C. <i>Senior Research Assistant in Division of International Finance, Trade and Financial Studies.</i>
2013–14	<b>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System</b> in Washington, D.C. <i>Research Assistant in Division of International Finance, Trade and Financial Studies.</i>

**Job Market Paper****Cutoff from Support: The Effects of Losing Cash Welfare** (with Motaz Al-Chanati)

Does removing families from welfare programs result in increased employment? Using detailed administrative data from Michigan, we study a policy reform in the state's TANF program that swiftly and unexpectedly removed over 10,000 families from welfare while quasi-randomly assigning time limits to over 30,000 remaining participants. Consistent with economic theory, removing families from welfare increases formal labor force participation by roughly 4 percentage points (20% over control group mean), with increases in annualized earnings of roughly \$500. We find that time limits – particularly for those further from their expiration – and sanctions due to program noncompliance yield similar results. However, despite this, the majority of families remain formally unemployed after welfare removal, and using quantile regressions we show that even the highest percentile wage gains fail to offset the loss in welfare benefits. Overall, our findings provide evidence that, contrary to their stated goals, welfare reform measures that either kick families off welfare or make welfare harder to access are likely to deepen poverty.

## Working Papers

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### **Welfare-to-Work Revisited: Was Jobs First Better?**

Is it better to better match unemployed low-income individuals to the labor market, or first have them complete remedial coursework? I reexamine the original data from the GAIN experiment of the early 1990s, utilizing unexplored details about program intake that created quasi-random variation in treatment status within each treatment arm. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find support for the notion that among participants equally suited to either type of treatment, those induced directly into the labor force saw much larger increases in earnings relative to those who completed coursework. Effects are strongest along the extensive margin; neither type of programming differentially induces those already in the labor force to earn more. Finally, results grow in magnitude over time. This evidence leads to the conclusion that direct labor force strategies may be superior to remedial coursework for welfare participants who already have baseline cognitive skills.

### **The Impact of Natural Disasters on Human Capital** (with R. Jisung Park and Isaac Oppen)

We show that natural disasters affect a region's aggregate human capital through at least four channels. In addition to causing out-migration, natural disasters reduce student achievement, lower high school graduation rates, and decrease post-secondary attendance. We estimate that disasters that cause at least \$500 in per-capita property damage reduce the net present value (NPV) of an affected county's human capital by an average of \$505 per person. These negative effects on human capital are not restricted to large disasters: less severe events – disasters with property damages of \$100-\$500 per capita – also cause significant and persistent reductions in student achievement and post-secondary attendance.

## Works In Progress

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### **Economic Impacts of Government Spending: Evidence From Natural Disasters**

**Valuation of Public Transit and Landlord Market Power: Evidence from NYC** (with Vinayak Iyer)

## Journal Publications

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### **Monetary Policy Uncertainty** (with John Rogers and Bo Sun)

*Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2020. [Link](#)

We construct a new measure of uncertainty about Federal Reserve policy actions and their consequences, a monetary policy uncertainty (MPU) index. We evaluate the information content of our index and document the usefulness of our index in bridging periods of conventional and unconventional policy making. We also estimate the aggregate effects of shocks to MPU on output, credit spreads, and other variables. Finally, we investigate the transmission channels of MPU, finding that heightened MPU leads to protracted declines in firm investment through both real options and financial frictions channels.

### **Uncertainty, Currency Excess Returns, and Risk Reversals** (with John Rogers and Bo Sun)

*Journal of International Money and Finance*, 88, 228-241. [Link](#)

In this paper we provide strong evidence that heightened uncertainty in the U.S. real economy or financial markets significantly raises excess returns to the currency carry trade. We posit that this works through the influence of uncertainty on global investors' risk preferences. Macro and financial uncertainty also lower foreign exchange risk reversals, an effect that is particularly strong for high interest rate portfolios. Our results are consistent with the idea that an increase in uncertainty regarding the U.S. economy or financial markets increases investors' risk aversion, which in turn drives up the expected returns and the cost of protection against crash risk in the FX market.

## Other Research

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**Measuring Cross Country Monetary Policy Uncertainty** (with John H. Rogers & Bo Sun), *IFDP Notes, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)*, 2016-11-23. [Link](#)

**Measuring Monetary Policy Uncertainty: The Federal Reserve, January 1985-January 2016** (with John H. Rogers & Bo Sun), *IFDP Notes, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)*, 2016-04-11-2. [Link](#)

**The Price of Cannabis: An analysis of How Decriminalization and Federal Enforcement Affect the Price of Marijuana** (Honors Thesis in Economics, Brown University, 2013). [Link](#)

## Honors and Awards

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2020	NSF DISSERTATION GRANT (Welfare Reform), National Science Foundation
2020	PER RESEARCH GRANT (Welfare Reform), Columbia University.
2020	PER RESEARCH GRANT (Spatial Equilibrium), Columbia University.
2019	NSF DISSERTATION GRANT (Spatial Equilibrium), National Science Foundation
2019	PER SUMMER RESEARCH FELLOW, Columbia University.
2017-19	TEACHING FELLOW, Columbia University.
2016-17	DEAN'S FELLOW, Columbia University.
2016-17	PROVOST'S DIVERSITY FELLOWSHIP, Columbia University.
2013	HONORS IN ECONOMICS, Brown University.
2013	PHI BETA KAPPA, Brown University.
2013	MAGNA CUM LAUDE, Brown University.
2013	OMICRON DELTA EPSILON, Brown University.
2009	AUSTIN SCHOLAR AWARD, St. Anselm's Abbey School (High School Valedictorian).

## Invited Presentations

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National Tax Association Meetings, 2021

## Teaching Assistant Experience

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PUBLIC ECONOMICS, Fall 2019

INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS, Fall 2018 and Spring 2019

GAME THEORY, Summer 2018

URBAN ECONOMICS, Spring 2018

INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS, Fall 2017

## Journal Service

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Journal of Urban Economics; Empirical Economics

## Software/Languages

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**Data Analysis:** Python/Pandas (high), Stata (high), MATLAB (med), R (med), SQL (med).

**Typesetting:** L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X, L<sup>A</sup>X

**Languages:** English, Spanish

**Authored GitHub Packages:** [propscore](#), [py\\_rdpackages](#), [pystout](#), [pytrendex](#)

**Causal Inference Techniques:** linear and non-linear regression with panel and time-series data, instrumental variables regression, regression discontinuity, propensity score matching, event study, difference-in-differences, machine learning methods (lasso, ridge regression, random forests, causal forests, double machine learning).

## Other/Hobbies

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2019-20 Ted-ED Educator (3 million+ views) [[Video 1](#), [Video 2](#)]

2016- Columbia University Cycling Team Treasurer and Bike Mechanic

2012-13 Opinions Editor, Brown Daily Herald (*Student-run daily independent newspaper*)

## References

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Sandra Black (Primary)  
*Professor of Economics and  
International and Public Affairs*  
Columbia University  
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212-854-3676

Michael Best (Co-Sponsor)  
*Assistant Professor of Economics*  
Columbia University  
[mcb2270@columbia.edu](mailto:mcb2270@columbia.edu)  
212-851-9485

Miguel Urquiola  
*Chair and Professor of Economics  
and International and Public Affairs*  
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212-854-3769

# Vinayak Iyer

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CONTACT INFORMATION	420 W 118 <sup>th</sup> Street New York, NY-10027	vi2137@columbia.edu <a href="https://vinayakiyer.github.io/">https://vinayakiyer.github.io/</a>
PERSONAL INFORMATION	NATIONALITY - Indian	
PLACEMENT INFORMATION	<b>Co-Chairs</b> Donald Davis, drd28@columbia.edu Suresh Naidu, sn2430@columbia.edu	<b>Administrator</b> Amy Devine (212) 854-6881 aed2152@columbia.edu
EDUCATION	<b>Ph.D. Economics, Columbia University</b> <b>M.A. Economics, Delhi School of Economics</b> <b>B.Sc. Economics, St. Xavier's College, Kolkata</b>	<b>2016- 2022 (Expected)</b> <b>2013 - 2015</b> <b>2010 - 2013</b>
RESEARCH INTERESTS	Urban Economics, Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics	
PAPERS	<p><b>What Drives the Efficiency in Ride Sharing Markets? Evidence from Austin, Texas</b> (with Motaz al-Chanati) (Nominated for Best Paper, Econometric Society Meeting, Delhi School of Economics 2020)</p> <p><i>Ridesharing platforms, who act as intermediaries in transport markets, improve upon traditional taxis along two key dimensions: surge pricing and centralized matching. We study how and why existing inefficiencies are solved by these two features and evaluate how alternate pricing and matching rules can improve outcomes. To this end, we develop a structural model of the ridesharing market with three components: (1) dynamically optimizing drivers who make entry, exit and search decisions; (2) stochastic demand; and (3) a matching technology. We evaluate the welfare effects of surge and matching separately. We also implement a simple change in the pricing rule by making it more flexible which is able to address both static and dynamic inefficiencies, thus generating large welfare gains for all agents. We conclude by drawing policy implications for improving the competitiveness of traditional taxis.</i></p> <p><b>Informational Barriers to Market Access: Experimental Evidence from Liberian Firms</b> (with Jonas Hjort and Golvine de Rochambeau), NBER WP No 27662</p> <p><i>Evidence suggests that many firms in poor countries stagnate because they cannot access growth-conducive markets. We hypothesize that overlooked informational barriers distort market access. To investigate, we gave a random subset of medium-sized Liberian firms vouchers for a week-long program that exclusively teaches “sellership”: how to sell to corporations, governments, and other large buyers. Firms that participate win three times as many formal contracts a year later. The impact is heterogeneous: informational sales barriers bind for about a quarter of firms. Three years post-training, these firms continue to win desirable contracts, are more likely to operate, and employ more workers.</i></p>	

