DANIEL MARK DEIBLER

website: https://sites.google.com/view/ddeibler/home
email: dmd2195@columbia.edu
phone: (646)710-0533
address: 420 W 118th Street, #1022, New York, NY 10027

Placement Chairs

Don Davis
drd28@columbia.edu

Suresh Naidu
sn2430@columbia.edu

Placement Assistant

Amy Devine
aed2152@columbia.edu

Research Interests

Labor Economics, Public Economics, Economics of Education, Law and Economics

References

Professor W. Bentley Macleod	Professor Suresh Naidu	Professor and Chair Miguel Urquiola
Columbia University	Columbia University	Columbia University
bentley.macleod@columbia.edu	sn2430@columbia.edu	msu2101@columbia.edu

Education

2015-PRES. **Columbia University**
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics, Expected: May 2022
Dissertation Title: What Makes a Good Job? Essays in Labor Economics
Masters of Philosophy, 2018
Masters of Arts, 2017

2010-2014 **Washington University in St. Louis**
Bachelor's of Arts: Summa Cum Laude, 2014

Job Market Paper

The Effect of Outsourcing on Remaining Workers, Rent Distribution, and Inequality

Firms can decide whether to produce some goods and services in-house or purchase them from the market. Increasingly, they are purchasing from the market—using subcontractors, temp agencies, and other outsourced labor. Low-wage workers' wages decline when they are outsourced, but little is known about how outsourcing affects remaining workers. If firms are rent sharing, outsourcing might increase remaining workers' earnings because there are more rents or fewer workers to share them with. This paper measures the impact of occupational layoff (OL) outsourcing, where firms outsource some occupations, on the earnings and separations of workers who remain employed by those firms. Using employer-employee data based on German social security records in a dynamic difference-in-differences design, outsourcing increases remaining workers' long-run earnings by 6% in a sample of 260 OL outsourcing events. Remainers are also more likely to stay at the outsourcing firm. Higher earnings and lower separations is consistent with remainers receiving additional rents. Earnings gains are larger for workers in the bottom-half of the within-firm wage distribution. When comparing effects of outsourcing by collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), outsourcing increases remainers' long-term earnings by 6% in firms with CBAs, and lowers short-term earnings by 3% in firms without CBAs. These results are consistent with a model of wage setting where firms compensate remainers in the presence of a CBA. When there is no CBA, firms do not compensate remainers, and can lower their wages. Analyzing the impact of outsourcing on within-firm and overall wage inequality, a typical outsourcing event in the sample lowers

the within-firm gini index by 5% as low-wage workers leave the firm and low-wage remainers are compensated. 11.7% of workers are part of an outsourcing event. Using Recentered Influence Functions, a 1% increase in the share of workers part of an outsourcing event increases earnings at the top of the distribution by approximately 10-15%, and the overall gini index by 10%. Remainers are relative high-wage, and outsourcing increases their earnings. By not accounting for this effect, prior studies likely underestimate the total impact of outsourcing on wage inequality.

Working Papers

"What's in a Name? How Definitions of "Employee" Shape Worker-Firm Relationships" *[joint with Elliott Ash. Supported by NSF Award Number 1949415]*

This paper provides causal evidence on how changing the legal boundaries of employment—whether a worker is defined as a firm's "employee" versus an outside contractor—affects labor market outcomes. We introduce a dataset of all U.S. Circuit Court cases making substantive employment determinations for the years 1990-2018 and link them to state- and occupation-level data on employment and earnings. Our difference-in-differences analysis reveals how employee definitions impact firm structure: when courts give workers additional legal rights by declaring them "employees", low-wage workers are more likely to be outsourced. For occupations where effort is more easily monitored (e.g. janitors, guards), "is-employee" determinations increase outsourcing and reduce earnings. For occupations where effort cannot be monitored easily (e.g. doctors, scientists, engineers), employment declines and workers are more likely to be independent contractors.

"Why Choose Alternative Work Arrangements? The Effect of Labor Demand Shocks on AWAs in the U.S. Labor Market" *[supported by the DOL Scholars Program]*

Alternative work arrangements (AWAs) are employment contracts where workers have fewer legal protections relative to traditional employment. I analyze the effect of economic downturns on AWA prevalence using two negative labor demand shocks. In a framework with uncertainty and fixed labor costs, I find that negative labor demand shocks reduce the probability that workers are in AWAs. The largest declines in AWAs occur in industries most affected by the shocks. This result suggests that AWAs are more marginal employment contracts, and are mostly let go during downturns.

"Keep Going to School: The Effect of Social Promotion on Wage Response to Childhood Labor"

Research has shown that when wages increase, families are less likely to send their children to school. I explore whether the uncertainty about children's success in school can explain part of this behavior. India's "No Detention Policy", enacted in 2010, required Social Promotion – automatic promotion regardless of test results – up to grade 8. I exploit pre-2010 variation in states with Social Promotion, and random wage shocks, to explore whether families are less likely to respond to wage shocks after Social Promotion is implemented. I find that without Social Promotion, higher wages increased dropout probability by 5%. With Social Promotion, higher wages decreased dropout probability by 1.1%, a sign switch and 80% decline in absolute effect. I find no effect on attendance, suggesting no intensive-margin response. These results illustrate that responses to wage shocks can depend on existing education policy, and that families internalize the likelihood of schooling success.

Grants and Awards

2020 National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement Grant

2019 Wueller Pre-Dissertation Award, Columbia University

2018 Runner up – Columbia University Vickrey Award for Best 3rd Year Paper

2017 Department of Labor Scholars Program Grant

2015 Columbia University Graduate Fellowship

2015 Columbia University Graduate Summer Fellowship

2014 Adam Smith Prize for Excellence in Economics, Washington University

Presentations (including upcoming)

2021 Columbia University Applied Micro Workshop

2021 Society of Labor Economics (SOLE)

2020 ETH Zurich

Columbia University Applied Micro Workshop

Society of Institutional and Organizational Economics

2019 Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium

W.E. Upjohn Institute Visiting Presentation

3rd IZA Conference on Contract Work

Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium

2018 Midwestern Economics Association

Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium

Briq Workshop on Firms, Jobs, and Inequality

Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium

2017 Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium

Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium

2016 Columbia University Applied Micro Colloquium

Research and Professional Experience

2019 W.E. Upjohn Institute, Visiting Researcher

2018-2019 Columbia University, Research Assistant for Professor Francois Gerard

2016-2019 Columbia University, Research Assistant for Professor W. Bentley MacLeod

2014-2015 NERA Economic Consulting, Research Associate

Teaching Experience

Fall 2021 Intermediate Microeconomics
Professor: Prajit Dutta
Position: Teaching Assistant

Fall 2020 Introduction to Microeconomics
Professor: Prajit Dutta
Position: Teaching Assistant

Spring 2019 Seminar in Political Economy
Professor: W. Bentley MacLeod
Position: Teaching Assistant

Spring 2017 Intermediate Microeconomics
Professor: Jonathan Vogel
Position: Teaching Assistant

Fall 2016 Intermediate Microeconomics
Professor: Pietro Ortoleva
Position: Teaching Assistant

Other Skills

Skills: STATA, R, MATLAB