Columbia University Market Design Initiative

Dynamic Matching and Queueing Workshop

Thursday, April 29th
& Friday, April 30th

A Zoom Event
Registration Required
econ.columbia.edu

@Columbia_Econ
@Columbiaecon
Columbia Department of Economics

April 29th:

9:00 AM (EST) - "Dynamic Model of Matching"
Pauline Corblet (Science Po), Jeremy Fox (Rice), Alfred Galichon (NYU)

10:00 AM (EST) - "The Value of Time: Evidence from Auctioned Cab Rides"
Nicholas Buchholz (Princeton), Laura Doval (Columbia), Jakub Kastl (Princeton), Filip Matejka (CERGE), and Tobias Salz (MIT)

11:00 AM (EST) - Coffee Break

11:15 AM (EST) - "The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets"
Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford), Yeganeh Alimohammadi (Stanford), Shengwu Li (Harvard), Amin Saberi (Stanford)

12:15 PM (EST) - "Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design"
Itai Ashlagi (Stanford), Faidra Monachou (Stanford), and Afshin Nikzad (USC)

1:15 PM (EST) - Social Gathering

April 30th:

9:00 AM (EST) - "Stable Assignments and Search Frictions"
Stephan Lauermann (Bonn), Georg Nöldeke (Basel)

10:00 AM (EST) - "Optimal Queue Design"
Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia) and Olivier Tercieux (PSE)

11:00 AM (EST) - Coffee Break

11:15 AM (EST) - "Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets"
Itai Ashalgi (Stanford), Afshin Nikzad (USC), and Philipp Strack (Yale)

12:15 PM (EST) - "Asymptotically Optimal Control of a Centralized Dynamic Matching Market with General Utilities"
Jose Blanchet (Stanford), Martin Reiman (Columbia), Virag Shah (Uber), and Larry Wein (Stanford)

1:15 PM (EST) - Social Gathering

Organizers:

Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia) and Olivier Tercieux (PSE)