## **Value of Public Transport and Landlord Market Power : Evidence from NYC** (*with Lucas Husted*)

*This paper studies how individuals across the income distribution value access to public transit and how this shapes the rental housing market. To study this question, we use the announced closure of the L train in NYC to study how rents were affected in the housing market and how the mobility decisions of individuals across the income distribution changed. We find that low-income households value the subway more than high-income households, while high-income households likely value other neighborhood amenities more. We show evidence of landlord market power and find that landlords give existing low-income households a higher discount on their rent to incentivize them to stay in the affected neighborhoods. From a transportation policy perspective, one must keep the dynamics of other neighborhood amenities in mind while evaluating whether intended beneficiaries benefit in the long run.*

## **Transparency and Polarization of Political Speech : Evidence from Canada** (*with William Labasi Samartino*)

*This paper studies how MPs in the Canadian parliament modified their speeches post the televisation of parliamentary debates in 1977. Using NLP techniques on text data from the Hansard, we find that post the televisation of debates, speeches of MPs who were younger (in Parliament) become more polarized/distinct from their party manifesto relative to older (in Parliament) MPs. The effects are not persistent in the long run.*

IN PROGRESS	<b>In the Dark? Impact of Streetlight Outages on Crime</b> ( <i>with Michele Baggio, Alberto Chong, Nishith Prakash, Anjali P. Verma</i> )	
SCHOLARSHIPS AND GRANTS	Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University	2021
	NSF Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics (\$24300)	2020
	PER Research Grant (\$5000)	2020
	GSAS Matching Travel Grant	2019
	Marion B. Stewart and Marcia E. Glanz Fund, Columbia University	2019
	PER Summer RA Fellowship, Columbia University	2017, 2018
	Department of Economics Fellowship, Columbia University	2016 - 2021
	Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University	2016 - 2021
	Professor Balvir and Ranjana Singh Memorial Scholarship	2014-15
	Krishna Raj Summer Fellowship, Delhi School of Economics	2014-15
	National (CAS) Scholarship, Delhi School of Economics	2013-14
TEACHING AWARDS	Wueller Award for Best TA for Masters	2020
	Wueller Award for Best TA for Masters	2019
	Wueller Award for Best TA for Principles (Runner Up)	2018
WORKSHOPS	Chicago Price Theory Summer Camp	2019
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS	Urban Economics Association Virtual Meeting	2020
	Winter School (Delhi School of Economics)	2020
	ACEGD, ISI Delhi	2019

WORK	Economist Intern, Amazon	Jun - Aug 2021
EXPERIENCE	RA for Jonas Hjort, Columbia University	Jan - Aug 2018
	RA for Navin Kartik, Columbia University	June-Dec 2017
	RA for Anirban Kar, Delhi School of Economics	2015-2016
	RA for Rohini Somanathan, Delhi School of Economics	2014-2015
	Research Fellow, Krishna Raj Summer Fellowship	Summer 2014
TEACHING	Math Methods for Economists (Masters), Columbia University	Fall 2018-2020
EXPERIENCE	Microeconomics II (Masters), Columbia University	Spring 2019
	Math Camp (PhD), Columbia University	Summer 2018
	Principles of Economics (Undergraduate), Columbia University	Spring 2018
	Principles of Economics (Undergraduate), Columbia University	Fall 2017
TECHNICAL SKILLS	Python, Julia, R, Stata, SQL, Matlab, Hadoop, Spark, Hive, Scala	
LANGUAGES KNOWN	English, Hindi, Bengali, Tamil (Native)	
REFERENCES	<b>Bernard Salanié</b> ( <a href="mailto:bs2237@columbia.edu">bs2237@columbia.edu</a> ) Professor of Economics Columbia University	<b>Donald Davis</b> ( <a href="mailto:drd28@columbia.edu">drd28@columbia.edu</a> ) Ragnar Nurkse Professor of Economics Columbia University
	<b>Suresh Naidu</b> ( <a href="mailto:sn2430@columbia.edu">sn2430@columbia.edu</a> ) Professor of Economics and Public Affairs Columbia University	

# Paul Sungwook Koh

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Placement Chair: Donald Davis, [drdavis@columbia.edu](mailto:drdavis@columbia.edu)

Placement Chair: Suresh Naidu, [sn2430@columbia.edu](mailto:sn2430@columbia.edu)

Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, [aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu), (212) 854 6881

## Fields of Interest

Econometrics, Microeconomic Theory, Empirical Industrial Organization

## Education

Ph.D. Economics, Columbia University, 2022 (Expected)

M.Phil. Economics, Columbia University, 2019

M.A. Economics, Columbia University, 2018

B.A. Economics, Yonsei University, 2015

## Job Market Paper

“Stable Outcomes and Information in Games: An Empirical Framework”

**Abstract:** Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players’ decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete information, we build an empirical framework by introducing a novel solution concept that we call *Bayes stable equilibrium*. Our framework allows the researcher to be agnostic about players’ information and the equilibrium selection rule. The Bayes stable equilibrium identified set collapses to the complete information pure strategy Nash equilibrium identified set under strong assumptions on players’ information. Furthermore, all else equal, it is weakly tighter than the Bayes correlated equilibrium identified set. We also propose computationally tractable approaches for estimation and inference. In an application, we study the strategic entry decisions of McDonald’s and Burger King in the US. Our results highlight the identifying power of informational assumptions and show that the Bayes stable equilibrium identified set can be substantially tighter than the Bayes correlated equilibrium identified set. In a counterfactual experiment, we examine the impact of increasing access to healthy food on the market structures in Mississippi food deserts.

## Working Papers

“Estimating Discrete Games of Complete Information: Bringing Logit Back in the Game”

**Abstract:** This paper proposes an extremely fast and simple approach to estimating



static discrete games of complete information under pure strategy Nash equilibrium and no assumptions on the equilibrium selection rule. We characterize an identified set of parameters using a set of inequalities that are expressed in terms of closed-form multinomial logit probabilities. The key simplifications arise from using a subset of all identifying restrictions that are particularly easy to handle. Under standard assumptions, the identified set is convex and its projections can be obtained via convex programs. Numerical examples show that the identified set is tight. When applied to the entry game between Walmart and Kmart using a real-world dataset, the projections of the identified set can be obtained in less than ten seconds.

## Works in Progress

“Estimating Dynamic Games with Unknown Information Structure”

**Abstract:** This paper studies identification and estimation of a class of dynamic games when the underlying information structure is unknown to the researcher. We introduce *Markov correlated equilibrium*, a dynamic analog of Bayes correlated equilibrium studied in Bergemann and Morris (2016), and show that the set of Markov correlated equilibria coincides with the set of Markov perfect equilibria that can arise when the players might observe more information than assumed by the analyst. We leverage the informational robustness property of Markov correlated equilibria and propose an econometric approach for estimating dynamic games with weak assumptions on players’ information. We also propose multiple computational strategies to deal with the non-convexities that arise in dynamic environment. As an empirical application, we apply the framework to study the dynamic entry competition by major coffee chains in the US.

## Publications (Pre-doctoral)

- “Court-appointed Experts and Accuracy in Adversarial Litigation” (with Chulyoung Kim), *International Journal of Economic Theory*, vol. 16, no. 3, September 2020
- “Minimum Asset and Liability Insurance Requirements on Judgment-Proof Individuals When Harm is Endogenous” (with Chulyoung Kim), *Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics*, vol. 60, no. 2, December 2019

## Honors and Awards

- The Dhrymes Econometrics Award, Department of Economics, Columbia University, 2020
- Wueller Teaching Award for Ph.D. Courses (Runner-up), Department of Economics, Columbia University, 2018, 2020
- Best TA in First-Year Graduate Courses (Runner-up), Association of Graduate Economics Students, Columbia University, 2019
- Summer Research Fellow Grant, Program for Economic Research, Columbia University, 2018, 2019
- Summer Research Grant, Microeconomic Theory Initiative, Columbia University, 2019
- Dean’s Fellowship, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University, 2016–2022

Outstanding Research Award, The 7th Korea Health Panel Conference, 2015

National Humanities Academic Scholarship (merit-based), Korea Student Aid Foundation,  
2013-2014

## Teaching Experience

### Instructor

Math Camp (for first-year economics PhD students), Summer 2018 & Summer 2019

### Recitation Instructor for PhD-level Courses

Math Methods for Economists, Fall 2018 & Fall 2019;

Introduction to Econometrics II, Spring 2018

### Recitation Instructor for Undergraduate-level Courses

Advanced Microeconomics, Spring 2020 & Spring 2021;

Introduction to Econometrics, Fall 2020;

Intermediate Microeconomics, Fall 2017 & Spring 2019

### Tutor

Graduate-level econometrics and math methods

## Departmental/University Service

Student organizer for Microeconomics Colloquium, Econometrics Colloquium

## Skills

Languages: English (fluent), Korean (native), Japanese (beginner)

Software: R, Matlab, Julia, Python, Stata

## Miscellaneous

Military service, Republic of Korea Army 3rd Artillery Brigade, Jan 2010–Nov 2011

Citizenship: US, Republic of Korea

## References

Sokbae (Simon) Lee  
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Qingmin Liu  
Professor of Economics  
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**PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR**

Amy Devine  
[aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu), (+1) 212-854-6881

**RESEARCH INTERESTS**

Macroeconomics, Innovation, Firm Dynamics, Household Finance

**EDUCATION**

Ph.D. in Economics, Columbia University	2016 – 2022 (Expected)
M.A. in Economics, Columbia University	2015 – 2016
Ph.D. in Cell and Developmental Biology, Rutgers University	2009 – 2015
B.S. in Pharmaceutical Science, Peking University	2005 – 2009

**REFERENCES**

**Matthieu Gomez**  
Assistant Professor  
Columbia University  
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**Martin Uribe**  
Professor  
Columbia University  
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**Harrison Hong**  
John R. Eckel, Jr. Professor  
of Financial Economics  
Columbia University  
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**Émilien Gouin-Bonenfant**  
Assistant Professor  
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## JOB MARKET PAPER

### **Firm Dynamics and Innovation: Evidence from Decomposing Top Sales Shares, [\[PDF\]](#)**

*Abstract:* What do changes in top sales shares signal about changes in firm dynamics? I use an accounting decomposition to identify two sources of top sales shares growth: (i) incumbent top firms grow bigger; (ii) new top firms replace old top firms. Over the 1950-2019 period, incumbent top firms contribute about 3.5 times as much as new top firms to the growth of the sales shares accrued to the top 0.01% firms in the US economy. Using the results from this empirical decomposition, I then build a model to estimate a firm dynamics process in which firms grow in response to own innovation shocks and shrink at the impact of creative destruction shocks. The existence of a channel through which own innovation can lead to higher top sales shares growth is supported by the data. My estimation reveals a surge in the rate of own innovation since 1980 and a decline in the rate of creative destruction over time.

## OTHER WORKING PAPERS

### **Employment during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Collapse and Early Recovery with [Tam Mai, \[PDF\]](#)**

*Abstract:* We use monthly Current Population Survey data to document employment changes during the COVID-19 pandemic at the occupation, industry, and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) levels. Over March-April 2020, jobs losses are larger for occupations with higher physical proximity or lower work-from-home feasibility, especially for lower-paying occupations. Non-essential industries also see greater declines in employment. Such occupational and industrial susceptibility to COVID-19 contributes to the variation in employment changes across MSAs: Employment shrinks more for MSAs with larger pre-crisis fractions of workers employed in occupations with higher infection risk. Over April-June 2020, occupations and industries that are hit harder recoup more jobs, but the recovery is only partial. Moreover, the gains are concentrated in lower-paying occupations and a few industries. Taken together, these abrupt changes in employment following the COVID-19 outbreak are unprecedented and potentially have long-term implications for occupational inequality and regional disparity.

## Income Inequality and Mortgage Credit Allocation [\[PDF\]](#)

*Abstract:* This paper studies how income inequality at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level affect mortgage credit allocation along the income distribution of households *within* MSAs. I find that MSA-level income inequality has heterogeneous effect on household-level mortgage debt accumulation. Two measures of inequality, the ratio of 95th-to-80th percentile ( $p_{95}/p_{80}$ ) and the ratio of 80th-to-50th percentile ( $p_{80}/p_{50}$ ) of household income, exhibit significant impact. With respect to credit approval along the income distribution, high  $p_{95}/p_{80}$  inequality works more in favor of low-income households while high  $p_{80}/p_{50}$  inequality benefits high-income households more.

## PUBLICATIONS (IN BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FROM PREVIOUS PHD STUDY)

1. Shi, A., **Liu, O.**, Koenig, S., Banerjee, R., Chen, C. C. H., Eimer, S., Grant, B. D. (2012). RAB-10-GTPase-mediated regulation of endosomal phosphatidylinositol-4, 5-bisphosphate. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 109(35), E2306-E2315. [\[PDF\]](#)
2. Sun, L., **Liu, O.**, Desai, J., Karbassi, F., Sylvain, M. A., Shi, A., Grant, B. D. (2012). CED-10/Rac1 regulates endocytic recycling through the RAB-5 GAP TBC-2. *PLoS genetics*, 8(7), e1002785. [\[PDF\]](#)
3. **Liu, O.**, Grant, B. D. (2015). Basolateral endocytic recycling requires RAB-10 and AMPH-1 mediated recruitment of RAB-5 GAP TBC-2 to endosomes. *PLoS genetics*, 11(9), e1005514. [\[PDF\]](#)
4. Wang, P., Liu, H., Wang, Y., **Liu, O.**, Zhang, J., Gleason, A., Grant, B. D. (2016). RAB-10 promotes EHBP-1 bridging of filamentous actin and tubular recycling endosomes. *PLoS genetics*, 12(6), e1006093. [\[PDF\]](#)
5. (In Chinese.) Li, X. T., Yuan, Y. L., Xia, Y. Y., Yu, B. Z., Zhang, T. J., **Liu, O.**, Zhan, S. Y. (2009). Genetic polymorphism of glutathione-S-transferase M1 and T1: a systematic review in Chinese population and a pilot study in smear-positive pulmonary tuberculosis cases of Jilin province. *Chinese Journal of Epidemiology*, 30(5):502-6. [\[PDF\]](#)

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

### TEACHING FELLOW

#### **Columbia University**

Finance and the Real Economy (Undergraduate) Spring 2019, Spring 2020

Instructor: Matthieu Gomez

Corporate Finance (Undergraduate) Fall 2018, Fall 2019, Fall 2020

Instructors: Olivier Darmouni and Ethan Namvar

Intermediate Macroeconomics (Undergraduate) Fall 2017, Spring 2018

Instructors: Irasema Alonso and Jón Steinsson

#### **Rutgers University**

Genetics (Undergraduate) Fall 2013, Spring 2014, Fall 2014, Spring 2015

### INSTRUCTOR

#### **Institute of Industrial Economics of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences**

Macroeconomics (1st-year PhD level, equiv. 1.5 credit minicourse) Summer 2018

### LAB MENTOR

#### **Rutgers University**

Mentored pre-med, master and PhD students during their lab rotations 2011-2015

## FELLOWSHIPS

Dissertation Fellowship, 2021-2022, Columbia University

Dean's Fellowship, 2016 – 2021, Columbia University

Anne B. and James B. Leathem Fellowship, Summer 2011 – 2014, Rutgers University

Excellence Fellowship, 2009 – 2010, Rutgers University

## PERSONAL INFORMATION

### LANGUAGES:

Chinese (native)      English (fluent)      French (intermediate)      German(basic)

- French: Diplôme de Français professionnel-Affaires B2 awarded by the Paris Chamber of Commerce
- German: Goethe-Zertifikat B1

PROGRAMMING: Python, Stata, Matlab

CITIZENSHIP: Chinese

DATE OF BIRTH: Oct. 24th, 1988

SPORT: player on Table Tennis women's team at Peking University (2005 – 2008) and at Columbia University (2016 – 2017)

# Felipe Netto

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<b>Contact Information</b>	Department of Economics Columbia University 420 West 118th Street New York, NY 10027	<b>Mobile Phone</b>	+1 (929) 309 6582
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		<b>Website</b>	<a href="https://felipesnetto.github.io/">https://felipesnetto.github.io/</a>
		<b>Nationality</b>	Brazilian

## RESEARCH FIELDS

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*Primary Fields:* Banking, Financial Intermediation, Corporate Finance

*Secondary Fields:* Macroeconomics

## EDUCATION

---

### Columbia University

Ph.D in Economics (expected) 2022

M.Phill in Economics 2019

M.A. in Economics 2018

### University of Brasilia

M.A. in Economics 2016

### FAE Business School

B.A. in Economics 2012

## JOB MARKET PAPER

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**Government Banks and Interventions in Credit Markets** (with Gustavo Joaquim and Jose Renato Haas Ornelas)

We study a large scale intervention in the Brazilian banking sector, characterized by a sudden increase in the supply of credit provided by commercial government banks. Theoretically, the effect of this type of policy is ambiguous: the effect of the policy is beneficial if credit is inefficiently low, or harmful if public banks finance riskier firms with unproductive projects. We use confidential credit registry data to document a series of empirical facts and test if the policy alleviates inefficient underprovision of credit. We show that while the policy leads to a reduction in private banks interest rates and to an increase in total credit, public banks experience worsening of loan default risk. However, after the policy was implemented government banks subsidized more levered firms, and loans to indebted firms explain the increase in loan default in public banks relative to private banks. Moreover, neither the increase in total credit nor the reduction in interest rates by private banks has any observable effects on GDP or employment growth. Our results suggest that the policy increased credit misallocation, and that adverse selection did not play a significant role in the allocation of credit in Brazil.

## WORKING PAPERS

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**Bank Incentives and the Impact of the Paycheck Protection Program** (with Gustavo Joaquim)

**The Optimal Allocation of Relief Funds: The Case of the Paycheck Protection Program**  
(with Gustavo Joaquim)



## WORK IN PROGRESS

---

Macroprudential Policy Spillovers

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

---

**Research Assistant** 2019-2020  
*Profs. Jose A. Scheinkman and Yueran Ma*

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

---

**Corporate Finance** Fall 2019, Spring 2020, Fall 2020  
*Prof. Tri Vi Dang*

**Financial Crises** Fall 2017, Fall 2018  
*Prof. Jose A. Scheinkman*  
*Wueller Teaching Award (Runner Up) - Fall 2018*

**Financial Economics** Spring 2018  
*Prof. Irasema Alonso*

**Macroeconomic Analysis II** Spring 2019  
*Prof. Irasema Alonso*

## PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

---

**Financial Planning Analyst** 2013  
*Grupo THA Construction and Development*

**Market Analyst** 2010-2012  
*Safras & Mercados Agribusiness Consulting*

**Stock Broker** 2010  
*XP Investments Curitiba*

## HONORS & AWARDS

---

Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University 2021-2022

Wueller Teaching Award (Runner Up), Columbia University 2018

Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University 2016-2021

CNPq Fellowship for Master's Program 2014-2016

## PROGRAMMING SKILLS

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Programming: R, Stata, MATLAB  
Tools: Git, L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X, MS Office

## PERSONAL

---

Citizenship: Brazilian  
US Status: F-1 Visa  
Languages: Portuguese (native), English (fluent), Spanish (Basic)

## REFERENCES

---

**Jose A. Scheinkman**

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Finance & Economics  
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# SILVIO RAVAIOLI

September 2021

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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine (212) 854-6881 [aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu)

## EDUCATION

2022 (expected)	Ph.D. Economics	Columbia University
<i>en route</i> : M.A. in Economics (2018), M.Phil. in Economics (2019)		
2016	Diploma in Economics	Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
2015	M.Sc. Economics	University of Pisa
2012	B.Sc. Economics	University of Pisa

## FIELDS

*Primary Field*: Behavioral and Experimental Economics

*Secondary Fields*: Consumer Behavior, Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization

## REFERENCES

Michael Woodford	Mark Dean	Alessandra Casella	Eric Johnson
John Bates Clark Professor of Political Economy Columbia University	Associate Professor Department of Economics Columbia University	Professor of Economics and Political Science Columbia University	Norman Eig Professor of Business Columbia University
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## JOB MARKET PAPER

### Coarse and Precise Information in Food Labeling

Public authorities and companies often adopt simple categorical labels to convey information and promote healthy, ethical, or energy-friendly behavior. These labels tend to be coarse and withdraw information. For example, food front-package labels often report low-fat but not the exact fat content. In this paper I study how labels with different precision affect choices: can precision become "too much" and impair choices?

In a preregistered online study conducted on a representative US sample, I manipulate the precision of front-package labels about foods' calorie content. Coarse labels generate higher levels of healthy choices compared to more detailed ones (-2% calories, -3% high-calorie products chosen), despite providing less information. Participants also prefer coarse labels.

Choices are at odds with the predictions of a Bayesian updating model, suggesting that subjects pay less attention to detailed information. A behavioral model with limited attention can capture the main results by introducing a tradeoff between level of detail and cognitive cost. Some information helps, but too much detail can be harm consumers, and lead to less healthy food choices.

## **PUBLICATIONS**

**Diverse Motives for Human Curiosity** (with Kenji Kobayashi, Adrien Baranès, Michael Woodford, and Jacqueline Gottlieb), *Nature Human Behavior*, 2019.

**Is EEG Suitable for Marketing Research? A Systematic Review** (with Andrea Bazzani, Leopoldo Trieste, Ugo Faraguna, and Giuseppe Turchetti), *Frontiers in Neuroscience*, 2020.

## **WORKING PAPERS:**

**The Status Quo and Belief Polarization of Inattentive Agents: Theory and Experiment** (with Vladimir Novak and Andrei Matveenko).

**Avoidable Risk: An experiment on Context-Dependent Risk Aversion** (with RC Xi Zhi Lim).

**Matching and Learning: An Experimental Study** (with Lan Nguyen and Guillaume Haeringer).

## **WORK IN PROGRESS**

**Dynamic Choice Between Biased Information Sources** (with Michael Woodford and Jacqueline Gottlieb)

**You Don't Know It Until You Need It** (with Hassan Afrouzi)

## **CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS**

2020: Economics Science Association Annual Conference (ESA, online), Student Workshop for Experimental Economics Techniques (Princeton, online).

2019: Sloan-Nomis Workshop on the Cognitive Foundations of Economic Behavior (NYU).

2018: Columbia University IIGSS seminar (Columbia).

2017: INET YSI Festival for New Economic Thinking (Edinburgh).

2016: Society of Neuroeconomics 2016 Annual Conference (Berlin, poster session).

2015: Society of Neuroeconomics 2015 Annual Conference (Miami, poster session).

## **WORK AND TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

F 2019-S 2021	Lab Manager for CELSS (Columbia Experimental Laboratory).
S 2018, S 2019.	Teaching Assistant, Market Design (Instructor: Prof. Guillaume Haeringer), Columbia University.
F 2017, F 2018.	TA Cognitive Mechanisms and Economic Behavior (Instructor: Prof. Michael Woodford), Columbia University.
F 2015-S 2016.	Research Assistant (Prof. Michael Woodford), Columbia University.
F 2014-S 2015.	TA, Microeconomics I (Instructor: Prof. Pier Mario Pacini), University of Pisa.

## **GRANTS AND ACADEMIC AWARDS**

2021, Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University.

2021, IFREE Grant for the project "News Inaccuracy and Speed: Model and Experiment" (with Sara Saharaghi).

2020, Columbia PER Grant for the project "Coarse Labels for Inattentive Consumers".

2018, CELSS Seed grant for the project "The Status Quo and Beliefs Polarization of Inattentive Agents" (with Vladimir Novak).

2016, Cognitive and Behavioral Economics Fellowship, Columbia University.

2015, Graduated with Distinction from M.Sc. in Economics, University of Pisa.

2010, "Alfieri del Lavoro" Award, prize awarded by the President of Italian Republic.

2010, Winner of a place at Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna for a five-years scholarship.

## **MISCELLANEOUS**

Citizenship:	Italian.
Languages:	Italian (native), English (fluent), Spanish and German (elementary).
Programming skills:	LaTeX/Beamer, Matlab, R, Python, JavaScript, zTree/oTree.
Refereeing:	Journal of Economic Theory, European Economic Review.

# DARIO A. ROMERO

CURRICULUM VITAE

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## PLACEMENT ADMINISTRATOR

Amy Devine  
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## RESEARCH INTEREST

Development Economics, Political Economy, Economic History

## REFERENCES

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**Eric Verhoogen**  
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**Réka Juhász**  
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## EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, Columbia University, NY, USA	2016-22
<i>en route</i> : M.A. in Economics (2017). M.Phil. in Economics (2018)	(expected)
M.A. Economics, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia.	2011-12
B.A. Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia.	2007-10
B.A. Economics, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia.	2006-10

## JOB MARKET PAPER

### “An Empire Lost: Spanish Industry and The Effect of Colonial Markets and Trade on Innovation”

*Abstract:* I study how accessing new (international) markets affects innovation direction. To do so, I use two historical experiments on the textile industry in Spain at the end of the 19th century. I provide causal evidence on how international trade’s patterns enhanced biased technical improvements. Although each shock meant access to new markets to Spanish cotton textiles, their effect on innovation differed because demand characteristics were not the same. First, after Spain effectively forced their colonies to buy manufactured cotton goods in 1891, I document an increase in innovation destined to create cotton textiles. Second, after the Spanish-American war and the unexpected loss of these captive markets, I find a change inside the cotton industry towards weaving innovation. After the 1898 war, and with an already installed capacity, cotton industrialists entered and competed in international markets that demanded more sophisticated fabrics. Using novel archive data from a big cotton firm, I evaluate the mechanism that explains my results. I show that changes in intermediate goods relative prices explain the technology type that innovators developed. Finally, I show that these new incentives on innovation translated directly into adopting new mechanized tools in the sector. I find evidence of a rise in industrial technology due to an increase in mechanized cotton looms used in Spain after 1900.

## RESEARCH PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS

---

### PUBLICATIONS

- **Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace**, with Mounu Prem, Andres Rivera and Juan Vargas (forthcoming) *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*
- **The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives**, with Daron Acemoglu, Leopoldo Fergusson, James Robinson and Juan Fernando Vargas (2020). *American Economic Journal*, vol. 12(3), pp.1- 43.
- **Improving Access to Preventive Maternal Health Care Using Reminders: Experimental Evidence from Guatemala**. With Matias Busso and Dario Salcedo (2017), *Economic Letters*, vol. 161, pp. 43-46.
- **Books or laptops? The effect of shifting from printed to digital delivery of educational content on learning**. With Rosangela Bando, Francisco Gallego and Paul J. Gertler (2017). *Economics of Education Review*, vol. 61, pp. 162-173.
- **The effects of financial aid and returns information in selective and less selective schools: Experimental evidence from Chile**. With Matias Busso, Taryn Dinkelman and Claudia Martínez (2017). *Labour Economics*, Vol. 45, pp. 79-91.
- **Insecurity or Perception of Insecurity? Urban Crime and Dissatisfaction with Life: Evidence from the Case of Bogotá**. (2014). *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, Vol. 20(1), pp. 169-208.

### CHAPTERS IN BOOKS

- Facts and Determinants of Female Labor Supply in Latin America, with Matias Busso. In “Bridging gender gaps? The rise and deceleration of female labor force participation in Latin America”, Leonardo Gasparini and Mariana Marchioni (Eds), 2015.

### WORKING PAPERS

- **Labor Market Adjustment to Import Competition: Long-run Evidence from Establishment Data**, with Juan Blyde and Matias Busso. IDB WORKING PAPER SERIES N° IDB- WP -01100
- **The Environmental Impact of Civil Conflict: The Deforestation Effect of Paramilitary Expansion in Colombia**, with Leopoldo Fergusson and Juan F. Vargas, Cede Working Paper 2014-36.

### WORK IN PROGRESS

- Non-State Actors in Pandemic: Violence as a Territorial Control Strategy during COVID-19 (With Diego Martin)
- Every Cloud has a Silver Lining: The Effect of Cotton Crisis on Spanish XIXth Century Textile Industry
- The (unintended?) effects of US military training during the Cold War in Latin-America
- Civilians in the Time of Counterinsurgency: The Consequences of Foreign Military Training in Colombia
- Something Biased This Way Comes: The Effect of Media on Local Elections in US (With Haaris Maatin)

### CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

- 2021** Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA, Bogotá)
- 2019** Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA, Puebla)

## TEACHING AND WORK EXPERIENCE

---

### TEACHING FELLOW

#### Columbia University

Introduction to Econometrics (Undergraduate)	Summer 2021, Fall 2020
Instructor: Seyhan Erden	
Game Theory (Undergraduate)	Spring 2021
Instructor: Qingmin Liu	
Perspectives on Economic Studies (Ph.D. 1st Year course)	Spring 2021
Instructor: Joseph Stiglitz and Suresh Naidu	
Political Economy (Undergraduate)	Fall 2019, Fall 2017
Instructor: John Marshall	
Political Economy (Undergraduate)	Fall 2018
Instructor: Alessandra Casella	
Principles of Economics	Spring 2018
Instructor: Nicola Zaniboni	

### RESEARCH ASSISTANT

#### Columbia University

*Francois Gerard* June 2018- August 2019

#### Inter-American Development Bank

*Matias Busso* 2014–2016

#### J-PAL LAC

*Francisco Gallego* 2013–2014

#### Universidad del Rosario

*Juan Fernando Vargas* 2010–2013

## RESEARCH GRANTS AND ACADEMIC AWARDS

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### RESEARCH GRANTS & FELLOWSHIPS

Research Grant	2021
Columbia Development Colloquium; \$1,000	
Dissertation Fellowship	2021
Department of Economics, Columbia University	

### AWARDS

Dean's Fellow (Ph.D. in Economics)	2016-2021
Columbia University	

## PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

---

### REFEREEING

Revista Cuadernos de Economía

## PERSONAL INFORMATION

---

*Full name:* Dario Alberto Romero Fonseca

*Citizenship:* Colombian

*Birth Year:* 1989



## LANGUAGE

Spanish (Native)

English (Fluent)

Portuguese (Advanced)

German (Intermediate)

French (Beginner)

Italian (Beginner)

## PROGRAMMING SKILLS

Stata, Python, ArcGIS, QGIS, GeoDa, MATLAB, R, Wolfram Mathematica

### WEBSITE AND CONTACT INFORMATION

davidrosenkranz.com  
darosenkranz@gmail.com  
1 (347) 907 0001  
Columbia University  
420 West 118th Street  
New York, NY 10027

### FIELDS

Applied Microeconomics  
Health Economics  
Industrial Organization

### PLACEMENT CO-CHAIRS

Donald Davis  
drd28@columbia.edu  
Suresh Naidu  
sn2430@columbia.edu

### PLACEMENT ASSISTANT

Amy Devine  
aed2152@columbia.edu

### REFERENCES

Douglas Almond Columbia University da2152@columbia.edu	Ryan McDevitt Duke University ryan.mcdevitt@duke.edu	Ashley Swanson Columbia University ats2180@columbia.edu
Benjamin Ho Vassar College and Columbia University benjamin.ho@gmail.com		

### OTHER FACULTY WHO KNOW ME WELL

Sebastian Calonico Columbia University nsc2136@cumc.columbia.edu	Gautam Gowrisankaran Columbia University gautamg2@gmail.com	Michael Best Columbia University mcb2270@columbia.edu
Pietro Tebaldi Columbia University p.tebaldi@clumbia.edu		

### EDUCATION

Doctor of Philosophy, Economics, Columbia University, expected May 2022  
Master of Philosophy, Economics, Columbia University, May 2019  
Master of Arts, Economics, Columbia University, May 2018  
Bachelor of Arts, Economics and Mathematics, with honors, Vassar College, May 2014

### WORKING PAPERS

Entry Barriers in Provider Markets: Evidence from Dialysis Certificate-of-need Programs  
**[job market paper]**

*Abstract.* Can entry barriers in health care provider markets raise welfare? In the U.S., proponents of regulatory entry barriers called CON programs claim that they reduce waste by limiting “unnecessary” entry. I examine CON programs in the dialysis industry, where their effects on market structure, access, health, costs, and welfare are poorly

understood, and where patients are sensitive to access and quality. I combine quasi-experimental policy variation in low population areas with a structural model of patient preferences to find that marginal entrants improved access significantly, reduced hospitalization rates, and generated for patients the utility value of traveling 275-344 fewer miles per month; but there is evidence that they contributed even more to fixed costs. Using policy variation throughout North Carolina, I also find evidence that the NC dialysis CON program created a mechanism through which incumbents could block potential entrants by expanding in tandem with their local patient populations. Taken together, my findings suggest that stronger regulatory entry barriers in low population areas may raise total welfare at patients' expense—but they also amplify concerns that CON programs dampen competition statewide.

#### Estimating event studies when units experience multiple events

*Abstract.* An event study is a statistical framework used to identify the impact of an event over time using observational data. Researchers conducting event studies typically estimate average differences between treated units and untreated units before-and-after an event. So-called “no anticipation” and “parallel trends” assumptions are known to equilibrate such estimands with average treatment effects on the treated in settings where units experience one event at most. In this paper, I introduce a new event study framework to accommodate settings where units may experience one or more events. I introduce an estimator which consistently estimates average treatment effects on the treated of a single event under generalizations of the no anticipation and parallel trends assumptions. I also introduce a parallel pre-trends test which can be used to falsify these assumptions in the usual sense. Finally, I demonstrate in a series of Monte Carlo simulations that the estimator and parallel pre-trends test work well for a wide range of treatment effects, including dynamic, non-stationary, and history-dependent treatment effects.

#### SELECTED WORKS IN PROGRESS

Shutting the door behind you: CON programs and pre-emption in the U.S. dialysis industry

Is it time yet? Measuring the negative externalities of ambulance diversions

Do mandatory minimum standards influence charity care expenditures? Evidence from Illinois.

What happens when resources move but quotas don't? [*joint work with Bozidar Plavsic*]

#### FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS

**Dissertation Fellowship**, 2020-2021, Columbia University

**Wueller Award** for the best teaching assistant in an undergraduate economics elective, 2021 (*solo winner*), 2020 (*two-way tie*), 2019 (*solo winner*), 2018 (*solo winner*)

**Vickrey Prize** for the best third year paper in the Economics Ph.D. Program, runner-up, 2019, Columbia University

**Teaching Fellowship**, 2017-2020, Columbia University

**Tananbaum Family Leadership Program for Work and Development Fellowship, 2013,**  
Vassar College

### TEACHING

Game Theory	<b>Instructor</b> , 2020, Columbia University <b>Instructor</b> , 2019, Columbia University <b>Teaching Assistant</b> , 2018, Columbia University [ <i>with Prof. Ho</i> ] <b>Teaching Assistant</b> , 2017, Columbia University [ <i>with Prof. Ho</i> ] <b>Teaching Assistant</b> , 2017, Columbia University [ <i>with Dr. Ward</i> ]
Industrial Organization	<b>Teaching Assistant</b> , 2019, Columbia University [ <i>with Prof. Asker</i> ] <b>Teaching Assistant</b> , 2018, Columbia University [ <i>with Prof. Vergote</i> ]
Economics of Uncertainty and Info.	<b>Teaching Assistant</b> , 2019, Columbia University [ <i>with Prof. Chiappori</i> ] <b>Teaching Assistant</b> , 2020, Columbia University [ <i>with Prof. Chiappori</i> ]
Market Design	<b>Teaching Assistant</b> , 2020, Columbia University [ <i>with Prof. Haeringer</i> ]
Intro. Econometrics	<b>Teaching Assistant</b> , 2018, Columbia University [ <i>with Prof. Erden</i> ]

### SERVICE WORK AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

**Discussant**, 2021, LACDev Conference

**Attendee**, 2021, Inclusive Teaching Workshop, Columbia University Center for Teaching and Learning

**Referee**, 2019, Young Economists Symposium

**Seminar Organizer**, 2019-2020, Columbia University IO Colloquium

**Seminar Organizer**, 2019-2020, Mailman School of Public Health, Health Economics Research and Policy Seminar

**Economics Major Advisor**, 2018-2019, Columbia University

**Research Assistant**, 2016, Columbia University [*with Prof. Nakamura*]

**Associate Analyst**, 2014-2016, NERA Economic Consulting

**Research Assistant**, 2013-2014, Vassar College [*with Prof. Ruud*]

**Research Assistant**, 2012-2013, Vassar College [*with Prof. Johnson*]

**Editor-in-Chief**, 2012-2013, *The Miscellany News*, Vassar College

### PERSONAL

Full name: David Abraham Rosenkranz	Birth Year: 1992
Citizenship: USA	Languages: English (nat.), Russian (conv.)

# Arpita Saluja

September 2021

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Phone +1 (917)403-3552  
<https://sites.google.com/view/arpitasaluja>

## Placement Chairs

Donald Davis: [drd28@columbia.edu](mailto:drd28@columbia.edu)  
Suresh Naidu: [sn2430@columbia.edu](mailto:sn2430@columbia.edu)

## Placement Assistant

Amy Devine, (212) 854-6881  
[aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu)

## EDUCATION

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### Columbia University

Ph.D. in Economics	<i>(expected)</i> 2022
M.Phil. in Economics	2018
M.A. in Economics	2017

### University of Delhi, India

M.A. in Economics, <i>Gold Medal</i>	2012
B.A. (Hons) in Economics, <i>Gold Medal</i>	2010

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

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Labour, Organizational Economics, Development Economics, Political Economy

## JOB MARKET PAPER

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### Mentoring and Incentives

Managers play an important role in the human capital development of junior employees through mentoring initiatives and on-the-job training programs. However, little attention has been paid to the trade-off managers face in allocating their time between two competing tasks: production of own output and mentoring of juniors. This paper examines this question using a stylized model of multi-tasking and data of the elite civil servants in India where newly junior bureaucrats undergo training in district administration under a district head. The decentralized structure of administration creates a natural variation in the distance of district heads to their own supervisors. Exploiting this variation along with the random assignment of junior officers, I find that district heads that are in closer proximity to their supervisors and more easily monitored, exert relatively less effort in mentoring and more on their own output production. These differences in mentoring translate into long-term differences in productivity and effectiveness of juniors bureaucrats. Juniors that receive less mentoring are more likely to be suspended and less likely to take up training programs in future. Finally, I show that a country-wide policy reform that was introduced to bring greater transparency to the performance evaluation process distorts the incentives of district heads thereby leading to an unintended impact on the mentoring of junior employees.

## WORK IN PROGRESS

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Violence and Participation of Minorities in Social Programs  
Peer Diversity and Bureaucratic Performance

## FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

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Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University	2020
Development Colloquium Grant, Columbia University	2019
Dean's Fellowship, Columbia University	2015-2020
Shri Ram Behari Rohatagi Memorial Gold Medal, Hira Lal Bhargava Gold Medal & K.C. Nag Memorial Prize, University of Delhi	2012
All India Post Graduate Scholarship, University Grants Commission	2011
Shri Mudiylpadmanabha Pillai Memorial Gold Medal, Vidyavati & Sohanlal Nayyar Gold Medal & Erachshah Maneckji Nanavutty Memorial Prize, University of Delhi	2010

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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### Instructor

Industrial Organization	Summer 2018, 2019
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### Teaching Assistant

Public Economics	Spring 2021
Industrial Organization	Fall 2019, 2016-2017
Principles of Economics	Fall 2017, 2018-2019

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND WORK EXPERIENCE

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Research Assistant to Suresh Naidu, Columbia University	Summer 2017
Research Assistant to Bharat Ramaswami, Indian Statistical Institute	2014-2015
Analyst, Human Capital Analytics, Accenture Management Consulting	2012-2014

## FIELD WORK

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Pilot surveys of Potato cold storage owners (Agra, Uttar Pradesh)	IFPRI, 2014-2015
Surveys of Dairy farm owners (Punjab, Haryana) and retailers (Delhi)	

## PERSONAL

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Skills : STATA, Python, R, SAS, VBA  
Citizenship: India, Canadian Permanent Resident

## REFERENCES

---

### Suresh Naidu

Professor of Economics, Columbia University  
Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University  
sn2430@columbia.edu

### Michael Best

Assistant Professor of Economics, Columbia University  
michael.best@columbia.edu

### Jonas Hjort

Associate Professor of Economics  
Columbia University, Graduate School of Business  
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# SARA SHAHANAGHI

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Placement Administrator: Amy Devine [aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu), (212) 854-6881

## References

**Yeon-Koo Che**  
(co-advisor)  
Kelvin J. Lancaster  
Professor of Economics  
Columbia University  
[yc2271@columbia.edu](mailto:yc2271@columbia.edu)  
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**Navin Kartik**  
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Professor of Economics  
Columbia University  
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(212)854-3926

**Andrea Prat**  
Professor of Economics and R. P.  
Richman Professor of Business  
Columbia University  
[ap3116@gsb.columbia.edu](mailto:ap3116@gsb.columbia.edu)  
(212)854-6176

## Fields of Specialization

Economic Theory, Dynamic Games, Information Economics, Media Economics

## Education

May 2022 (expected)  
2014

Ph.D. Economics  
B.A. Math and Economics

Columbia University  
Brandeis University

## Job Market Paper

### [Competition and Errors in Breaking News](#)

*Abstract:* Reporting errors are endemic to breaking news, even though accuracy is prized by consumers. I present a continuous-time model to understand the strategic forces behind such reporting errors. News firms are rewarded for reporting before their competitors, but also for making reports that are credible in the eyes of consumers. Errors occur when firms *fake*, reporting a story despite lacking evidence. I establish existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium, which is characterized by a system of ordinary differential equations. Errors are driven by both a lack of commitment and by competition. A lack of commitment power gives rise to errors even in the absence of competition: firms are tempted to fake after their credibility has been established, capitalizing on the inability of consumers to detect fake reports. Competition exacerbates faking by engendering a preemptive motive. In addition, competition introduces observational learning, which causes errors to propagate through the market. The equilibrium features rich dynamics. Firms become gradually more credible over time whenever there is a preemptive motive. The increase in credibility rewards firms for taking their time, and thus endogenously mitigates the haste-inducing effects of preemption. A firm's behavior will also change in response to a rival report. This can take the form of a *copycat effect*, in which one firm's report triggers an immediate surge in faking by others.

## Working Papers

### Reputation in News Media: Speed vs. Accuracy

*Abstract:* We study news firms' reporting behavior, including their propensity to misreport, when they are reputation driven. In our model, a news firm (sender) dynamically learns about a state and reports to a consumer (receiver). Senders are concerned with their reputation at the end of the game and must choose when to time their report. We find that in equilibrium, the sender fakes, i.e., report despite being ignorant of the state, with positive probability in every period. This faking in turn leads to a higher level of misreporting than if the sender were instead truthful. We further find the sender's reputation is endogenously rewarded for both speed and accuracy, and thus we provide a microfoundation to the speed-accuracy tradeoff in the news media setting. Finally, we consider the dynamics in the sender's strategy, finding that the sender becomes more truthful, and thus less prone to misreporting, as time passes.

## Works in Progress

### Dynamic Reputation-Driven Media Bias

*Abstract:* We study the dynamics of reputation-driven media bias. To this end, we present a dynamic model of reputation-driven media bias. A firm privately learns about an issue in increments and reports to a consumer with each new piece of information. With each new report, the consumer updates her beliefs about the firm's information quality, i.e., the firm's reputation. Firms are forward-looking and thus take into account both their immediate and future reputations when reporting. Nonetheless, we establish that equilibrium reporting behavior is identical for myopic and forward-looking firms. In equilibrium, firms bias their reports, and this bias is shown to be driven by two separate factors. First, firms can appear more reputable by appealing to a consumer's prior bias (the *prior effect*). Separately firms with reports that are more consistent across time are viewed more favorably (the *consistency effect*). The relative importance of the consistency effect grows over time as the firm accumulates a richer history of reports.

### News Accuracy and Speed: Theory and Experiment (with Silvio Ravaoli)

*Recipient of 2021 IFREE Grant*

### Preemption and Private Learning

## Work Experience

Research Assistant, Columbia University

Yeon-Koo Che	2019-2021
Andrea Prat	2018
Jacopo Perego	Summer 2019
Bentley MacLeod	Summer 2017

Research Associate, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Macroeconomic and Monetary Studies, Research and Statistics Division	2014-2016
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**Teaching Fellow**

Game Theory (undergraduate)	Fall 2018, Fall 2019, Spring 2020, Fall 2020
Microeconomic Theory (undergraduate)	Spring 2018, Spring 2019
Industrial Organization (undergraduate)	Fall 2017
Economics of the Environment (undergraduate)	Summer 2017

**Honors and Awards**

Caswell L. Johnson Fellowship	Columbia University	2021
Dissertation Fellowship	Columbia University	2021
Dean's Fellowship	Columbia University	2016-2020
Summer Fellowship	Microeconomic Theory Initiative, Columbia University	2020
Research Fellowship	Program for Economic Research, Columbia University	Summers 2017, 2018, 2020
Sidney H. Cohen Award for Best Undergraduate Thesis	Department of Economics, Brandeis University	2014

# MAGGIE SHI

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[www.maggie-shi.com](http://www.maggie-shi.com)

Last updated: November 8, 2021

## PLACEMENT CHAIRS:

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Suresh Naidu, 212-854-0027, [sn2430@columbia.edu](mailto:sn2430@columbia.edu)

PLACEMENT ASSISTANT: Amy Devine, 212-854-6881, [aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu)

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## EDUCATION

PhD	Columbia University Economics	2016 - 2022
BA	Rice University Mathematical Economic Analysis and Statistics <i>magna cum laude</i>	2012 - 2016

## FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

*Primary Field:* Public Economics; *Secondary Field:* Health Economics

## JOB MARKET PAPER

### [The Costs and Benefits of Monitoring Providers: Evidence from Medicare Audits](#)

*Abstract:* This paper examines the extent to which government programs should monitor for wasteful expenditure when outsourcing to third parties, taking into account the costs and savings associated with monitoring. I use novel administrative data to study the largest Medicare monitoring program aimed at identifying unnecessary inpatient admissions and reclaiming payments for them. I exploit plausibly exogenous variation across hospitals and across patients, and find that the majority of savings are due to the deterrence of future admissions. I do not find evidence that the marginal patient denied admission is harmed, suggesting that hospitals fine-tune their response to target unnecessary care. But in doing so, they incur compliance costs and adopt technology specifically aimed at assessing the medical necessity of care. For every \$1,000 in savings to Medicare, hospitals incur \$216 in compliance costs. My welfare calculations imply that despite the costs, increasing monitoring improves welfare.

## WORKING PAPERS

### [Regulated Revenues and Hospital Behavior: Evidence from a Medicare Overhaul](#) *(submitted)*

with [Tal Gross](#), [Adam Sacarny](#), and [David Silver](#)

*Abstract:* We study a 2008 policy reform in which Medicare revised its hospital payment system to better reflect patients' severity of illness. We construct a simulated instrument that predicts a hospital's policy-induced change in reimbursement using pre-reform patients and post-reform rules. The reform led to large persistent changes in Medicare payment rates across hospitals. Hospitals that faced larger gains in Medicare reimbursement increased the volume of Medicare patients they treated. The estimates imply a volume elasticity of 1.2. To accommodate greater volume, hospitals increased nurse employment, but also lowered length of stay, with ambiguous effects on quality.

### [Job Lock, Retirement, and Dependent Health Insurance: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act](#)

*Abstract:* The 2010 Affordable Care Act expanded health insurance coverage to dependents up to age 26, allowing some parents to add adult children to their employer-sponsored plans. I leverage this policy to understand the role adult children play in their parents' labor supply and consider a potential spillover of the dependent mandate policy to parents: did parents delay retirement to take advantage of the policy? I find that affected parents' retirement rate fell by 3.8 percentage points after policy enactment, causing them to delay retirement by 0.74 years on average. An estimated 290,000 parents delayed retirement in order to obtain coverage for their children.

### [Free to Spend? The Effect of Decentralization on Local Governments](#)

with [Andrea Tulli](#)

*Abstract:* This paper considers whether decentralization of tax revenue to local governments affects their budgetary decisions. We study a 2012 Italian decentralization reform which (1) expanded municipalities' discretion in setting property tax rates, and (2) increased the share of the budget a municipality is responsible for raising through taxes. We exploit the unexpected nature and differential impact of the reform to document three findings. First, we use novel data on the tax rate the national government would have chosen in a centralized setting and compare it to the actual local tax rates municipalities chose, and find heterogeneity in how municipalities used their newfound discretion. Second, we find that municipalities responsible for raising a greater share of their budget raise more revenue and spend the additional resources on public services. Third, we show how political competition at the local level shapes the response. Municipalities with lower political competition spend less in public services, but more on administration and remuneration of public officials.

## WORKS IN PROGRESS

### Medical Necessity and the Cost and Quality of Healthcare

with [\*Ashvin Gandhi\*](#)

*Research Question:* How does requiring healthcare providers to demonstrate medical necessity change the cost and quality of care they provide?

### What Determines Compliance with Hospital Pricing Transparency Laws?

with [\*Ben Chartock\*](#)

*Research Question:* Hospitals are required by law to disclose prices, yet many do not comply with this law -- what are the market-level and hospital-level determinants of compliance, and what does this imply about the usefulness of price transparency laws?

## AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

R36 Dissertation Fellowship	2020 - 2022
Health Services Research Dissertation Program	
Agency for Health Research and Quality	
Harriss Prize	2018
Best second-year paper	
Columbia University	
Dean's Fellowship and Faculty Fellowship	2016 -2022
Columbia University	
Peter Mieszkowski Prize for Honors Program Research	2016
Rice University	

## GRANTS

Columbia Applied Microeconomics Colloquium Data Grant	2019
Columbia Applied Microeconomics Colloquium Travel Grant	2019
Columbia Program for Economic Research Travel Grant	2019
Columbia Program for Economic Research Data Grant (2x)	2018, 2019

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

The American Economy (Halbac)	F2018, F2019, F2020
Intermediate Microeconomics (Vergote)	S2019, S2020
Principles of Economics (Miller, Zaniboni)	F2017, S2018

## RESEARCH ASSISTANTSHIP

Adam Sacarny	2019
Michael Best, François Gerard	2018 - 2020

## INVITED PRESENTATIONS

ASSA, EEA, APPAM Student Research Series, Columbia HPM, ASHEcon, WEAI Graduate Student Workshop, EHEC, Congressional Budget Office, SHESG, SEA*, NTA*, Rice University*, APPAM* (* <i>scheduled</i> )	2021
YES, NTA	2020
ASHEcon, SOLE	2019

## OTHER ACTIVITIES

Panel on the Path to Economics and Related PhDs -- <i>panelist</i>	2020
Health Economics Bootcamp Alumni Online Workshop -- <i>organizer</i>	2020
NBER Health Economics Bootcamp -- <i>invited attendee</i>	2019
Columbia Applied Microeconomics Reading Group -- <i>organizer</i>	2019

## CITIZENSHIP

USA

## REFERENCES

Wojciech Kopczuk Professor Department of Economics and School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University <a href="mailto:wk2110@columbia.edu">wk2110@columbia.edu</a>	Adam Sacarny Assistant Professor Department of Health Policy and Management Mailman School of Public Health Columbia University <a href="mailto:ajs2102@columbia.edu">ajs2102@columbia.edu</a>
Michael Best Assistant Professor Department of Economics Columbia University <a href="mailto:mcb2270@columbia.edu">mcb2270@columbia.edu</a>	Pietro Tebaldi Assistant Professor Department of Economics Columbia University <a href="mailto:pt2571@columbia.edu">pt2571@columbia.edu</a>

# JOO-HYUNG (GRACE) SHIN

November 18, 2021

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Placement Administrator: Amy Devine, (+1) 212-854-6881, aed2152@columbia.edu

## EDUCATION

2022 (expected)	Ph.D. in Economics, Columbia University
2018	M.Phil. in Economics, Columbia University
2017	M.A. in Economics, Columbia University
2015	M.A. in Economics, Yonsei University
2013	B.A. in Economics, Yonsei University
Fall 2011	Undergraduate Exchange Program, University of California, Berkeley
–Spring 2012	

## AWARDS

2020–2021	Dissertation Fellowship, Columbia University
2015–2020	Dean’s Fellowship, Columbia University

## FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Labor Economics, Macroeconomics

## JOB MARKET PAPER

### **“Occupation Specificity and the Decline in the Aggregate Job Separation Rate”**

*Abstract:* The long-run decline in the aggregate job separation rate in the United States has been documented in the literature. This paper proposes that the increase in occupation-specific training, which results in human capital becoming less transferable across occupations, explains the falling aggregate job separation rate. I do a shift-share decomposition of the decline in the aggregate job separation rate to find that it is accounted for mostly by the within-occupation increase in required occupation-specific training. Then I build a search-and-matching model where the increase in occupation-specific training within occupations reduces job separations. The model predicts 60% of the decline in the aggregate job separation rate. When occupations become more specific, human capital acquired from one occupation becomes less transferable to another, resulting in larger wage cuts for occupation switchers. Occupation switchers must also undergo a longer period of occupation-specific training in their new occupation, during which they earn low wages. In the model, after occupations become more specific, workers separate less to avoid switching occupations, accepting lower wages at their current job at the same level of productivity.

# JOO-HYUNG (GRACE) SHIN

November 18, 2021

## WORK IN PROGRESS

### **“Occupation Specificity, Endogenous Occupation Switching, and Unemployment Duration”**

*Abstract:* It is documented in the literature that the average unemployment duration has increased in the United States. This paper studies how the increase in occupation-specific training results in longer unemployment spells. I do a shift-share decomposition to find that the observed increase in the average unemployment duration is driven by the within-occupation increase in required occupation-specific training. Then I build a search-and-matching model where the increase in occupation-specific training within occupations lengthens unemployment duration. The model predicts all of the increase in the average unemployment duration. In the model, the longer unemployment spells come from the unemployed workers who are trained in their previous occupation. They become less motivated to switch occupations because their human capital has become more specific to their previous occupation. If they switch occupations, they could quickly end their unemployment spell. This would, however, come at the cost of larger wage cuts because their human capital has become less transferable to other occupations. Occupation switchers would also have to earn these lower wages for a longer time until they become trained in their new occupation. Hence, despite a low probability of becoming employed in the same occupation as before, previously trained workers increasingly choose to not switch occupations. This results in longer average unemployment duration.

## PUBLICATIONS

**“A Simple Correction of Gini Estimates Using Tax Return Data”** (with So-Hye Yoon and Tae-Hwan Kim), *The Review of Social & Economic Studies*, 2020, Vol. 63, No. 1, pp.1–38. (in Korean)

**“Top Income Shares Based on Household Income and Expenditure Survey Data”** (with Yunmi Kim and Tae-Hwan Kim), *The Korean Journal of Economics*, 2015, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 87–97. (in Korean)

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

September 2016  
–May 2020

Teaching Assistant, Columbia University

- (Master’s Level) International Economics (Spring 2019)
- (Master’s Level) Macroeconomic Analysis II (Spring 2018)
- Financial Economics (Fall 2019)
- Money and Banking (Fall 2017, Spring 2020)
- Intermediate Macroeconomics (Fall 2016, Spring 2017, Fall 2018)

# **JOO-HYUNG (GRACE) SHIN**

November 18, 2021

## **RESEARCH EXPERIENCE**

- |                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| July 2016<br>–August 2016 | Research Assistant to Professor Christian Moser, Columbia Business School <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Worked with Brazilian microdata (Brazil National Household Sample Survey and Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey) to construct inequality time series and labor market transition rates</li><li>• Wrote the dictionary files and relevant codes to import Brazilian microdata into Stata</li></ul> |
| August 2014               | Young Scientist at the 5th Lindau Nobel Laureate Meeting on Economic Sciences  |

## **OTHER EXPERIENCES**

- |                              |  |
|------------------------------|--|
| September 2009<br>–June 2011 | The Yonsei Annals, Republic of Korea <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Monthly English-language news magazine of Yonsei University</li><li>• Editor of Research, Photo, Campus Affairs, Global Affairs, Culture Divisions (March 2011–June 2011)</li><li>• Reporter (September 2009–December 2010)</li></ul> |
|------------------------------|--|

## **OTHER INFORMATION**

Programming:	Stata, Matlab, R
Citizenship:	United States, Republic of Korea

## **REFERENCES**

**Suresh Naidu**  
Professor of Economics and  
International and Public Affairs  
Columbia University  
sn2430@columbia.edu

**Bernard Salanié**  
Professor of Economics  
Columbia University  
bs2237@columbia.edu

**Andrés Drenik**  
Assistant Professor of Economics  
The University of Texas at Austin  
andres.drenik@austin.utexas.edu



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Placement Assistant: Amy Devine, [aed2152@columbia.edu](mailto:aed2152@columbia.edu), (212) 854-6881

## EDUCATION

---

**Columbia University**, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

<b>Ph.D.</b> in Economics	(expected) May 2022
<b>M. Phil.</b> in Economics	May 2019
<b>M.A.</b> in Economics	May 2018

**University of California, San Diego**

<b>B.S.</b> in Mathematics and Economics ( <i>magna cum laude</i> )	June 2015
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## FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

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Primary Fields: Applied Microeconomics, Environmental Economics

Secondary Fields: Industrial Organization

## FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

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Dean's Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University, 2016 onwards  
Applied Micro Research Methods Colloquium Grant, Columbia University, 2019 and 2020  
Program for Economics Research Grant, Columbia University, 2019  
Center for Development Economics and Policy Grant, 2019  
Joint Math-Econ Major Award, UCSD, 2015

## JOB MARKET PAPER

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### “Heat of the Moment? The Effect of Temperature on Police Racial Leniency”

Police officers often exercise substantial discretion when making highly consequential decisions, which can lead to unfair and arbitrary law enforcement. In this paper, I exploit daily ambient temperature as a source of transitory, high-frequency shocks and examine how it affects an officer's decision whether to discount a driver's speeding penalty in Florida. I find that a 1-standard-deviation increase in temperature lowers the driver's probability of receiving a lenient ticket by 2%. In addition, using traffic monitoring data and crash reports, I do not find evidence of decreased police effort or increased reckless driving on hot days. I show that the reduction in leniency is disproportionately borne by white drivers, who are less likely to get a discounted penalty from white officers as the temperature increases. In addition, I find that newly hired officers become less affected by temperature as they accumulate more experience on the job. For a potential mechanism, I find a negative effect of temperature on expressed sentiment using posts from an online police forum based in Florida, which suggests that the result could be due to increased officer hostility.

## **WORKING PAPERS**

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**“The Effect of Trade War on Pollution in China”** with Xinming Du

**“The Effect of Regional Emission Standards on Pollution Leakage in China”**

## **RESEARCH ASSISTANCE**

---

Douglas Almond, Columbia University, 2018-2019

Tobias Salz, Columbia University, 2017

Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 2015-2016

Behavioral Lab, UCSD, 2013

## **TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

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Introduction to Econometrics, Spring 2019, Fall 2019, Spring 2018, Fall 2017

Principles of Economics, Spring 2020, Fall 2018

Industrial Organization, Fall 2020, Summer 2018

## **REFERENCES**

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